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ABSTRACT 
DYNAMICS OF THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN TURKEY AND USA: 
          THE SOUTH CAUCASUS CASE 
AYHAN, HALİL SIDDIK 
M.A. In International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
July 2003, 222 pages 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus presented several 
opportunities and challenges in the political, economic and military domains to the US 
as the unique superpower of the world, and to Turkey as a regional power. Though there  
occurred several crises in the Turkish-American alliance from its outset,  both states 
whose interests converged; encouraging the development of democratic pro-Western 
regimes and free-market economy, hindering ethnic conflicts, expanding NATO’s 
membership, blocking  monopolization of  oil export routes in the Caucasus, securing  
oil reserves in the Caspian, preventing the  rebuilding of the Russian Empire and falling 
the newly independent states of the South Caucasus from falling into the hegemony of 
Russia and Iran, keeping Iran’s fundamentalist regime in check, and  pursuing active 
politics in the South Caucasus as a duty for the sake of their own global and regional 
interests. But, there had been also differences in the allies’ politics as in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. 
 
However, the South Caucasian states, including Azerbaijan, Armenia and 
Georgia  faced enormous difficulties in enhancing their national security, implementing 
the process of state building and improving their economic situation after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union and therefore, independence for these states did not initially provide 
political stability. Internal conflicts, and  Russia’s imperialist policies undermined these 
states’  efforts in order to be  strong and  independent states,  and  they could not   cope 
with the challenges of the new geopolitical and economic environment due to the lack 
of  their own military power, and  strong economy. Thereupon, these states’ first years 
of independence have been fraught with economic, political, and social difficulties. But 
the vigorous efforts of the US and Turkey prevented the South Caucasian states from 
falling into Russian hegemony  and accelerated  state-building process of these 
countries as examined in this study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: Turkey, United States, US, Caucasus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, 
Armenia, alliance , military, energy, oil, security, interest. 
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ÖZET 
TÜRKİYE-AMERİKA MÜTTEFİKLİĞİNİN DİNAMİKLERİNİN GÜNEY 
KAFKASYA BOYUTUNDA İNCELENMESİ  
AYHAN, HALİL SIDDIK 
Uluslararası İlişkiler Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Danışmanı: Asst. Prof. Dr. Nur Bilge Criss 
Temmuz 2003, 222 Sayfa 
 
Sovyetler Birliğinin yıkılmasıyla birlikte Güney Kafkasya, dünyanın tek süper 
gücü olan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’ne ve bölgesel bir güç olan Türkiye’ye 
siyasi,ekonomik ve askeri alanlarda bazı  zorluklar ve  fırsatlar sundu. Türkiye-Amerika 
ittifakında başlangıcından itibaren bazı krizler yaşanmış olsa da, Güney Kafkasya’da 
demokratik batı yanlısı rejimleri ve serbest pazar ekonomisini teşvik etmek, etnik 
kargaşaları önlemek, NATO’nun genişleme sürecini desteklemek, Hazar bölgesindeki 
petrol rezervlerini korumak, petrol ihraç hatlarının tekelleştirilmesini,  tekrar Rusya 
İmparatorluğunun ortaya çıkmasını ve Güney Kafkasya’nın yeni bağımsız olan 
devletlerinin Rusya ve İran’ın hegemonyasına girmesini önlemek, İran’ın aşırı tutucu 
rejimini kontrol altında tutmak gibi  ortak paydaları olan müttefikler, bölgesel ve 
küresel çıkarları için aktif bir politika izlemeyi öngördüler. Fakat, Dağlık Karabağ 
çatışması gibi bazı konularda müttefiklerin politikalarında farklılıklar da oldu.   
 
Bununla birlikte, Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasının ertesinde Azerbaycan, 
Ermenistan ve Gürcistan’dan oluşan Güney Kafkasya ülkeleri, ulusal güvenliklerini 
sağlamak, ekonomilerini sağlamlaştırmak ve devlet olabilmek için gereken adımları 
atmada çok büyük güçlüklerle karşılaştılar ve bu yüzden, başlangıçta özgürlük bu 
ülkeler için siyasi istikrar sağlamadı. Etnik kargaşalar, Rusya’nın emperyalist 
politikaları bu ülkelerin güçlü ve özgür birer devlet olma yolundaki çabalarını baltaladı 
ve bu ülkeler askeri güç ve ekonomilerinin yetersizliklerinden dolayı yeni jeopolitik ve 
ekonomik çevrenin zorluklarıyla baş edemediler. Dolayısıyla, bu devletlerin ilk 
özgürlük yılları siyasi, ekonomik ve askeri zorluklarla geçti. Fakat, bu çalışmada 
anlatıldığı gibi Türkiye ve Amerika Birleşik Devletlerinin gayretli çabaları, Güney 
Kafkasya devletlerinin Rusya’nın hegemonyasına girmesini önledi ve bu ülkelerin 
devlet olabilme süreçlerini hızlandırdı.  
  
 
 
 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, US, Kafkasya, 
Gürcistan, Azerbaycan, Ermenistan,  müttefik, askeri, enerji, petrol, güvenlik, 
çıkar. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In this thesis,  dynamics of the alliance between Turkey and the United States of 
America is examined but  the scope of this study is  restricted to examining the case of the 
South Caucasus between 1990 and 2003. In this study, after examining the Turkish-American 
alliance and general situation in the South Caucasus in a chronological order as introductory 
background, the similarities and differences of the global interests of the US and regional 
interests of Turkey in the South Caucasus will be presented. Within the framework of this 
topic,  this study is prepared to give answers to the questions stated below: 
• Which factors led to the formation of the Turkish-American alliance and which 
problems arose in the alliance up to now ? 
• Which difficulties did the South Caucasian states meet in enhancing their national 
security, implementing the process of state building, improving their economic situation and  
constituting their military forces after the dissolution of Soviet Union ? 
• What are the general characteristics of the allies’ politics toward the South 
Caucasian states between 1990 and 2003 ? 
• What are the conflicting and converging interests of the allies’ politics in the region? 
• What are the military activities of the US and Turkey in the South Caucasus? 
This thesis consists of four chapters. The first chapter  starts with the definition of 
alliance. After analyzing the concept of alliance,  factors that were effective in the formation 
and development of the alliance such as the Soviet threat, military and economic aid, strategic 
reasons and Turkey’s westernization policy is clarified. Then later, significant events such as  
the Truman Doctrine, Turkey’s acceptance in NATO and  incidents that caused crises or that 
Turkey  suffered from will be touched upon shortly to present the evolution of the alliance up 
to now. These events are mainly; the 1955 Baghdad Pact, 1962 Jupiter Missile Crisis,  1964 
Johnson letter, 1960-1965 U-2 crises and the problems that the American bases and military 
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personnel caused in that period, 1970 Poppy problem, 1975-1978 Arms embargo and 1991 
Gulf War. Finally,  why  the alliance endured despite these crises above is evaluated in this 
chapter. 
Chapter II analyzes the general political, economic and military situation in the South 
Caucasus states. While examining Georgia, factors that undermined political stability of 
Georgia such as  ethnic conflicts, Russia’s pressure and interference in Georgia’s internal 
affairs  is clarified. In the case of Azerbaijan , the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which caused  
to lose 20 percent of its  territory and Azerbaijani leaders’ ideological policies, which 
endangered Azerbaijan’s national security is discussed. As for Armenia, the domestic policy 
of Armenia including   the effect of diaspora  and  its foreign policy that differentiated  it from 
Georgia and Azerbaijan’s foreign policy , because of  its close relationship with Russia, is 
explained. In addition, the oil reserves of Azerbaijan, oil export routes, especially the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the evolution of these states’ armed forces, and the efforts of 
these states in the economic domain  will be emphasized. 
 The third chapter puts forward the US and Turkey’s policies toward the South 
Caucasus  in the aftermath of the demise of the Warsaw Pact and then of the Soviet Union.  
This chapter begins with explaining the changing priority in American policy towards the 
South Caucasus  from placating Russia to supporting the stability and independence of the 
states through multilateral and bilateral conflict resolution efforts, strengthening the 
economies and armed forces within the three Caucasian states, securing the energy reserves, 
and shifts in Turkish foreign policy due to the  new geopolitical configuration of the world 
that relieved Turkish foreign policy of certain constraints. Then,  similarities and diversities in 
the Turkish-American alliance politics in the   Transcaucasus is evaluated. First, is the 
transformation of the US’ biased policy towards Azerbaijan and the Nagorno- Karabakh 
conflict to  cooperative politics, which aims  to bolster the energy security of the region. 
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Furthermore, this part also sheds light on Turkey’s efforts to make Azerbaijan a genuinely 
independent state and the reasons that  discouraged  Turkey from applying  military solutions 
in the Nagorno- Karabakh conflict. In the second place, the significance of diversification of 
energy supplies and prevention of monopolization of oil export routes is presented. Third, this 
chapter focuses on divergence in the allies’ politics towards Armenia and convergence in the 
allies’ politics toward Georgia. While there were clear differences on the allies’ relations with 
Armenia, Turkey and the US supported the independence and territorial integrity of Georgia 
in order to secure oil transportation routes and  to prevent Russian imperialistic policies on 
Georgia. Finally, the region will be evaluated from the viewpoint of Russia and  Iran, and 
major areas of contention and cooperation between  Russia, Iran and Turkish-American 
alliance will be identified. 
 The last chapter is devoted to the military activities of the allies in the region that are 
aimed to improve these states’ armed forces which are necessary for the independence of the 
Transcaucasus states and stability in the region. In this thesis, while examining the allies 
politics towards the South Caucasus region, I wanted to put forward the importance of this 
region  for the Turkish-American alliance that remained strong despite several problems and 
at the end, in the conclusion part, I emphasized on the points that the US and Turkey should 
pay attention in their policy making in the South Caucasus  for the sake of their interests and 
the stability in the region. 
The review of  literature on this subject included books, articles in the books, journals 
and on internet, these, documents including treaties, newspapers, interviews, conference 
papers and research reports. 
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CHAPTER 1 
1. TURKISH AMERICAN ALLIANCE FROM 1945 TO 2002 
  1.1. The Concept of Alliance 
 Alliance can be defined as a formal or informal union or association formed for 
mutual benefits by countries, organizations or firms. However, International Relations (IR) 
scholars mostly  focus on  alliances between states and  define alliance as a formal or informal 
arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states1. Alliances as the 
crucial determinants of the outbreak, spread and outcome of  wars2, as a response to threat and 
as an opportunity for profit,   have been the primary foreign policy of states especially those 
downsize their military forces.  
In the anarchic structure of the international system, external threats urge states to ally 
when they are incapable of unilaterally facing a stronger enemy. In this regard, states decide 
to cooperate with other states in order to increase their security by massing their capabilities 
against a common enemy.3 If the state can not deter the offensive state with its own military 
power, it will choose to ally with  a state that will deter the aggressor. Nevertheless, in some 
cases, states may choose to ally with the state that constitutes the threat. This behavior is 
called bandwagoning “alignment with the source of danger”.4 Mostly weak and isolated states 
prefer bandwagoning to appease the strong state that has offensive intentions and to share the 
fruits of victory with the offensive state.  
Security concerns are not the sole motivation for states to ally. External threats, 
benefits in the economic, political or military domain play a predominant role in the formation 
                                                 
1 Stephen Walt,  The Origins of Alliances,  (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 12. Also, Glenn Synder 
presents a widely accepted definition of alliances as “Formal associations of states for the use (or nonuse) of 
military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership”    Alliance Politics, 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 4.       
2 Dan Reiter, “Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past,” World Politics 46:4 
(1994), p. 490.   
3George Liska, Nations in Alliance, The Limits of Interdependence cited in Wolfango Piccoli, Alliance Theory: 
The Case of Turkey and Israel, (Ankara: Bilkent University, (Master’s) Thesis, 1999), p. 2.  
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of alliances. Because, “alliances are formed if only member states believe that the benefits 
outweigh the cost”.5 While a state outside the alliance will try to handle its problems with its 
own resources, the state in the alliance will have the opportunity to get the support of its allies 
when it can not manage with its domestic capabilities. In short, "belonging confers additional 
benefits from which outsiders can be excluded."6 Of course there is not a rule that a state in 
the alliance will always have much to gain. For example, especially in the bipolar system, a 
strong state will support the weak state to extend its hegemony and prevent its alignment with 
the other superpower. Therefore, the strong state will take upon the cost of that alliance for 
relative gains.7 However, generally the distribution of benefits is likely to reflect the 
distribution of power within an alliance, as does the determination of policies.8 Therefore, if a 
weak state’s interest is not common with the others, it will be obliged to sacrifice  its own 
interests for the preservation of alliance.  
In addition to external threat and benefit, domestic factors also determine the 
formation of alliance. To increase their prestige in the eyes of their people, to undermine the 
political position of their domestic rivals and to consolidate their domestic political position, 
leaders of the state may choose to ally with the strong power. By this way, domestic elites will 
be able to retain their authority with the support of their allies and legitimize their status in the 
international arena and in the eyes of their people. In this type of alliance, the level of analysis 
is not the state but leadership. “Therefore, the political survival of the leadership predominates 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 Stephen Walt, op.cit., p.17.      
5 Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliance Theory A Neorealist First Cut” cited in Banu Eligur, Turkey's Quest For A Western 
Alliance (1945-1952): A Reinterpretation, (Ankara: Bilkent University, (Master's) Thesis, 1999), p. 4. . 
6 Randall L. Schweller, Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest available at 
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/schweller/schweller03.html 
7 When relative gains are important, states ask themselves “ Who will gain more?” instead of  “ Will both of us 
gain?” See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), p. 105. This 
thought had been effective in American foreign policy. America’s two major wars (Korea and Vietnam) were 
fought under the banner of the domino theory. Neither Korea nor Vietnam was thought to have great importance 
for US national interests. However, US officials were aware that defeat of these states would empower the rival 
superpower and cause other smaller states to jump on the aggressors’ bandwagon  
8 Hans Morgenthau, “Alliances in Theory and Practice,” in (ed) Arnold Wolfers, Alliance Policy in the Cold 
War, (London: Greenwood Press,1976), p. 190. 
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the survival of the state.”9 As well, internal threats can be more dangerous than external 
threats and if a state can not cope with its internal problems with its domestic resources, then 
will choose to ally with a state or states that will help in dealing with its internal threats. 
Regarding types of alliances, they can be offensive or defensive. While offensive 
alliances are formed to attack a third party, states form defensive alliances to protect 
themselves against a third party. Nevertheless, there is not a clear-cut line between the 
offensive and defensive alliances. Because intentions, rather than military capabilities 
determine the alliance as offensive or defensive and no one can be sure about the intentions of  
allies. Nonetheless, in the defensive or offensive alliance, if an ally is attacked or if it gets 
involved in any war, other members of the alliance are expected to come to its aid. 
Alliances can also be classified as formal or informal alliances. Formal alliances 
fortify existing alignments by their solemnity, specificity and legal obligations, as well as 
their public visibility and introduce elements of precision, obligation and reciprocity.10 
Contrary to the highly institutionalized formal alliances; informal alliances are not based on 
treaties. These informal alliances can be ad hoc coalitions or a de facto military alliance in the 
case of Turkey and Israel.  
According to the relative capabilities of the allies, alliances can also be divided as 
symmetrical or asymmetrical. When there is an imbalance in the relationship of the allies and 
one state is able to dominate the relationship and influence the other state in accordance with 
its interests, there exists an asymmetrical alliance. In this type of alliance, the weak state 
makes concessions of  sovereignty for greater security, restricts itself in pursuing preferred 
policies and risks its own security as Morton Kaplan  has stated: "the weakest player, by 
joining a nearly predominant strong player, only creates a condition in which he will be the 
                                                 
9 Banu Eligur, op.cit., p. 12.                                 
10 Fred Koetje San, “Shifting The Paradigm In RSA International Relations” at 
www.mil.za/CSANDF/CJSupp/TrainingFormation/DefenceCollege/ResearchPapers1999/koetje.htm 
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next victim." 11.  Alliances can also vary according to their duration. For instance, NATO is 
included in  long-term alliances. In  short-term alliances, partners convene for a specific 
purpose and when that purpose is accomplished, the group scatters as in the eviction of Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait in 1990 by twenty-eight states. However, such alliances are often called 
“coalitions”.12 
In the anarchic structure of the international system, alliances can collapse in response 
to changes in the international or external environment. There are some reasons for the 
dissolution of an alliance. The most important reason is the lessening or disappearance of the 
threat. Second, if members achieve  security by their own sources, there is no need for an 
alliance. Third, if the  alliance partners avoid  fulfilling their obligations, the credibility and 
the future of the alliance will be questioned. Fourth, if an alliance is based on common ethnic 
and cultural background or ideology, a change in these characteristics may cause 
dissolution.13  
The cohesion of the alliance is also affected by the structure of the international 
system. In a multipolar system, there is balance of power and it is maintained by alliance 
groups. In addition, alliances are flexible and can constantly shift. In multipolarity, a tiny 
alteration in the system can easily lead to the collapse of balance of power and war occurs 
with the aim of reestablishing that balance.14 In a bipolar system, the structure of the system 
provides little opportunity or incentive for defection and as a result states do not change their 
partners easily for  fear of being punished by their patron. 
Two or more states ally for different purposes. These purposes may be to benefit, 
prevent or minimize losses, deter and contain an  aggressor (repel and expel, disable and 
                                                 
11 A. Morton Kaplan, “Towards Professionalism in International Theory” cited in Randall L. Schweller, 
Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest available at 
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/schweller/schweller03.html   
12 Glenn H. Snyder, “Alliance Theory A Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International Affairs 41:1(1990), 
p.107. 
13  Stephen M. Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39:1 (1997), pp: 156-179.  
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disarm, deny access or directly frustrate an attack of the offensive state), defend territorial 
integrity, offend or annex a target state, effect the ally’s behavior, gain leverage in the 
bargains and reflect its enhanced power and interests better in the international arena, enhance 
the state’s internal security and domestic political stability, legitimize an existing regime, 
suppress internal  disorder,  appease the aggressor,  obtain foreign aid for economic 
development, perfect its military and police institutions for control over its populace…15  
After the Second World War, the US left its isolationist policy and began to assume 
responsibilities in several places of the world in accordance with its global interests. Although 
Turkey had been a non-belligerent in WWII, it desired to get involved in security and military 
alliances after the war. Turkey and the US, aware of their common and complementary 
interests - some listed above-, formed an alliance with the Truman doctrine and strengthened 
this alliance within NATO. In the following section the factors that had been effective in the 
formation and development of the alliance will be clarified to better understand the dynamics 
of this alliance. 
1.2. The roots of Turkish-American Alliance 
           1.2.1. Soviet Threat 
The Ottoman principle of seeking support from an outside power to counter the threat 
of an offensive state and insistence on territorial integrity and independence had been 
inherited  by the Turkish Republic. Turkey never wanted to make concessions from its 
territorial integrity in any case and sought to find diplomatic and financial support against  
external pressures. Turks and Russians have shared the same borders for centuries but war and 
rivalry had dominated in their relations. Both sides had looked at each other’s policy with 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 Martin Hollis & Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (Oxford: 
Clarendon,1990), p. 103. 
15 Randall L. Schweller, “The Concept of Alliance” cited in Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Tomorrow at. 
www.tkfd.or.jp/eng/research/alliance/pdf/AT_Cncpt.pdf See also Bruce M. Russet, “Components of an 
Operational Theory of International Alliance Formation,” The Journal of Conflict, 12:3, (1968), p. 285 
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concern.  Even though there had been reciprocal good relations between Lenin’s Bolshevik 
regime in Moscow and that of Mustafa Kemal in Ankara, this had come to an end during the 
Second World War. After the war, the Soviet Union put pressure on Turkey to change the 
Montreux Convention, demanded Kars, Ardahan provinces and a base on the Turkish Straits. 
At that time the newly established  war-torn Turkish republic was not strong enough to resist 
the Soviet threat with its own resources. Relying on its historical experiences, Turkey tried to 
strengthen its ties with Western states to confront the perceived Soviet threat for preserving its 
territorial integrity and sovereignty.Therefore, Turkey  sought security against the traditional 
threat of Russia from the United States and Turkish leaders wanted to obtain US’ diplomatic 
and military support to balance the Soviet threat. Hence, the Turkish government did not 
refrain from committing 3000 soldiers to Korea for this purpose. Consequently, having fought 
numerous wars with Russians in the past, Turks had welcomed US assistance in containing 
their traditional  enemy, the Soviet Union and this threat unified Turkey and US under the 
same perspective. 
              1.2.2. Strategic Factors     
 Turkey’s geographic position was an important factor in the eyes of US officials. 
They saw Turkey as a natural barrier to  Soviet expansion, a deterrent to a Soviet attack and a 
challenge to the Soviet Union’s southern flank. The State Department and the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff (JCS) believed that   Turkey was “ the most important military factor in defending the 
Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. By its geographical position, Turkey [constituted] 
the stopper in the neck of the bottle through which Soviet political and military influence 
could most effectively flow in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East”.16 Besides, as  
Admiral William Crowe said “ No Western or Soviet planner can address the Middle East 
                                                 
16 FRUS, 23 August.1946 cited in Ekavi Athanassopoulou, Turkey-Anglo American Security Interest 1945-1952 
(London: Frank Cass, 1999), p. 61.  
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challenge without considering Turkey’s orientation, terrain, airspace, forces and bases”.17  If 
Turkey could not be a barrier between the Warsaw Pact and the Arabian Peninsula, the SU 
would have direct access to the petroleum producing areas in the Arabian Peninsula, which 
would radically change the balance in the world.  Also the Soviet Union would be obliged to 
commit significant forces to protect its southern flank and its vital oil fields around Baku. In 
addition, Turkey was  an invaluable ally as the guardian of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles as 
an obstacle to a sudden attack of Soviet submarines and missile-bearing surface ships. 
Otherwise, if the Soviet Black Sea Fleet passed into the Mediterranean in time of war, that 
may be a disaster for the West since the Mediterranean is crucial to the economy of the West, 
which are fueled by  300 to 400 oil tankers that cross its waters with 25 million barrels of oil 
on any given day.18 Besides, Turkey by virtue of its geography was able to supply intelligence 
to the US. After Turkey joined NATO, the installations and facilities in Turkey  obtained 
information concerning Soviet space, missile, military force and weapons systems, Soviet 
research operations, strategic nuclear activities, Soviet military activity in bordering military 
districts, radar monitoring, air and naval testing, which provided 25% of NATO’s hard 
intelligence.19 Due to the factors  listed above, the US did not abstain from assisting Turkey in 
accordance with its global interests. 
                1.2.3. Military and Economic Aid    
 “Military [and economic] aid have a dynamics of its own and different effects on the 
giving and receiving nations which in turn can yield [negative and positive results for each 
side]”. 20 Mostly the country providing assistance desires to control  the receiving country and 
does not want it to run an independent policy. Besides, the aid receiving country, by taking 
                                                 
17 Christian Science Monitor, October 22, 1989 in from Ömer Karasapan, “Turkey and US Strategy in the Age 
of Glasnost,” Middle East Report, No.160, 1989, p. 8. 
18 Bruce Kuniholm, “Turkey and the United States: Views and Expactations,” in Turkish-American Relations: 
Forty Years of Continuity and Change, (İstanbul: SISAV,1987), pp:33-34. 
19 Ibid. p. 35. 
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the arms systems, military strategy, tactics and training systems, adopts the military standards 
and culture of the giving nation, which makes its dependence on the aid providing state in a 
subtle way.21 
 Although Turkey did not participate in  WWII, it kept a large army ready for war. 
However, after the war, because of the perceived Soviet threat, Turkey’s military expenditures 
did not decrease but increased.  Turkey endeavored to be an industrialized state, but  also felt 
obliged to maintain large armed forces. But, Turkey, due to its insufficient facilities for 
extraction and exploration of its mineral resources, primitive methods in agricultural 
production, poor transportation facilities, and dependence on oil, could not achieve 
industrialization and modernization of its military forces at the same time22 since the Soviet 
threat was hindering Turkey to focus on its economic problems and was compelling Turkey to 
keep a large army prepared for a sudden attack which in turn caused the Turkish economy to 
weaken. Besides, at that time inflationary policies and foreign trade deficits had brought 
Turkey's economy face to face with bankruptcy23 and the Democrat Party government, which 
did not want to be criticised by the  Republican People’s Party, saw the US aid as a savior for 
their planned reforms. As a result, Turkey   sought economic and military aid to bring its 
economy to a better situation and to modernize its armed forces to resist firmly against Soviet 
pressures. Briefly, Turkey’s military and economic requirements and US’ desire to meet 
Turkey’s needs had been an important factor in the birth of the alliance. 
               1.2.4. Westernization 
 Westernization attempts that had started during the Ottoman era  also continued more 
vigorously   in the Turkish Republic era. Atatürk targeted to be a full, equal member of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
20 Sezai Orkunt, “The Dynamics, Influence and Effects of Foreign Assistance” in Turkish-American Relations: 
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21 Ibid. p. 82. 
22 Banu Eligur, op.cit., p. 78. 
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Western European community of nations as the national goal of Turkey and hence, the West 
has been a source of enlightenment, modernization, the key driving principles for the future 
Turkish state24. Therefore, Westernization had been the basic foundation of Turkish foreign 
policy.  Westernization policy, which aims for Turkey to be part of Europe and an 
industrialized modern state rather than an agrarian state, was one of the domestic reasons of 
Turkey’s desire to form alliance with the US. In addition, Turkey’s Westernization policy 
necessitated to belong to as many Western organizations as possible.   Turkish foreign 
policymakers had always endeavored to present Turkey as a Western oriented secular state in 
a predominantly Muslim country, which has common features with the Western world. 
Therefore, Turkish administrators thought that Turkish-American alliance would strengthen 
their ties with the Western community and assist them to implement  Westernization policies 
domestically. Also, the other Western states would look more moderately to  Turkey that 
allied with the strongest member of the Western world. Hence, Turkey’s military alliance with 
US via NATO seemed as a part of Turkey’s  integration with  Western community. If 
Turkey’s modernization process is  examined, it is seen that Ottoman and Kemalist  reforms 
initiated by the military- bureaucratic elite, were security focused modernization reforms25, 
and most of the reforms were made in the military domain. This legacy had also been 
effective in Turkish foreign policy in the 1950s and modernization in the military field had 
been  the vanguard of  other reforms. 
 The main factors that led to the Turkish-American alliance  also continue today. 
However, from the establishment of the alliance up to now, there  appeared several problems 
in the alliance. In the following section , the beginning of the alliance and the problems that 
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occurred between the two states will be analyzed and as a conclusion the question of “why did 
the alliance endure despite the several crises” will be answered.  
1.3. Significant events and main problems in the Alliance26  
           1.3.1. The appearance of Alliance with the Truman Doctrine 
 The Second World War that lasted between 1939 and 1945 had brought immense 
damages to the European states and finished their dominance in  world politics. The  US and 
SU (Soviet Union), which were allies in WWII  had emerged as two rival superpowers after 
the war. While the SU intended to extend its influence well beyond its existing borders, the 
US initiated to replace the role of England in world affairs.  
 Stalin as the leader of the SU, wanted the Montreux Treaty of 1936 that regulates the 
use of Turkish straits, to be reviewed in the Yalta Conference in 1945, alleging that Turkey 
had taken an anti-Soviet stance in regulating the passage through the Turkish Straits during 
the war. After a month on 19 March 1945, the foreign minister of the SU, Vyacheslav 
Mikhailovich Molotov informed the Turkish ambassador in Moscow, Selim Sarper that the 
Soviet-Turkish Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression of 1925 would be invalid after 
then.27 Later on the SU increased its pressures over Turkey to change the Montreux 
Convention and demanded Kars, Ardahan provinces and a base on the Turkish Straits. In the 
Potsdam Conference (July-August 1945), Churchill, Truman and Stalin had come to an 
agreement on the revision of the Montreux Treaty but rejected a Soviet base on the Straits. In 
the following month, American Department of State informed the Turkish government about 
their proposals on the revision of the Montreux Treaty. Meanwhile, Georgians and Armenians 
claimed territories from Turkey’s northeast border. While the American government was 
resolute on not provoking the SU, there were some American elites who were severely 
worried about  SU policies on Turkey. According to Edwin Wilson, the American ambassador 
                                                 
26 See appendix 1 for the chronology of Turkish-American Relations. 
27 Ekavi Athanassopoulou, op.cit. , p. 39. 
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in Ankara, the Russians’ real purpose was to dominate Turkey and the Eastern Mediterranean. 
He also informed the American policymakers that Russians were trying to end the Turkish-
British  partnership and change the political regime in Turkey. Besides, the Inönü government 
struggled to enhance its relations with Washington, emphasizing Turkey’s geopolitical 
position, which was  threatened by Soviet Russia and succeded to divert US’ attention to the 
Soviet threat.  US policymakers had begun to see Russian pressures that aimed to control the 
Straits and invasion routes to Iraq and the Persian Gulf as a detrimental threat to the Middle 
East and Mediterranean. In December 1945, Acting Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, gave 
private assurances to the Turkish government in reaction to the territorial claims put forward 
by two prominent Georgian professors in Moscow. 28 This was perceived by Turkish officials 
as the first significant sign of change in  American policy. In addition, on 6 April 1946, the 
US sent USS Missouri  to Istanbul in order to bring the remains of the previous Turkish 
ambassador in Washington. But in fact, the USA has sent the battleship to signal that it would 
not permit the SU to expand to the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean and would support 
Turkey as a barrier to  Soviet expansion. Although, this was only a gesture,  that visit is often 
accepted as the symbolic start of the Turkish-American alliance.29  
However, after these incidents, Kremlin sent a strong note to Turkey on August 7 
1946, reiterating its demands on participation in the administration of the Straits and joint 
control of the waterway.  After Ankara informed Washington about the note, the US 
administration had been obliged to choose one of the alternatives below according to the 
Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal: - Send a protest note to Moscow and then, let 
Turkey and Russia resolve this problem bilaterally; or support Turkey regardless of the 
                                                 
28George Harris, Troubled Alliance, (AEI- Hover Policy Studies, 1972),  p. 19.  
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consequences.30 The US chose the second alternative and sent a message indicating that 
attacks or threats of attack against the Straits would clearly be matters for action by the U.N. 
Security Council.31 
 Besides, in 1946 a civil war broke out in Greece. The American administration was 
anxious about  Russian support to the Greek communist troops. Moreover, American 
policymakers were aware that the  SU would try to dominate Greece by benefiting from its 
weaknesses. At that time, England informed the American government that it would not be 
able to bear the burden of rendering  financial and military assistance to Greece and Turkey. 
This was a great opportunity for the US to take over the responsibilities of the bankrupt 
British in the Near and Middle East and to create a general policy towards the USSR (Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics).32 
These events prepared the suitable environment for the Truman Doctrine through 
which the USA devoted itself to providing economic and military aid to make Turkey and 
Greece strong enough to resist communist aggression. On 12 March 1947, Truman made a 
speech about the aid that would  be given to Greece and Turkey in the Congress. The most 
stressed issue was to stop  Soviet expansion, communist activities and support the free people 
of the world. Besides, Secretary of State Dean Acheson warned the US cabinet  “If Greece 
fell within the Russian orbit, not only Turkey will be affected but also Italy, France and the 
whole of Western Europe”.33 
Four moths later, on 12 July 1947 a treaty that was signed in accordance with the 
Truman doctrine, initiated an era of close cooperation and friendship between the USA and 
Turkey. With this treaty, the US was going to supply weapons, ammunitions, military experts 
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31George Harris, op.cit., p.22. 
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and roads, financial and technical support in building harbor and military foundations. One 
year later, Turkey was also accepted into the  Marshall Plan (European Recovery Program) 
that aimed to assist the Western countries to recover their economies.34 
   1.3.2. Turkey’s acceptance in NATO 
 After the establishment of NATO in 1949, Turkish officials had made a strong 
campaign to enter NATO. Turkish policymakers believed that if they were excluded from 
NATO, this would increase  Soviet harassment and decrease  American aid. They were 
thinking that Turkey could receive the military aid, which is necessary for the modernization 
of the Turkish army  only by joining NATO, because otherwise aid had to be approved 
annually by the US Congress which was not a taken for granted situation.  In addition, NATO 
membership would be a balance against the Soviet threat. 
 After the North Korean forces had passed the 38th parallel to invade South Korea, 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) condemned the attack as a threat to world peace and 
recommended to the U.N. members to assist South Korea. Turkey had been the second state 
that  replied positively to the call of the UN (United Nations) about assistance to Korea. 
Turkish leaders, to show their eagerness and resoluteness for NATO membership and to 
eradicate Turkey’s image as an unreliable ally  by declaring non-belligerency in World War 
II. despite its treaty alliance of 1939 with Britain and France,35 did not refrain from sending 
one Turkish troop involving up to 3000 soldiers to Korea in order to facilitate Turkish 
membership in NATO.36 In the Korean War, the  Turkish brigade  suffered heavy casualties 
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by protecting the retreat of US forces and  gained the appreciation of the Western states by its 
bravery.37 Besides, by sending troops to  Korea, Turkey deviated from its traditional policy 
principles that did not take risks and sent a message to the West that Turkey was ready to 
assume military undertakings and participate in  NATO.38 
 After Turkey’s participation in the Korean War, the Americans, thinking that Turkey 
would strengthen  NATO’s southern flank, accepted the membership of Turkey despite severe 
opposition from   Britain and Scandinavian  states in February 1952. The American 
administration was aware that with Turkey’s entrance into NATO, Soviet expansion and 
aggressiveness would be limited in the southern flank of NATO. Besides, 22 Turkish 
divisions would consolidate NATO’s deterrence power, and the SU would have to draw some 
of its troops from  East Europe to face the Turkish troops that were positioned on its southern 
borders. In addition, Turkey’s strategic position would be a barrier to the expansion of Soviet 
penetration to the Middle East. 
 After Turkey’s acceptance in NATO, Turkish-American relations strengthened to a 
great extent so much so that Americans were completely free in their activities on Turkish 
territory and Turkish leaders never hesitated to think and declare that US was going to support 
Turkey on every issue. Turkish leaders lent almost blind support to the US and supporting the  
US had been accepted as a task by the Turkish government in the 1950s. While Americans  
appreciated Turkish heroism in the Korean War, Turks saw the  US as the symbol of 
democracy, freedom and civilization. Also American military experts made great efforts to 
train, organize and equip the Turkish Army on the American model – but the equipment of 
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nearly all Turkish armed forces was US originated, and this  made Turkey excessively 
dependent on the US via the military domain.39 
           1.3.3.   Baghdad Pact 
In the 1950s Turkish elites turned their face to the West in their foreign policy 
dealings and divorced themselves from  Middle East politics and the Arab world. Since 
Turkey  recognized  Israel in 1949, it was seen as  part of the imperialist West in the eyes of 
Arab states. However, while Turkey  abstained  from the Middle East, the significance of this 
region was increasing day by day in the great powers’ policies because of its rich oil reserves. 
Britain, to preserve its position and influence in the Middle East was trying to 
establish a regional organization. For this reason, the English government wanted Turkey  not 
in NATO but in a regional organization in the Middle East under   British control. But, the 
plans that Britain  proposed were not successful. Meanwhile, England withdrew its opposition 
to Turkey’s NATO membership, which was the biggest barrier to Turkey. Thus, after joining 
NATO, Turkey began to look more moderately at English plans. Nevertheless, these projects  
(MEC); Middle East Command, (MEDO); Middle East Defense Organization had only 
increased the hatred of Arabs to Turkey and caused Turkey to be the common enemy of Arab 
nationalists. After Arabs  definitely rejected the English plans, US officers thought that the 
leadership in the region must be transferred from England to themselves. In the US Middle 
East policy, the most important aim was the containment of SU in the region.40 
After the US had established SEATO (South East Asian Treaty Organization), there 
remained only one gap between Turkey and Pakistan. In the American policymakers’ eyes, 
Turkey was the most suitable state for the leadership of a regional defense organization in the 
region since along with its ethnic and religious ties, Turkey as a NATO member, had the 
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largest and strongest army in the region. On the other hand, Turkish officials were keen on  
the leadership of a defense organization that was supported by the US, since Turkish leaders 
believed that their security and sovereignty were firmly tied to the US. Besides, Pakistani 
officials were also keen on getting  US support to strengthen their military power and political 
situation against India. Then, with the encouragement of the US government, Turkey and 
Pakistan signed a friendship and security cooperation treaty in 1954. At that time, the prime 
minister of Iraq, Nuri el-Said, was a sympathizer of the West and was keen on getting 
involved in a security system which was supported by the West to encounter  Soviet threat to 
his country. Therefore Iraq and Turkey, which shared similar thoughts, had established the 
Baghdad Pact. In a short time, England, Pakistan and Iran  entered  the pact.41    
Although, the US government encouraged this pact, it avoided to participate fully in 
this security arrangement for several reasons. First of all, US Middle East policy  necessitated 
not to be involved in groupings in the region in order to avoid Arab reaction. Second, the US 
officials did not want to lose their ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Third, Americans did not 
want their relations with Israel to be damaged because of this pact. Fourth, they did not want 
to provoke the  SU.42 
While the US did not join the Baghdad Pact, this pact had brought Turkey and the 
Arab world at odds. The intensive propaganda that Arab states made against Turkey and the 
Baghdad Pact caused Turkey to be further alienated from the Arab world. Contrary to Turkish 
administrators, Soviet threat was not a vital and close threat for the Arab policymakers. Arab 
politicians were more interested in  Israel  that was established in the middle of the Arab 
world and the continuity of Western colonial-like influence in the Arab states. Therefore, the 
dominant trend in Arab policy was anti-Western. Consequently, Turkey’s defense alliance 
with Iraq had been perceived as a move to divide the Arab world and   this pact had also 
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strengthened inimical feelings to Turkey in the Arab world. With the encouragement of the 
US, Turkey aimed to gather Arab states against the  Soviet Union by the Baghdad Pact. 
However, the Baghdad Pact had caused Egypt and Syria to strengthen their political, 
economic and military ties with the SU. Besides, the SU had accused Turkey of being the 
gendarmerie of the US and for reviving  Western imperialism in the region. While Turkey 
always tried to stay away from  Middle Eastern problems, this pact had put Turkey in the 
middle of the problems. Also, the armament of Syria and Egypt by the SU  increased the 
number of threats to Turkey’s national security.43  
Even though Western countries  tried to force Lebanon, Jordan and Syria to join the 
Pact, Arab states saw  the British formed, U.S.-backed, Baghdad Pact as an imperialist 
organization. Therefore, the Baghdad Pact, which was created with the aim of strengthening 
regional defense and prevent the infiltration of the Soviet Union into the Middle East, failed 
that purpose due to the strong Arab opposition. At that time, Arab radicalism, eventually led 
by Egypt's president Gamel Abdel-Nasser,  also flourished in Iraq like in the other Arab 
states. In late 1958, the pro-Western government of King Faisal of Iraq was overthrown in a 
violent coup and afterwards Iraq was declared a republic under the nationalist regime of 
Brigadier Abdal-Karim Kassem. Consequently, in 1959 Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad 
Pact, which ultimately became the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). After Baghdad 
Pact  dissolved, Turkey once  again returned to its non-involvement policy in the Middle East. 
But the Baghdad Pact in which Turkey took the lead with the US and British incitement, 
attracted harsh reactions from Arab regimes which saw Turkey as trying to further Western 
interests at the expense of Arabs. In addition, this pact had contributed to strengthen Pan-Arab 
ideology.44 Not for its own sake, but in order to strengthen its  position vis-à-vis the West, 
Turkey  took the leadership of this organization but more alienated itself from the Middle 
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East.45  The negative effects of this pact were better understood when Turkey had tried to 
mobilize Muslim support on the Cyprus issue. 
               1.3.4. Jupiter Missile Crisis 
 When American U-2 planes discovered forty two medium range Soviet originated 
SAM missiles on the territories of Cuba, President John F. Kennedy  decided to blockade 
Cuba. This had been the beginning of the Cuban Crisis. In a short time, two superpowers had 
come to the edge of a nuclear war. After receiving Kennedy’s request for an embargo, İsmet 
İnönü told the National Assembly the next day that “when we are in danger, we expect our 
allies to support us. Likewise, we have to stand by our allies if they are in danger”.46 To show 
its support, Turkish ships refused to deliver goods to Cuba. 
 When the Soviets had launched Sputnik missiles in 1957, the Eisenhower 
government was seized with fear of falling behind the USSR in the nuclear armament race. 
Later on, the American proposal about deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles 
(IRBM) in the European territories had been accepted by NATO members.47 However, 
although European states accepted, most of them had not given permission to the deployment 
of these missiles since they were afraid of provoking the SU and being a target in a nuclear 
war. The states that had accepted to deploy these missiles were only England, Italy and 
Turkey. Turkey had consented to the deployment of 15 Jupiter missiles on its territory.48 
Ironically, Jupiter missiles were, obsolete, liquid fueled, ignited in a long time, vulnerable to 
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air attacks, some used to be for only first attack and also their probability of hitting the target 
was small.49 
 After the  United States detected the Soviet-originated missiles in Cuba, it warned 
the Soviet Union to retrieve those missiles from  Cuban territory. But the SU offered to 
remove their missiles in Cuba if the US withdrew the Jupiters from Turkey. While the tension 
reached a peak between the US and USSR, on October 26th , Robert Kennedy (Attorney 
General, and also a member of EX-COM) met with the Soviet  Ambassador Anatoly 
Dobrynin, who claimed that the Soviet missiles in Cuba were justified by those of the 
Americans’ in Turkey. Robert Kennedy convinced Ambassador Dobrynin that the removal of 
the missiles from Turkey in exchange for the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba may 
be implemented in four or five months and brought this bargain to the President, his brother 
John F. Kennedy. Then, Kennedy  accepted the proposal on removing the missiles from 
Turkey’s territory and promised that the US would not invade  Cuba.50 US policies- shortly 
explained in  figure 1- had not been successful and decided  to withdraw the missiles in 
Turkey. For Turkish administrators,  to withdraw these missiles under the Soviet threat and 
pressure was impracticable. These weapons as the concrete symbol of Turkish-American 
alliance were enhancing the security of Turkey by deterring the SU. They did not expect the  
US to make Jupiter missiles a bargain issue to please its rival at the expense of its ally’s 
interest. Before this bargain was revealed, Turkish policymakers were seeing  this issue as a 
Soviet scenario as Foreign Minister Feridun Cemal Erkin  stated, “ As you know, in the 
Cuban Crisis a Soviet attempt had been to make the bases in our country and bases in Cuba a 
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bargain issue but USA had denied this bargain”.51 But the reality was different as stated by the 
Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev: 
 “ President Kennedy told us through his brother that in exchange [of removing Soviet 
missiles from Cuba] he would remove missiles from Turkey. He said: If this leaks into the 
press, I will deny it, I give my word I will do this, but this promise should not be made 
public.”52 It is understood that Kennedy initially choose to contact with Soviet Union rather 
than its ally and put Turkey into a difficult situation. 
53Figure 1: 
    Hard line                 US options, offer to the Soviets, and fall-back position 
         * Invasion 
         *  Air strikes 
         *  Strengthen blockade         
         *  Continue blockade 
         *  Non-invasion pledge 
         *   Secret trade for Jupiter        Deal to end crisis   
     Soft line  *  Open trade for Jupiter           Fall-back position               
  
With the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles in 1963, the Cuban crisis, which had brought 
the two superpowers to the edge of a nuclear war, had come to an end . The  US had 
sacrificed the Turkish missiles to pull out the Soviet missiles in Cuba. This crisis led Turkish 
decision makers to think   that US for the sake of its own interests, would not refrain from 
making secret treaties with the  SU or another state. Although Jupiters were obsolescent and 
vulnerable, Turkish officials regarded  these weapons as the symbol of alliance's 
determination to use nuclear weapons against Russian attack. Therefore, this bargain fostered 
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doubts about the US commitment to Turkey’s security and showed the difficulties of allying 
with a superpower. Besides, Turkish leaders understood that armament does not always create 
security when their state had been the target of Soviet nuclear missiles because of the 
American nuclear weapons deployed in their territory. 
 
1.3.5. Problems in the Alliance in the1960s 
         (Johnson Letter and American Bases in Turkey) 
  
After the missile crisis, Turkey's relations with the United States continued to 
deteriorate. Between 1960 and 1963, the Greek Cypriots, with Greek military assistance 
raided isolated Turkish villages. Hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were murdered and wounded. 
Because of the  tense situation and bloodshed in Cyprus, in 1964 Turkey as a guarantor state, 
decided to intervene in Cyprus by landing troops on the island  to preserve the security of the 
Turkish community and prevent the Greek Cypriot massacres from turning into a genocide. 
But on 5 June  the "Johnson Letter" came. The letter that President Lyndon B. Johnson sent54 
to Prime Minister İsmet İnönü in 1964 to hinder Turkish intervention in Cyprus had caused 
Turkish policymakers to see US from a different angle. The important factors in the letter 
were those; first, a war between Turkey and Greece was unthinkable. Because joining NATO 
necessitated that two NATO states could not fight in any case. Second, this letter pointed to 
the fact that Turkey would have to take the permission of US to use American supplied 
military equipment in the operations that it will make.55 Therefore, it was understood that, the 
adversary of Turkey would be decided by the USA. For example if Greece as a NATO 
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member harmed Turkey’s vital interests, Turkey should keep a low profile. Especially the 
limitation of using weapons was a vital and delicate issue for the Turkish army whose 
weapons and ammunitions were mostly American originated. Third, according to the letter if 
Turkey intervened in Cyprus without consulting the NATO members, NATO members would 
rethink to help Turkey in case of an attack from the SU. 56 Until then, Turkish leaders  felt 
themselves secure under the NATO umbrella, but this letter  arose doubts about the credibility 
of NATO. As a result, most of the people had begun to see Turkish-American alliance as a 
one-sided alliance, which  progressed in line with American interests. As Geoffrey Lewis 
stated, “NATO looked like an organization which is established for saving the American 
interests rather than for a reciprocal assistance”.57 Only a decade earlier, Turkey had eagerly 
dispatched its troop Korea to assist the US  but when the Cyprus issue  came on the agenda, 
the US  support failed. Consequently, this letter started the anti-Americanism era in Turkey, 
frustrated Turkish politicians who trusted America deeply and caused a widespread 
resentment in  Turkish public opinion. Turkish policymakers, who saw their interest and those 
of the US as identical, realized the realities of international relations with this letter. On the 
other hand, at that time Turkish armed forces were ill equipped for a naval landing in Cyprus. 
Therefore, this letter had been used as an excuse for non-intervention58 and saved Turkey 
from a probable failure as İnönü said to Alparslan Türkeş ‘even if we lost diplomatically, this 
would not be as dangerous as a military defeat’.59 Besides, after this letter, Turkey began to 
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strengthen its relations with the Soviet Union. In September of 1967, Turkish Prime Minister 
Süleyman Demirel visited Moscow and stated Turkey’s attitude to the SU:  “I think we have 
entered a new era in our dealings with the Russians. As is known, there had been great strain 
between our countries over the years, and in the period after World War II we had no relations 
at all. Now that gap has been bridged; I am not suggesting that all doubts are gone, but I think 
the hostility is gone”.60    
Although  “American military presence has been positive in the sense that Turkey 
could never have played a deterrent role against potential Soviet aggression on its own 
without risking suicide”61, there  arose problems with the American bases and personnel that 
led   Turkish leaders and public to suspect Turkey’s sovereignty was not being respected. 
In 1958, USA had transported 1600 American soldiers from West Germany to İncirlik 
when it decided to disembark troops in Lebanon. But the strange point was that Americans  
“due to the need for haste in preparation of the force deployment” did not inform the Turkish 
authorities until after the military units had landed in İncirlik.62 Especially Turkish leftists had 
criticized US at that time. According to them, US was using the İncirlik air base without 
consulting Turkish administrators for  non-NATO purposes which would eventually lead 
Turkey to an unwarranted war. Besides, “ Turkish press was especially upset by the fact that 
West European and American newsmen were permitted to enter İncirlik to cover the 
operation, but Turkish newsmen were not”.63 
Turkey  permitted US forces to use U-2 planes for  investigations which were situated 
in the İncirlik base. But when a U-2 plane had been shot down on  Soviet  air space in 1960, 
there  appeared discussions about the real purpose of U-2 planes. After this event, the Soviet 
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leader Khrushchev had declared Turkey as the accomplice of USA. Again as in the Cuban 
Crisis, Turkey had come face to face with the SU. However, the Turkish administration   did  
not   exaggerate   this event   and   blamed   Khrushchev  for his offensive statements. In 
addition, Americans were sending meteorology baloons to collect intelligence from the Soviet 
Union under the guise of scientific investigation. When the Soviets blamed Turkey for these 
balloons, the Turkish government  tried to convince the Soviets that the flights of these 
baloons were vital for  meteorology research.64 But after the 1962 Cuban Crisis and the 
Johnson letter, again in 1965, an American RB-57 reconnaissance aircraft crashed into the 
Black Sea. After   Soviet naval authorities informed Turkey about the crash, the US military 
mission insisted on investigating the accident unilaterally and a US destroyer tried to move 
toward to the wreck of the airplane but Turkish naval ships  stopped it, claiming that such an 
investigation was Turkey's affair.  The Turkish navy concluded that the accident took place  
because of technical reasons. As a result of this incident, the Demirel government banned U-2 
reconnaissance flights from Turkish soil in 1965 but this ban did not prevent another incident 
in 1967.65  
“The various agreements gave US military personnel freedom from customs, duties, 
established jurisdiction of US military courts over most criminal activities and allowed US 
facilities, including clubs and exchanges, to operate free from Turkish taxes, rules or laws”.66 
The Anatolian territory, which has one of the richest natural, historical and cultural features,  
was exposed to an  unprecedented antiquites smuggling due to the privileges that were 
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granted to American military personnel on the postal services.67 In November 1959, an 
American lieutenant- colonel driving intoxicated had ran into a formation of the elite 
Presidential Guard, killing one soldier and injuring 11  others. The colonel was brought to 
trial in an American military court since he had been accepted to be on duty during the time of 
the accident. The court  fined him $1.200  and relieved him of duty for a time. But, the 
Turkish press and public did not consider this to be adequate punishment and began to 
criticize even the little offences that that had been committed by the US military personnel. 
Especially, Americans’ tearing the Turkish flag and attacking  Atatürk monuments were 
received negatively by the  Turkish people and “ much of the public agitation in Turkey 
against US military presence has recalled the capitulations and often parallels have been 
drawn between the various privileges granted to US military personnel and the concessions 
granted to foreigners under the Ottomans”.68 
              1.3.6.  Poppy Problem 
 The poppy growing problem became acute when the US government began a 
campaign against the use of narcotics, which was mostly spread among its young people. In 
line with the campaign, the American governments put pressure on Turkey to decrease and 
prohibit poppy production, which turned into a crisis between the allies later. 
 Drug addiction had been one of the main problems in America in the beginning of  
the 1960s. The chief of BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs) stated in 1970 
that the number of drug addicts had increased twofold in 1969.69 According to  statistics, one 
third of American families were complaining about their children’s heroin addiction.70 For 
American authorities, the main problem was the entrance of heroin from abroad. BNND 
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indicated that  %80 of the heroin, which was consumed illegally in the USA, was smuggled 
from Turkey. Therefore, Americans were claiming that without stopping the poppy 
production in Turkey, this problem would never end. 
 In order  to support the  US, Turkish government decreased the number of provinces 
that were permitted to produce poppy legally. The number of provinces that cultivated opium 
was 42 in 1960, 30 in 1962, 25 in 1964, 21 in 1967, 18 in 1961, 11 in 1969, 9 in 1970 and 7 in 
1971. However, US officials had not been satisfied since they claimed that there had not been 
any reduction in the production of poppy although the number of provinces that cultivated 
opium had decreased from 42 to 7. American authorities did not hesitate to threaten Turkey 
with the economic embargo because of poppy production.71  
According to the Turkish authorities, if Turkey prohibited poppy planting, this 
problem would not end. Because, as long as the drug demand continued to exist, it would be 
supplied in one way or another. Therefore, the drug addiction problem must be solved in the 
US, not in Turkey. In addition, there were also poppy producing states such as India, Pakistan, 
China, Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Thailand, and Laos. Marseille in France was the center of 
heroin smuggling but the US did not put pressure on France or the other states although 
Turkey did its best to help the  US. Besides, plantation of poppy was the living source of  
Turkish farmers. In Afyon alone 100.000 Turkish families were engaged in farming opium.72 
Ironically, at the same time the US was  demanding from Turkey to decrease the punishment 
of the Americans who had violated the drug prohibitions in Turkey.73 
 Despite the arguments above, in 1971 Prime Minister Nihat Erim, who was not an 
elected but appointed executive after the 1971 coup,  eradicated opium cultivation ‘for 
humanitarian reasons’ and in exchange for this, the United States agreed to provide $35 
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million to compensate Turkish poppy growers’ losses and to assist the Turkish government 
for other agricultural investments.74 But, according to Turkish public opinion, prohibition 
symbolized Turkey’s excessive dependence on the US. Ironically, after the prohibition of 
poppy in Turkey, there  appeared  opium scarcity for medical purposes in the world to a great 
extent and even Turkey was spending a lot of money to obtain opium. In addition, the US  
encouraged India to increase its poppy production to supply its demands. Eventually, Prime 
Minister Ecevit, who charged that Erim had acted against the best interests of Turkey by 
prohibiting  opium cultivation, had been successful in the 1974 elections and lifted the ban on 
poppy growing. This action soured relations between the two countries. “ On June 1974, the 
US State Department ordered the US ambassador to ‘return for consultation’ a traditional 
means of displaying official displeasure”75 and “On 9 July 1974, Representative Lester Wolff 
introduced a bill to cut off aid to Turkey unless the opium ban was reinstituted”.76 Besides, 
some journalists in their articles gave advice to the US administration to   bomb the poppy 
fields in Turkey. 
 Nevertheless, the Ecevit government took strict steps to hinder the illegal poppy 
traffic and the Turkish government was appreciated for its measures by the whole world. The 
UN made a formal declaration that welcomed the Turkish governments’ endeavors. More 
over, American authorities also appreciated the efficient measures that Turkey took with the 
help of United States Drug Enforcement Administration (USDEA)  and supplied financial aid 
to the Turkish administration. 
 As a consequence, in this problem, the US government ignored the supply and 
demand reality in opium, blamed Turkey as the culprit  for the whole narcotics traffic and 
damaged relations. Because of America’s threatening policies, Turkish leaders saw and 
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presented this problem to the Turkish people as a symbol of Turkish subservience to US 
interests, which put Turkey and the US at loggerheads. 
              1.3.7.   Arms Embargo 
 As a retaliation to Turkey’s intervention to avoid the total destruction and massacre 
of the Turkish Cypriots in Cyprus following the Greek-junta supported coup, the US Congress  
placed an embargo on transferring military equipment to Turkey, claiming that American-
supplied military equipment had been used against US law during the Cyprus operation. 
Besides, some members of the US Congress   claimed that Turkey   lost its strategic and 
military value in the age of intelligence satellites and strategic missiles and Turkey was not a 
necessary ally as in the 1950s, because of “détente” with the Soviet Union and rapprochement 
with the Arab countries. In other words, Turkey had become expandable.77 Though some 
realist policy makers  opposed78, the administration  failed to convince the Congress, which 
was deeply affected by the Greek- American lobby, and  advocated the ‘rule of law’, against 
about the dangers involved in the loss of Turkish friendship and in treating it as an underdog 
compared to Greece.79 However, Turkish officials had strictly opposed the US for breaking 
the defense treaty and they accepted it as a hostile manner to Turkey’s national security. As a 
response, the Turkish government declared in 1975 that all previous bilateral defense 
arrangements lost their legal validity and Turkish Armed Forces had taken the control of 
NATO/US bases until the embargo was lifted in 1978. After the embargo, the strategic 
importance of the US and NATO bases in Turkey had increased with North Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia with Soviet support, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan80 and 
despite the instability in the Gulf area (Iran-Iraq war and the Iranian revolution) during the 
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1980s, Turkey resisted the use of  the bases for rapid deployment operations, creating 
frustration for US policymakers.81 In addition, the arms embargo hindered the US from 
collecting intelligence, which was vital for the USA and weakened the Turkish NATO forces, 
which contained the Soviet army in the southern flank of NATO.82 
 Therefore, the costs of this embargo against Turks outweighed the benefits and the 
US senate annulled the embargo in 26 July 1978, but Turkish- American relations had 
stagnated severely in this period. The arms embargo  showed the importance of national 
defense industry, which had been mostly dependent on a single source, namely the US and 
stimulated Turkish leaders to diversify sources of supply for its armed forces to make them 
less dependent on American equipment. On the other hand, although Turkish defense industry 
was developed as a reaction to American arms embargo, three big public tenders had been 
won by  American firms- airplane with Lockheed Martin , MLRS (Multiple Launch Rocket 
System) with Enca&Ln and armed vehicles with FMC - soon after the  US cancelled the 
embargo83 due to Turkey`s established military system. 
 In 1974, the US  found Turkey’s intervention in Cyprus which Turkey undertook to 
protect the Turkish Cypriots  in accordance with the 1960 Guarantee Treaty, which was 
signed by Greece, England and Turkey, unjustified and applied an arms embargo. But if 
American policies are examined today (by alleging that the lives of a few hundred students 
were endangered if it had not refrained from invading Grenada, under the pretext of 
introducing democracy, landed troops on the territory of Haiti, bombed Afghanistan and 
Sudan holding Bin laden responsible for the bomb     attacks against embassies in Africa, 
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bombed Libya for producing chemical weapons), the arms embargo that US enforced in the 
past seems incoherent and unjustified.84   
              1.3.8.  Gulf War  
 If the general situation in the region is examined before the Gulf Crisis, it is clearly 
seen that there was a de facto military alliance with Iraq and the USA. In the 1980s, the US 
supported Iraq without any condition or restriction against its foe Iran. Iraqi Armed Forces 
were armed by America with the latest technological  weapons. As a result the US created a 
monster in the Middle East. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1991, the balances  changed. 
Saddam Hussein  dominated  huge oil reserves in the region. Oil prices increased twofold. 
This  urged the US to enforce strict measures as embargo and military intervention. The US, 
during the Operation Desert Storm, tested its latest technological weapons, damaged the 
military power of Iraq, improved its leadership image in the world and almost expunged the 
Vietnam syndrome from the minds of the American people. Turkey, as a loyal ally, permitted 
the US to use the İncirlik base and supported UN sanctions by closing the Kerkuk- 
Yumurtalık oil pipeline. Although, Turkey supported the US willingly, it has suffered much 
because of  this war. First, the US declared a safe zone on the north of the 36th  parallel and 
there emerged a lack of authority. Therefore, with  encouragement of the Americans, Kurdish 
people  revolted and the Iraqi administration  suppressed this rebellion in 1991, which caused 
the accumulation of Kurdish people on Turkey’s southern borders. Turkey  had several vital 
reasons for opposing the Kurdish immigration. This refugee onslaught was an economic 
burden on Turkey that lost million dollars in the crisis by closing the pipeline. Besides, most 
of the refugees were PKK (Kurdistan Worker Party) members or sympathizers. But, Turkey in 
order to be politically correct  accepted the refugees. Second, PKK was empowered because 
of the vacuum of authority in  Northern Iraq. While Turkey was advocating Iraq’s territorial 
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integrity, the US preferred a united Kurdish front in Northern Iraq to pressure Saddam.85  The 
third problem was the (RDF) Rapid Deployment Force, which was established by the US to 
secure the safe area in  Northern Iraq. But according to serious claims, RDF supplied 
advanced weapons to PKK, treated the wounded terrorists, hanged the photograph of the PKK 
leader in its headquarters, made secret flights and conducted intelligence activities without 
informing the Turkish authorities.86 When Turkey  attempted to terminate RDF, the US 
Congress sent a message to Turkey in 1992, “ If you do not prolong the duty time of RDF, we 
can fill this vacuum by giving weapons to Kurds”.87 
If  Turkish states are analyzed, it is   seen that  internal threats had been more effective 
than  external threats in the collapse of Turkish states. One of the major reasons for the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire was the nationalist ideas which had been materialized with 
the Greek independence. Like in the past,  the threat  that Turkey faces now is the separatist 
ideas which are incited by the Western  powers under the guise of freedom, and due to its 
experiences in the past, Turkey is very sensitive to separatist ideas in  Southeast Anatolia. 
Turkey enthusiastically advocates the territorial integrity of Iraq and sees any change in  
Northern Iraq contradictory to its vital interests. The  Turkish government  fears that Iraq will 
disintegrate, and that will lead to the creation of an independent Kurdish entity in Northern 
Iraq, which will augment their problem with the Kurdish population in Turkey. Thus, Turkey  
showed its determination by deploying military troops in Northern Iraq. 
Turkish security oriented policymakers equated American policy on the federated 
Kurdish   state  in  Northern  Iraq  with  policies  of victorious powers that aimed to divide the  
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remaining Ottoman Empire into small states and occupation zones by the unratified and 
virtual Sévres Treaty in 1920, and viewed the US through the lens of the ‘Sévres Phobia’, that 
is, as an enemy state rather than an old strategic ally.88 
 Despite fluctuations in Turkish-American relations, this alliance remained quite 
strong in the international arena for several reasons. First, the US has been the main supporter 
of Turkey in the economic and military domain. Second, this alliance was the concrete 
symbol of the Westernization policy of Turkey. Third, Turkey felt more secure under the 
NATO umbrella. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, for the first time in centuries, Turkey 
and Russia no longer share a border but  Turkish and Russian interests  overlap in areas such 
as the Caucasus and Central Asia. Though Russia is accepted as a risk rather than a threat like 
in the cold war in Turkish military planning, NATO continues to be the cornerstone of 
Turkey's defense and security policy against  Russia, which possesses a huge army compared 
to Turkey and which,  is a nuclear-power with a credible nuclear deterrent. Fourth, the US as 
the lone hyper-power needs a credible and trustworthy ally in the region as Turkey unlike 
Iran, Iraq, Syria, the Russian Federation… to carry out its geopolitical responsibilities and 
never wishes Turkey to be a ‘rogue state’. As Britain is the most reliable ally in  Europe, 
Turkey is the most reliable ally of US in the vast Islamic world.89 Turkey is a strong, stable 
and trustworthy partner that sits at the juncture of the unstable regions; Balkans, the Caucasus 
and the Middle East. In the Cold War, the US wanted Turkey as part of its containment 
policy, as a secure area for bases and installations to support its activities in the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the Middle East, to maintain stability on NATO’s southern front and to 
maintain US economic interests. In the Cold War, Turkey had found itself in the middle of the 
superpower contest mostly because of its geographic location and had been an important 
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strategic ally for the US as a stabilization factor in the region 90. But, “many people speculated 
that with the end of the Cold War, the strategic importance of the Turkish-American 
partnership has diminished, but they had ignored that even the political environment changes 
geography remains the same and overlooked Turkey’s ability to influence events in the 
Middle East and Eurasia”. 91  Moreover, as long as the Middle East region continues to be a 
‘boiling cauldron’, the US will need  bases in Turkey for a Middle East contingency like the 
Gulf War. Similar to the Great Power diplomacy toward the Ottoman Empire in the 
nineteenth century when Great Powers had aimed to prevent a drastic change in the Middle 
Eastern political order, Turkey played a significant role for  Western interests in the Gulf War, 
Turkey’s vigorous support of the coalition has increased its geo-strategic importance  which 
had begun to fade with the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the Gulf War, Turkey by its 
policies –allowing the use of the İncirlik airbase by US warplanes and supporting the 
economic embargo- had proved that it is and it will be a worthy strategic partner of the  US.  
Today Turkey continues to be an indispensable element in NATO since according to NATO 
evaluations, 13 of the 16 potential crisis scenarios are anticipated in the vicinity of Turkey.92 
Besides, Turkey has the largest armed forces among the European allies and comes second 
after the USA in NATO. In addition, after the September 11 attacks, Turkey as a secular 
Muslim country, which fought against terrorism seriously in the last decade, consolidated its 
strategic importance and struggle against terrorism brought two allies to a common point. 
“Especially after September 11 attacks it is more clearly seen that Turkey can offer the US 
support in a range of areas where Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States are either unable or 
reluctant to assist”.93. In addition, Turkey has purchased billions of dollars worth  of U.S. 
                                                 
90 US Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Turkeys Problems and Prospects. Implications for US 
Interests in Richard C. Company, op.cit. ,  p.12. 
91 Ian.O.Lesser, In Search of a Post-Cold War Role at www.tusiad.org/yayın/private/autumn 97/html/lesser.html. 
92 ‘Turkey's Security Perspectives and Its Relations with NATO’ at http://www.mfa/gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm. 
93 Steven A. Cook, “US-Turkey relations and The War On Terrorism,” available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/2001_cook.htm. This fact was also emphasized by President 
 
37 
military equipment over the years and continues to be  one of the ten biggest emerging 
markets for U.S. military exports.94 The  two countries share common objectives and there are 
numerous areas where the interests of the US and Turkey converge as encouraging the 
development of democratic pro-Western regimes and free-market economy in the Caucasus 
and Central Asia, establishing non-Russian/non-Islamic lines of communication for the newly 
independent states of Eurasia, curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
terrorism, preventing the accumulation of weapons in the hands of the irresponsible states and 
illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, expanding NATO’s membership, opposing terrorism, 
securing  oil reserves in the Caspian and Gulf, opening of new oil pipeline routes in the 
Caucasus, preventing the rebuilding of the Russian Empire, supporting Israel and the Middle 
East Peace Process. And as America’s war on terrorism expands, Turkey will play a critical 
role in obtaining intelligence facilities and over-flight rights throughout the region.95 The 
factors stated above, brought these two NATO allies even closer during the past decade and 
this alliance continues to be the cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy.If both sides try to 
understand their difficulties and challenges as Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer did96, 
this alliance will strengthen day by day. 
 In the post-Cold War era, Turkey is trying to diversify its relations with the USA in 
the technological, educational, political, economic and commercial domains. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus presented several opportunities in the 
political, economic and military domains to the US as the unique superpower of the world, 
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and to Turkey as a regional power with its ethnic  ties with the newly independent states (NIS) 
of the South Caucasus. It is seen that, while Turkey’s interests intersect with Russia in  the 
Caucasus, they are harmonious with the US to a great degree. In the second chapter, the 
general political, economic and military situation in the South Caucasus will be examined to 
better understand the convergences and divergences in the alliance in that region. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2. THE SOUTH CAUCASUS AFTER 1989 
The South Caucasus region, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, 
borders  Turkey, Iran, the Black and Caspian Seas, and Russia’s northern slopes of the 
Caucasus Mountains. Due to its geographic location,  the South Caucasus states served as a 
north-south   and east-west trade and transport “land bridge” linking Europe to the Middle 
East and Asia.97 In this chapter, the general political, economic and military situation in the 
South Caucasian states that faced enormous difficulties in enhancing their national security, 
implementing the process of state building and improving their economic situation after the 
dissolution of Soviet Union will be explained. While examining political issues, factors that 
affect  political stability  such as ethnic conflicts, the influence of Russia  in the internal 
affairs of these states to establish its respective dominance in the region, as well as 
democratization and state-building efforts of these states will be illustrated. Besides, 
economic issues, which are vital for the independence of these states as oil and gas reserves 
and export routes, will be discussed. In addition, the challenges to the NIS in establishing 
their own  military forces will be touched upon. These states’ attempts in building strong 
national armies and efforts in diminishing the effect of Russian military structure in their 
military units will be examined.  
After the break-up of the Soviet Union, all the NIS have experienced a difficult  state-
building and independence process. Compared with the other states, the Caucasian states’ 
path to independence was more tenacious than the others because of being surrounded by 
three major powers; Russia, Turkey and Iran and  the internal  specific characteristics of these 
states. Therefore, independence for these states did not initially provide political stability nor 
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a strong state to handle  the problems.  Below, the events that occurred in  the  South 
Caucasian states; Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia after the Cold War, will be presented in a 
chronological order from the political, economic and military viewpoints as mentioned above.  
2.1. Georgia98  
 
Georgia is bounded in the west by the Black Sea and south by Turkey, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan. Its area is 69.700 sq. km and its population was 5.316.000 in 1997. Its population 
is the most heterogeneous in the region, containing Azerbaijani, Armenians, Russians, 
Abkhaz, Ossets the last both of whom have separatist ideas. According to the 1989 census, 
Georgians 70.1%, Armenians 8.1%, 6.3% Russians, 5.7% Azerbaijanis, 3% Ossetians, 1.9% 
Greeks, 1.8% Abkhazians and Ukrainians accounted for %1 of the population.99 Georgia is a 
fertile country but it is dependent on imports of crucial staples such as grain, meat, and sugar 
from the other former Soviet Republics and most of its trade passes through rail and road 
links that lie across Abkhazia and through Azerbaijan. Georgia is also dependent on energy 
supplies from Azerbaijan, Russia and Turkmenistan. Its economic weaknesses and   complex 
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domestic setting  had  always been utilized by Russia to establish its hegemony over Georgia.  
However, despite the complexity of the geopolitical environment and the lack of domestic 
political and financial resources, Georgia endeavors to be a genuine independent and a strong 
state mostly with the aid of international community.100 
              2.1.1. Internal conflicts and their effects on Georgia's political stability 
 In October 1990, a national movement came to power in Georgia with the nationalist 
Georgian leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia  after the SU disintegrated, Georgia was the first 
Caucasusian state that declared full independence on 9 April 1991. Then, Gamsakhurdia 
accepted the 1918-constitution, which did not recognize the existence of autonomous 
republics in Georgia. That decision of Gamsakhurdia had been the main reason of the 
conflicts that arose later in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Besides, the Georgian government 
declared Georgia as an ‘occupied country’ and the Soviet military as ‘occupiers’. Therefore, 
the Georgian parliament requested the withdrawal of Soviet troops and in January 1991, it 
decided to set up its own military force, the National Guard. In November 1991 the Georgian 
administration began nationalizing the Soviet military equipment in the country.101 
 Gamsakhurdia appointed Tengiz Kitovani as  chief of the National Guard. However, 
the disagreements between Gamsakhurdia and Tengiz Kitovani, such as the status of the 
National Guard in the government, destroyed the friendship between two leaders. As a result, 
Gamsakhurdia ordered the disbanding of the guard and its tighter subordination to the 
Ministry of International Affairs, but Kitovoni did not obey the orders. Besides, 
Gamsakhurdia’s refusal to join the CIS and his readiness to lend aid to the Chechen 
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nationalist movements aggravated Georgian-Russian relations102 and Kitovani, with  Russian 
support103 and Gamsakhurdia’s political opponents, overthrew Gamsakhurdia in December 
1991.104 
 In January 1992, the Georgian Military Council which came to power after the coup, 
decided to improve relations with Russia and withdrew the law labeling Soviet forces as 
‘occupiers’. As a quid pro quo, by the end of May, Pavel Grachev, the Russian Minister of 
Defense recommended to the parliament that some military equipment should be handed over 
to  Georgia.105 At that time Georgii106 Eduard Shevardnadze, Gorbachev’s former foreign 
minister, was elected president of  Georgia. Georgians hoped that Shevardnadze with his 
personal prestige and experience would handle the problems that undermined the political and 
economic stability such as economic decline, ethnic problems, rising anti-Georgian 
separatism, political fragmentation and make Georgia a viable nation state. However, after he 
came to the power, conflict in  South Ossetia broke out.107 At that time Russia’s objective was 
to retain a stable Georgia within a Russian sphere of vital interest as a bulwark against 
instability in the North Caucasus and in the Transcaucasus. Therefore, Russia tried to exploit  
that conflict. Shevardnadze, due to the political instability and military weaknesses of 
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Georgia, was compelled to make serious concessions towards Russia concerning the 
stationing of Russian troops in Georgia. Unlike Gamsakhurdia, Shevardnadze understood that 
Georgia had to take into account the interests of  Russia to neutralize its negative impacts and 
therefore signed the  Dagomys agreement on 24 June 1992 which led to the settlement of 
Russian peacekeeping forces in South Ossetia.108 This agreement also warranted that Georgia 
would continue to take the share of equipment from the Soviet Armed Forces in accordance 
with Tashkent CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) Summit decisions which were 
agreed upon in July 1992. However, people of the other races in the Caucasus saw the 
relationship between Russia and Georgia as a Christian-inspired alliance and as an 
impediment to ethnoterritorial unification and political self-determination.109    
 However, in the autumn of 1992 relations between Georgia and Russia deteriorated 
with the Abkhazia conflict in Georgia. In the past, Abkhazia was independent, dependent on 
tsarist Russia, part of an independent North Caucasus Confederation, a republic of the Soviet 
Union, and an autonomous republic of Georgia.110  Encouraged by Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
Perestroika, in March 1989 thirty thousand Abkhazians had signed a petition demanding the 
restoration of a sovereign Abkhazia. But Georgia had reacted negatively and established a 
branch of Tbilisi University at Skhumi to consolidate Georgian power and influence.111 
Disputes between Abkhazians and the Georgian government continued until Shevardnadze 
came to  power in Georgia. Shevardnadze achieved international recognition of Georgia, 
which implied the inclusion of Abkhazia in Georgia. Nevertheless, in June 1992, the 
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Abkhazian president sent a draft treaty to the Georgian State Council that there must be a 
confederative or federative relation between Georgia and Abkhazia and the territorial integrity 
of Georgia must be preserved. But the Georgian parliament did not reply to this draft treaty 
and the problem  stagnated for a while. On 12 August 1992, the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet 
again sent an appeal to Shevardnadze to negotiate on the status of Abkhazia but two days 
later, the Georgian State Council made a decision to send units of National Guard to the 
Abkhazian capital, Sukhumi. According to the Georgian government, these troops were going 
to stop the sabotage activities especially on the railway line and search for the Georgian 
officials who were kidnapped  by supporters of the former Georgian President Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia and it was Georgia’s sovereign right to settle its troops within its territory. As 
for Abkhazian officials, sabotage activities also occurred in  other parts of Georgia and 
hostages were not in  Abkhazia. Therefore, they claimed that these reasons were pretexts to 
impose military control over  Georgia. Besides, Abkhazian officials put forward that military 
units could not be brought into the Autonomous Abkhazian Republic without the consent of 
the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet. Although, Shevardnadze sent Defense Minister Tengiz 
Kitovani to find the kidnappers, Tengiz Kitovani defied orders – as Shevardnadze claimed- 
and marched into Sukhumi.112  Finally, Georgian troops with the support of tanks113 and 
helicopters in a short time without meeting any important resistance, took  control of Sukhumi 
and declared that Abkhazian Supreme Soviet was dissolved. Four days later, the  Georgian 
Army with  fresh reinforcements, took the strategically important city of Gagra, close to the 
Russian border. 114 Although, Tengiz Kitovani was able to conquer the whole of Abkhazian 
territory, he permitted the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet retain control over Gudauta between 
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Sukhumi and Gagra which proved later a serious  military mistake.115 On 3 September 1992 ,a 
cease-fire was signed between the  Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Eduard Shevardnadze and 
the Abkhazian President Vladislav Ardzinba. These leaders agreed on  the territorial integrity 
of Georgia, withdrawal of  all illegal armed forces in Abkhazia and the reduction of Georgian 
armed forces. However, after that, Abkhazian leaders asserted that Georgians did not 
withdraw troops as agreed and began to violate the cease-fire. At the beginning of October 
1992, war again broke out in Abkhazia and Georgian forces  began to suffer defeat. At that 
time Defense Minister, Pavel Grachev,  sent Russian troops to Gudauta -as he said- to 
evacuate some 12.000 tourists and other citizens but that operation effectively cut off 
Kitovani’s vanguard in Gagra and gave Abkhazian militias  an opportunity to capture 
Gagra.116 Then, on  3 October   1992, Georgia  lost the Gagra province  against Abkhazian 
fighters. Georgian officials blamed Russia for its assistance to the Abkhaz forces and  the 
Georgian parliament passed a law that nationalized all Soviet military equipment on its 
territory. However, Abkhazia   continued to gain victories in the battlefield against Georgians 
with the help of the local Russian commanders in  Abkhazia and with the help of volunteers 
from the North Caucasus.117 After defeats, Georgians understood that they had to accumulate 
more forces to defeat the Abkhaz. Although Georgia massed a large army, there was no 
coordination among them. For example, in Sukhumi there were several military contingents 
“Kitovani’s guard, Ioseliani’s Mkhedrioni, Karkarashvilli’s special combat unit, Akhalaia’s 
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military police, a battalion of Afghani soldiers and people’s volunteer corps”.118 On the other 
hand, Abkhazians organized their armed forces  and this enabled them to gain victory. 
Besides, though Grachev denied accusations of Russian involvement in the conflict, claiming 
that these were Georgian planes painted with Russian markings, the downing of a Russian 
SU-27 airplane flown by Russian Major Shipko on 19 March 1993, confirmed  active Russian 
military assistance.119 Furthermore, at that time, Grachev urged Georgian forces to withdraw 
from Sukhumi and new Russian troops arrived in Abkhazia on June 2, 1993 to consolidate 
Russia’s presence along the Black Sea shore and to mediate a cease-fire between Georgia and 
Abkhazia. Besides, there had been several aerial attacks on Georgian targets although 
Abkhazia had no air forces. At that time, the UN also got involved in the conflict, with the 
aim of finding a peaceful settlement.  In July 1993, UN approved Resolution 849 which 
provided for the deployment of UN military observers and in August 1993 a small UN 
observer mission (UNOMIG) was established in Georgia. While diplomatic efforts were 
increasing to end the conflict, Abkhazians were building up their forces.120 By June 25, 
tension again increased in the region and bitter fighting started. At that time, by the end of 
September 1993, the supporters of Gamsakhurdia also launched attacks on western Georgia to 
destabilize the government of Shevardnadze. 121 On 27 September, Abkhazian forces captured 
Sukhumi and Georgian forces retrieved from Abkhazia.  Although Georgia did not have an 
interest in political, economic and military integration with Russia, Eduard Shevardnadze 
needed  Russia  for  stability required to rebuild the country. Then, Shevardnadze who was 
under severe pressure because of the economic decline, the situation in Abkhazia, the hostile 
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manners of  Gamsakhurdia’s  supporters and the growing unrest in the ethnic clans,  decided 
to cooperate with Russia to avoid the complete collapse of Georgia and his governance. As a 
result,  on 22 October 1993, he  signed the CIS agreement  and one day later, on 23 October 
agreed to a Russian peacekeeping operation with a CIS mandate under UN observation.122 In 
February 1994, Boris Yeltsin traveled to Tbilisi and held a meeting about  military 
cooperation between two states with Shevardnadze.123 After that visit, Russia began to assist  
Georgia in the establishment of a new unified army and in April 1994, Lieutenant-General 
Vardiko Nadibaidze (an ethnically Georgian general in the Russian army who could barely 
speak Georgian),  was appointed minister of defense in  Georgia. 124 Besides, Russia began  to 
put pressure on Abkhazia to accept the return of Georgian refugees, to agree to a federation 
with Georgia and Russia,125 and also put an embargo on Abkhazia. Because of this embargo, 
Abkhazia could only establish communication  abroad by  the  capital Skhumi through 
Turkey,  but this path was later blockaded by the Russian ships.126 In May 1994, Russia sent 
its troops to observe the cease-fire between Abkhazia and Georgia. Although Georgia was 
hoping to make a federative arrangement with Abkhazia with the support of Russia and 
international organizations, on 26 November 1994 the Abkhaz parliament adopted an Abkhaz 
constitution and elected Vladislav Ardzinba as president.127  In December  1994, Russia made 
an agreement with Tbilisi on the maintenance of four military bases in Georgia for 25 years 
and on Russian patrols on the Georgian-Turkish border. 128 Besides, in the same year an  
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OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe)  mission was established in 
Georgia to facilitate negotiations between Georgia and South Ossetia, under Russian 
auspices.129 In addition, when the war broke out in Chechnya, Shevardnadze supported the 
integrity of the Russian state. By this way, Shevardnadze aimed to receive the support of 
Russia in the Abkhazia conflict. Besides, he was suspecting  assistance from the Chechen 
militias to  Abkhazian guerrillas. In addition, Chechen leaders accused Georgia of  permitting 
the use military bases in Georgia to launch attacks on Chechen targets.130 While this war put 
Georgia and Chechnya at loggerheads, it brought Georgia and Russia closer.  However, after 
the  Russian-Chechen peace treaty, which was signed in May 1997, Georgian-Chechen 
relations began to improve. Aslan Maskhadov, the Chechen president, to consolidate 
Chechnya’s position in its struggle against Russia for complete independence, tried to develop 
contacts with Georgia. Shevardnadze hoping to prevent the Chechen fighters from getting 
involved in  the Abkhazia conflict,  tried to ameliorate relations with Chechnya. In June 1997,  
Schverdnadze took a guarantee from Maskhadov of Chechen military neutrality and political 
support in the Abkhazia conflict.131The political solution  in Abkhazia seems  difficult since 
Abkhazian authorities reject the arrival of the Georgians in Abkhazia. Abkhazian officials are 
aware that if they give permission to the return of Georgians with full political rights as 
Georgian citizens, the Abkhaz will once again be a minority in their own land and their gains 
of war will be lost to sheer demographics.132 After the cease-fire between Georgia and 
Abkhazia, there did not occur a big dispute except the six days133 war and silence dominates 
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relations between two nations up to present. However, the repatriation of  Georgian refugees 
remain a major obstacle in Georgian-Abkhaz relations. 
 Unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the other autonomous republic, Ajaria, does not 
have severe problems with Georgia. The majority of the population  of Ajaria is Muslim, 
unlike the rest of Georgia. However, Ajarian people are ethnically Georgian and thus the 
leader of Ajaria, Aslan Abashidze became a mediator between Georgian factions.134 The 
province cooperates with Tbilisi in a number of areas, especially on economic matters. 
Ajaria's Black Sea port of Batumi is  significant for oil exportation. Today, despite some 
problems, Ajaria as one of the more economically prosperous provinces of Georgia, and 
remains politically loyal to Tbilisi.135  
 While Georgia focused on its internal affairs, its neighbors; Armenia and Azerbaijan 
were at war in the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Georgia preferred to pursue a non-involvement 
policy in that case, but the Armenians in Georgia had been a problem for the Georgian 
government. Since the independence of Georgia, the Akhalkalaki district, where the 
Armenians constitute 91.3 percent of the population, resisted the authority of Tbilisi. 
Akhalkalaki Armenians refused to serve in the Georgian army in 1992-1995 and even some 
took part in the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Besides, Akhalkalaki Armenians transferred arms-
belonging to the Russian army-, fuel and lubricants to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. 
Encouraged by the victories of their  fellowmen and the instability in Georgia, Akhalkalaki 
Armenians sent a request to the republic of Georgia demanding ‘the constitutional right of 
political self-government within the framework of a united Federal Republic of Georgia’. But 
Georgian authorities who had serious problems with autonomous regions, refused to discuss a 
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federal state for Akhalkalaki. Furthermore, Armenia did not support Akhalkalaki Armenians, 
since it did not want to deteriorate its relations with Georgia, which enables communication 
with its protector, Russia. To show its resoluteness, it banned the daily Armenian newspaper 
Lragir for three months for publishing an article which advocated the annexation of Armenian 
populated regions of southern Georgia.136 On the other hand, to avoid potential problems with 
the ethnic Armenians, Tbilisi refrains from imposing any burdens on the population and 
permits Armenians to serve in the local Akhaltiskhe Brigade or in the Javakh unit of the 
Georgian border department.137 Though there is not a serious problem in the enclave, Russia 
which has a base at Akhalkalaki can provoke the Armenians if Georgia  decides on the 
withdrawal of the Russian forces from Akhalkalaki. 
Today, Georgia includes the Autonomous Republics of Abkhazia and Ajaria and the  
Autonomous Region of South Ossetia. However, the constitution of Georgia which   was 
adopted in August 1995,  does not address the status of Abkhazia, Ossetia or Ajaria.138 
                       2.1.2. The military in Georgia  
Despite the internal conflicts and Russian pressure since 1991, Georgia has succeeded 
to build a national army involving ground forces, air forces and navy. After, Georgia gained 
its independence, it  inherited few military assets in military equipment and experienced 
military personnel. At the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, only 300 Georgian officers were 
in the Soviet armed forces and 80 per cent of them had served in the rear. Moreover, not one 
Georgian had graduated from a Soviet military college since 1985.139   Besides, when the 
Georgian officials intended to build an army,  internal conflicts arose and hindered the 
establishment of the Georgian national army under  control of the government. As mentioned 
                                                 
136Alexander Kukhianidze, “The Armenian and Azeri Communities in Georgia: On Georgia’s Nationalities and 
Foreign Policies,” in (eds) Bruno Coppieters, Alexei Zverev and Dmitri Trenin, Commonwealth and 
Independence in Post-Soviet Eurasia, (London: Frank Cass Publishers,1998), p.123.  
137 Barry Turner (ed), The Statesman’s Yearbook 2003, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), p.247. 
138Available at www.anca.org/anca/transcaucasus.asp?trid=11  
 
51 
above, the leaders of Georgia attempted to build up a national army from militias, who were 
more loyal to their commanders than to the government in Georgia. Because of  internal 
conflicts and the lack of a powerful authority, these militias  played an important role in 
Georgia. Between 1991 and 1993, there were no forces actually controlled by the Georgian 
government. The militias  overthrew Gamsakhurdia and under Schverdnadze’s governance, 
they destroyed the rebels who supported Gamsakhurdia. As a result, in the absence of a 
strong, unified army, their importance increased after the independence of Georgia. But their 
strong links to organized crime and profit from gun running and drug smuggling, caused an 
unstable situation and low-level ethnic conflicts in Georgia.140 Though these forces and other 
quasi-official militias fought against the Abkhaz, they remained independent (loyal to their 
commanders but out of government control) and participated in an assassination attempt by 
one group, the Mkhedrioni, on President Shevardnadze in August 1995. Today, the most 
important militia group, National Guard, is absorbed into the Ministry of Defense. The other 
militia group, Mkhedrioni is disbanded. At the moment, there are two guerrilla groups named 
the White Legion and the Forest Brothers, which are the sole organs of security for Georgians 
returning to Abkhazia.141  
Initially, Shevardnadze succeeded to protect Georgia’s sovereignty with Russian 
political and military aid.  But he received this support as a quid pro quo for  joining the CIS 
and permitting the development of Russian forces. This reliance on Russia was formalized 
when Georgia signed two treaties with Russia on military cooperation: the “Treaty of 
Friendship, Good Neighborly Relations, and Cooperation”  and the “Treaty on Russian 
Military Bases on the Territory of the Republic of Georgia”. The latter document granted 
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Russia a 25 year lease of four military bases on Georgian soil. The Russians also took 
responsibility for protecting all of Georgia’s borders, both land and maritime. In return, 
Russia was to provide training and equipment to Georgia in order to rebuild the Georgian 
armed forces.142  In March 1995, Russia promised to assist in building up the Georgian army 
in accordance with a military agreement.143 Between 1994 and 1996, the  Russian Army and 
the Georgian army conducted joint exercises and Russia promised to implement a joint air 
defense system, make joint training, exchange information and agreed to pay  60 per cent of 
all costs associated with protecting the Georgian border.144While Georgian army troops 
numbered between 3,000 and 12,000 in 1992, by 1996, due to the cooperation between 
Georgia and Russia, the Georgian armed forces were estimated to total about 25,200 including 
a 5,000 strong air force.145 However, the presence of Russian armed forces in Georgia 
provided Moscow with great leverage over Georgian political and economic decisions. 
Besides, Russia failed to solve the Abkhaz conflict, strengthen the army as the Georgian 
officials wanted and restore the Georgian territorial integrity although Georgia had given 
military bases to Russia on its own territory. As a result, the Georgian parliament did not 
ratify the agreements on Russian forward basing, nor the agreements on joint border 
protection. Then, Georgia turned its face to the West in the military domain  because of  
Russia’s failure to provide adequate supplies and training to the Georgian armed forces, and 
the augmentation of the Russian influence on Georgian political and economic decisions. 
Therefore, NATO has become a strategic partner with Georgia. In 1996, Georgian servicemen  
took part in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP) peacekeeping maneuvers in the United 
States. Military co-operation with the West, especially with the U.S. and Germany, 
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substantially widened on the basis of the PFP program.146 In 1997, Georgia established with 
Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldavia, a regional organization named GUAM. The main 
objectives of this arrangement are to reinforce the states’ sovereignty, to coordinate their 
national politics and to weaken Russian Federation’s effect on the region. Actually, it was the 
first political-economic organization established within the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), which was created in 1991 as an attempt by RF to reintegrate the post-Soviet 
space and to maintain a common security and economic space, without RF. Common security 
worries, common financial interests related with energy and economic cooperation are the 
other factors that caused  GUAM to be set up. Also, in 1997 there had been low-intensity 
harassment actions against Russian forces and the number of casualties in the Russian troops 
increased as a result of minefield injuries.147 In 1997-8 Georgia made several agreements with 
the Turkish General Staff on equipping and training, and in April 1998 conducted a joint 
peacekeeping exercise within the framework of the Partnership for Peace.148 Georgia also 
withdrew from the   CIS Collective Security Treaty in April 1999.149 In accordance with an 
agreement reached at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, Russia left theVaziani military base 
nearby Tbilisi.150 On the eve of the scheduled Russian withdrawal from Vaziani and Gudauta, 
Georgia for the first time in its history hosted military maneuvers "Cooperative Partner-2001" 
under NATO's Partnership for Peace with the involvement of over 4,000 ground and naval 
troops from 10 countries - USA, Turkey, France, Greece, Italy (NATO member-states) plus 
Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine in western Georgia on June 11-22.151 
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However, Russian officials insist that the withdrawal from military bases in Batumi and 
Akhalkalaki and the development of alternative locations for the bases inside Russia will take 
14 years. As for today, the timetable of Russian military withdrawal from Georgia still 
remains the subject of discussions. Georgia is developing close trade and military relations 
with Turkey. In the military realm, Turkey has agreed to provide Georgia’s armed forces with 
financial and technological assistance. A March 1999 agreement provides for training of 
Georgian troops in Turkey and for Ankara’s assistance in modernizing training facilities in 
Georgia. The accord envisages further Turkish assistance in creating training centers in 
Kodori and Gori and a modern shooting range outside of Tbilisi. Consultations between 
Georgian and Turkish officers will also proceed to develop future assistance programs.152 
 Compared with Azerbaijan and Armenia, Georgia has a small army. On March 2, 
1999 the Georgian parliament reduced the armed forces from 47,500 to 38, 414153  and in 
2002 this number decreased to 16,790.154 Georgia acts more professional than the other states 
and is on the right way to build a Western type army. But while on the one hand Georgia  
tried to escape Russian control, it tried to utilize Russian influence and power on the other. 
Therefore, the double face of the Georgian military policy revealed itself in the pro-Russian 
orientation of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) on the one hand, and the pro-Western 
orientation of the Border Guards on the other.155 Besides, compared to Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, Georgia has a strong defense industry basis and it can manufacture and sell aircraft 
and spare-parts. But the social structure of the army is lacking in the number of educated 
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soldiers are not high enough. There are even many soldiers who can not speak the Georgian 
language.156                                                                                                                                                  
           2.1.3. Georgian economy 
After  independence Georgia’s economy, because of internal conflicts and external 
pressures, suffered more than the other states: the average annual decline of its GDP for 1990-
94 was more than 30 percent and by 1995 the economy had shriveled to about one-tenth of its 
size in 1989.157 Because of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, industrial production 
in 1992 fell 67 percent from the 1990 level and inflation rose to 50 percent a month.  
158Georgia introduced its own currency-the coupon- in April 1993, but its value equaled  near 
worthlessness since inflation rate reached over 15,000 percent in 1994.159 Also, the tourism 
sector in Georgia, which once had attracted millions of holiday makers, created thousands of 
jobs, and provided significant income in the private sector, deteriorated because of violence 
and political instability in the country. After Shevardnadze came to power, Georgia 
maintained close relations with Russia on which it depends for energy supplies and trade in 
industrial goods and, the  economy of Georgia got better in time. In August 1992, the 
Georgian government decided to implement a privatization program. In 1993, Georgian 
government began with the privatization of small, medium, and large enterprises which 
enabled the development of the Georgian economy.160 Georgia had been more successful than 
Armenia or Azerbaijan in its privatization policy and half a million Georgians are reported to 
be shareholders in privatized enterprises.161 In addition, relations between Turkey and Georgia 
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continued to expand. During 1991, more than a million Georgians traveled to Turkey for 
shopping and a Georgian consulate general was opened in Trabzon.162 Afterwards, Georgia 
emerged from two years of civil conflict with a collapsed economy, widespread crime and a 
weak government in 1994, the economic policies that Georgia implemented began to give  
fruit. In late 1994, the Georgian government began  to implement a comprehensive reform 
program with the assistance of the IMF and World Bank and there was a visible improvement 
in the Georgian economy 163 In January 1994, Georgia received a $50 million loan, promises 
of electricity, and other assistance from Turkey 164 and in September 1995 received $388 
million in US aid.165  Georgia introduced –the lari- as its own currency (worth 1 million 
coupons) in September 1995. Today, Turkey and Georgia engage also in several joint civil-
engineering projects such as the Kars-Tbilisi railroad, hydro-power projects, modernization of 
Batumi’s airport, and, most important, the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi Oil pipeline.166 In 1996, 
Georgia represented only 0.5 percent of Russian trade within the CIS, while  Georgian trade 
with Turkey increased dramatically.167 In 1996 and 1997 growth had exceeded %10  168 and  
Georgia had one of the largest GDP growth rates in the world. In addition to  strong internal 
development, the large oil discoveries in the Caspian area increased the  geopolitical 
importance of Georgia and  helped Georgia to gradually establish itself as a major transit 
route for the vast oil and gas resources which will serve as the main conduit between Caspian 
oil fields and the international market. Besides, a major boost for the economy is expected in 
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2003, when the construction phase of the $2.9 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and 
$2.5 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline will start. 169  
Since independence, Georgia  is struggling for  transition from the socialist economic 
system to a market economy and it is determined to further contribute to the policy of the 
liberalization of global trade and considers its participation in the multilateral trading system 
as an important step towards integration into the world economy as seen on the tables. 
In  2001 the Georgia’s first ten largest trade partners according to the trade turnover 
were the following: 
Table: 1 170  
Main partners Thousands USD % 
Turkey 173727.2 17.3% 
Russia  164748.2 16.4% 
Azerbaijan 83772.8 8.3% 
Germany 76982.8 7.7% 
Ukraine 61185.8 6.1% 
UK 48089.8 4.8% 
Turkmenia 46505.7 4.6% 
USA 37310.0 3.7% 
Italy 34115.3 3.4% 
Switzerland 29563.5 2.9% 
 
Table:2171 
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    2.1.4. Georgia's foreign relations 
 After Georgia declared independence in 1991, Georgian people, media and policy 
makers hoped to see a politically, economically and militarily strong state, a model for 
Azerbaijan and Armenia and a mediator in the disputes of the Caucasian states. But in fact, 
ethnic conflicts and Russian pressure prevented Georgia to become an effective state in the 
region. However, indeed, Georgia increased its political stature in the region via the 
Armenian-Azeri conflict. If this conflict had not occurred, Azerbaijan would have developed 
its communication links with Turkey through Armenia, and Armenia would have  reached the 
Black Sea and Russia through Russia. Besides, the Turkish and Azeri embargo imposed on 
Armenia increased the significance  of the transport routes through Georgia to Russia and the 
Black Sea. In addition, by this conflict two alliances-Turkey, Azerbaijan and Russia, 
Armenia- appeared in the Caucasus which are connected by the territory of Georgia. 
Therefore by this conflict, Georgia became a key player in the region.172 Although Georgia 
tried to remove itself from the influence of the Russian Federation after its independence, it 
reluctantly found itself as a strategic ally of Russia. Since the independence of Georgia, 
Russian-Georgian relations have been characterized by tension, threats, recriminations, and 
mutual suspicion. Because of the Russian active but  negative interferences in the internal 
conflicts of Georgia in the past, today  Georgian officials suspect  Russia of  undermining 
Georgian sovereignty, destroying domestic political stability, and preventing the economic 
upswing that is expected to result from the export via Georgia of Azerbaijan's Caspian oil.173 
At the moment, the Russian-Georgian relationship is extremely tense and complex,  since 
Russia is concerned that a NATO presence would decrease its effect in the region, cause the  
withdrawal of its forces from Georgia, while Georgia refuses to allow Russia to use Georgian 
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territory to attack Chechnya from the south. Since President Vladimir Putin came to office, 
Russian pressure has increased   principally using economic levers, such as gas supplies. In 
2000  Georgia emerged from a dark winter, plagued by a gas cut-off by Russia and a drought, 
which reduced hydropower.174. Besides, Russia's support of the Abkhazian people continues 
and the presence of Russian military disturbs Georgian officials. According to Georgia's UN 
envoy Ambassador Revaz Adamia, Russia  dropped visa requirements for the Abkhazia 
region's residents, freely distributes Russian passports in the area and Russian entrepreneurs  
buy up the region's land, businesses and natural resources.175 Throughout 2002, Russia 
accused Georgia of harboring terrorists for crimes answerable in Russia’s war with Chechnya, 
and Georgia claimed that Russia violated its sovereignty under the guise of antiterrorist 
operations. Aware of Russian power, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze has taken 
tentative steps to lower tensions with his country’s largest neighbor, Russia, but the problems, 
as touched upon above, still complicate efforts to build bilateral trust.176 
Although Shevarnadze is aware of the importance of Russia, he puts great importance 
on relations with neighboring states and  today, Georgia has forged close diplomatic and 
economic relations with Azerbaijan, Iran and Turkey as a balance to Russia since “proximity 
to a militarized state with undeveloped democracy and a highly unpredictable development 
course is an essential factor of the geopolitical environment of Georgia’s security”.177 Despite 
Georgia's obvious cultural and religious affinities with Armenia, relations between Georgia 
and Muslim Azerbaijan generally have been closer than those with Christian Armenia for 
several reasons. First, Azerbaijan is an indispensable state for  the health of the Georgian 
economy. Second, Georgians feel sympathy towards Azerbaijan's position in the conflict 
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between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh 
because of similarities to Georgia's internal problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On 
the other hand, Turkey is the economic, military and diplomatic partner of Georgia in the 
region as mentioned above. Georgia and Iran have no dispute of any kind, between them. If 
the US policy of containment of Tehran is changed, Georgian-Iran relations would become 
better.  
Although Georgia   supports the country's goal of greater integration with Western 
political, economic and security institutions, and came a long way in its process of state-
building, some problems as “separatism, external interference in domestic affairs, the relative 
strength of ethnic self-identification (lack of nationalist feeling), corruption”, continue to 
impede Georgia, which endeavors to be a real state. Today, Georgia as a member of the UN, 
the OSCE, and the CIS is a unitary state on paper including South Ossetia, Ajaria and 
Abkhazia but it does not have control over about %15 of its territory.  
In the next section, the other South Caucasian state, Azerbaijan, which had gained its  
independence like Georgia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, will be examined  from 
the political, economic and military viewpoints. 
 2.2. Azerbaijan178 
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 Azerbaijan is the largest of the three Transcaucasian republics in terms of both 
territory and population. Its area is  86,600 sq. Km and its population was 7,593,000 
according to the 1989 census. The population breaks down into 82,7 % Azerbaijanis, 5.6 % 
Armenians, 5.6 % Russians and 2.4 % Lezgins(1989 census).179 There are more ethnic 
Azerbaijanis (approximately 20.000 million) living in Iran rather than in Azerbaijan. 
Azerbaijan has extensive reserves of oil and other minerals. It is a fertile country, producing 
both staples and industrial crops such as cotton. It was one of the few non-Russian republics 
that paid more into the union budget than it received back in subsidies. It includes one 
autonomous region, Nagorno Karabakh(annexed by Armenia); and one autonomous republic, 
Nakhichevan, which is separated from Azerbaijan proper by the Zangezur region of Armenia; 
as well as several small islands in the Caspian Sea. 
          2.2.1. Azerbaijan's foreign relations and the political situation in  
                    Azerbaijan since 1990.      
   
In January 1990, Ayaz  Mutalibov, former Communist Party Secretary, won the 
presidential election which was conducted in an anti-democratic manner, crowding out any 
other candidate such as the Popular Front candidates. Mutalibov’s government that pursued a 
pro-Moscow policy, in order to assure Azerbaijani public support, resumed an attack on 
Nagorno-Karabakh and Ayaz Mutalibov, tried to obtain the support of Russia in its struggle 
with Armenians in the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh. 
 Nagorno-Karabakh is an Armenian-populated autonomous enclave in the middle of 
Azerbaijan. On 20 February 1988, the Soviet Oblast of the NKAO (Nagorno Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast) asked the USSR, Azerbaijan and Armenia to approve the separation of 
Karabakh from Azerbaijan and its annexation to Armenia with a petition which was signed by 
80,000 people that demanded  joining of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. But Azerbaijan 
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refused this demand.180 Azerbaijani officials did not manage to solve the problem and violent 
riots begun in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. At that time, unlike Armenia, 
Azerbaijan  did not assert its independence and supported the idea of a renewed Soviet Union. 
As a result, Soviet forces supported the Azerbaijani forces to remove the Armenian 
population from villages in the Shaumian district.181 At that time as the acts of violence 
increased in Baku,  tension also grew in Yerevan and the Armenian government expelled 
165.000 Azerbaijanis from Armenia, killing 216 of them-including 57 women, 5 infants and 
18 children of different ages-.182 After this event, in Baku there  began acts of violence against  
Armenians and in January 1990, Soviet troops, allegedly responding to reports of a pogrom 
directed against the Armenian inhabitants of Baku, intervened in Baku by killing many 
civilians and declared a state of martial law.183 Later, a sort of compromise was reached 
between Mutalibov’s regime and the Soviet Union. Mutalibov took a guarantee from the SU 
for the survival of his regime as long as  Soviet rule existed in Azerbaijan.184  But Mutalibov’s 
strategy had not been effective since his supporters in the Soviet Union were overthrown with 
a coup in August 1991. After the Moscow coup, on 30 August 1991 Ayaz Muttalibov 
proclaimed the independence of Azerbaijan, and Turkey was the first state to recognize 
Azerbaijan’s independence.  Ten days after, on 10 September 1991, the NKR Supreme Soviet 
declared  independence and in the beginning of 1992, Russian forces departed from Nagorno-
Karabakh and the conflict developed into an all-out war.185 Mutalibov, trusting  Soviet 
support, had not established a national army in  Azerbaijan and could not have resisted 
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Armenian guerrillas in  Nagorno-Karabakh. In fact, Mutalibov was thinking that an army 
could become a source of political opposition to him. While Mutalibov thought that he would 
gain a quick victory, this war caused a flow of Azeri refugees from Karabakh and 
deterioration of the Azerbaijani economy. After a massacre of Azerbaijani civilians by the 
Armenian army backed by the Russian army in the village of Khojaly, he was forced to resign 
in March 1992. 
 After Mutalibov, in May Yakub Marmedov, was chosen President by the parliament  
unconstitutionally. But in June 1992, the leader of the APF (Azerbaijani Popular Front), 
Abulfaz Elchibey who promised decisive victory in  Nagorno-Karabakh, became  president by 
winning the elections. 
 Elchibey who was known for his closeness to Turkey,  gave great importance on the 
development of Turkish-Azerbaijani relations and Turkey which has common linguistic, 
ethnic and cultural roots with Azerbaijan,  tried to do its best to aid Azerbaijan. Turkey was 
the first country to recognize Azerbaijan’s independence in November 1991, the first to sign a 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and the first to open its embassy. Elchibey accepted 
Turkey as a model for Azerbaijan and from the beginning, in his policies, Elchibey adhered to 
the motto of the Azerbaijani Nationalistic Party Musavat; “ Turkization, Modernization, 
Islamization” and tried to build an independent and democratic society with a market 
economy and parliamentary political  system.186 On the other hand, Elchibey, who was jailed 
for organizing anniversary celebrations of the founding of an independent republic in northern 
Iran in 1918 where the Azerbaijanis are most populated, called on Tehran to grant the region 
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cultural autonomy and thus relations between Azerbaijan and Iran remained tense.187 
Although Elchibey initially assumed an anti-Russian attitude in his policies, later he signed 
bilateral agreements with Russia on trade and economic policy.188 Besides, the Russian 
government did not oppose  Elchibey government’s  hiring of Russian mercenaries and  the 
seizure of several weapons, which  led to the Azerbaijani military victories in Nagorno-
Karabakh.189 Unlike Mutalibov, Elchibey tried to build a national army, which he saw as a  
necessary and indispensable component for the real independence of Azerbaijan. Elchibey 
could not have constituted an army, because the army was still composed of various militias 
loyal to their local commanders rather than being unified army. In November 1992, Elchibey 
appointed Colonel Suret Husseinov who did not have a professional military background, but 
was famous for  supplying equipment at his own expense by his wool-processing factory to 
the militias. Besides, the Russian Federation transferred heavy arms to the 709th Brigade in 
Azerbaijan which was the private army of Suret Husseinov.190 
 After the election, Elchibey mounted a large scale attack on  Nagorno-Karabakh. 
Although Azerbaijan gained military successes against Armenians in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
enclave initially, these victories began to turn to defeats with the loss of Lachin, a strategic 
city that broke the siege of  Nagorno-Karabakh and attached the enclave to Armenia by a safe 
land corridor.191 Elchibey to compensate for defeats, wanted to increase the draft but he  
pressured  the non-Azerbaijanis to enlist in  the army. However, the minorities in Azerbaijan 
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especially the Lezgins192 opposed Elchibey’s Azeri centric policy and refused to serve in a 
war that they felt was strictly ethnic. After then, Lezgins wanted to integrate with Daghestan. 
Besides, at that time the Talysh in the south declared their intention to set up a separate state 
of Mughan-Talysh and applied for membership in the CIS. While these events were 
undermining  political stability in Azerbaijan, Moscow wanted to strengthen its position in 
Azerbaijan by deploying troops to carry out peacekeeping functions. Besides, the 
Russian104th Parachute regiment based in Ganje  sent an ultimatum to Elchibey in January 
1993 demanding to remain in the republic as a ‘peacekeeping force’.193 But  the Elchibey 
government  denied  Russian proposals. By the end of 1993, the Russian Ministry of Defense 
agreed to withdraw all CIS joint armed forces because of the constant harassment of the 
Soviet 7th Army based in Azerbaijan by Azerbaijani fighters.194Then, the APF government 
demanded military assistance from  Turkey and Turkey sent retired army officers to train the 
Azerbaijani fighters. Azerbaijan’s  territorial losses continued with the loss of  Kelbajar and 
Fizuli. While, Azerbaijan had lost 10 percent of its territories before Elchibey, during the 
Elchibey governance, the losses  reached  25 percent of Azerbaijani territory.  
At that time the leader of Nakhichevan, Haydar Aliyev (previously the KGB chief of 
Azerbaijan and a member of Mikhail Gorbachev’s Politburo) was pursuing policies at odds 
with Baku such as allowing cargo shipments from Iran across Nakhichevan to Armenia. 
Elchibey tried to impose his own control in Nakhichevan but Aliyev’s popularity and power 
prevented it.195 After the loss of the Kelbajar district, Elchibey wanted to take away 
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Husseinov from the army but Husseinov refused and took refuge in Ganja. Elchibey launched 
an attack on Husseinov but was defeated by Husseinov’s militias.196 At that time, because of 
Elchibey’s refusal of the Russian plans, the Russian military commander handed over large 
quantities of weapons to Suret Husseinov to make a coup against Elchibey. After his victory 
against Elchibey, with the support of Russia, Husseinov marched on Baku with Haydar 
Aliyev and overthrew Elchibey from the administration on June 18,1993. 
After Elchibey escaped to Nakhichevan, all his powers were given to Haydar Aliyev, 
the parliamentary chairman. Aliyev initially held meetings with the Western oil firms and the 
Western oil consortium of British Petroleum, Amoco, and Pennzoil, which  promised to give 
$70 million on June 22,1993. After this, the parliament demanded Elchibey’s resignation on 
June 23, though the European Community, Turkey, and the United States declared their 
support to Elchibey.197 After Aliyev came to power, like the other leaders of Azerbaijan, he 
focused on the Nagorno-Karabakh affair, but he could not  prevent territorial losses. 
Azerbaijani forces which were demoralized, fell into confusion and could not  resist 
advancing Armenians effectively. In fact, although some retired Turkish officers trained 
Azerbaijani fighters, there was not a coherent strategy in the Azerbaijani forces and military 
units were poorly coordinated since they were loyal to their local commanders. Ironically, the 
large armory that was left from hastily departing Russian troops, was not matched by the 
supply of trained personnel.198  
The Nagorno-Karabakh war did not only effect Azerbaijan and Armenia but also the 
regional powers, Turkey, Iran, Russia, the unique superpower US and the European states and 
several peace initiatives were made to stop that war since its outset. Initially, CSCE 
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(Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE as of 1 January 1995) with the so 
called ‘Minsk Group’ (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, the Czech Republic,  France, Germany, 
Italy, Russia, Sweden, Turkey, the USA) got involved in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to 
find a peaceful settlement but could not be effective initially. At that moment Russia was  
partial to Armenia but later Russia assumed a more active stance by appointing Vladimir 
Kazimirov as special envoy with responsibilities for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in July 
1993. When he began an active shuttle diplomacy between Baku, Yerevan and Stepanakert, 
Nagorno-Karabakh forces launched attacks on Azerbaijanis, capturing Agdam (late July), 
Fizuli and Dzhebrail( early October), and Horadiz (late October). Then UNSC approved three 
resolutions (853 of 29 July, 874 of 14 October, and 884 of 12 November)199 recommending 
the withdrawal of Armenian forces from all occupied territories and Russia supported these 
resolutions to prove its impartiality. 200 In early 1994, Defense Minister Pavel Grachev also 
participated in  Kazimorov’s shuttle diplomacy and due to his efforts, on 12 May 1994 a 
cease-fire agreement was concluded. Grachev in this cease-fire regime, tried to deploy 
Russian peacekeeping troops, but President Aliyev wanted a multinational peace-force under 
the control of CSCE.201 Then, several CSCE states declared their readiness to provide 
peacekeeping troops and in December 1994  CSCE took the political decision to provide a 
peacekeeping contingent. Besides, Russia also accepted that decision.202 Today, the status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh continues to be a problem.   
Since the independence of Azerbaijan, despite some small problems Turkish-
Azerbaijani relations have been warm for several reasons. First, the people of both states  
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have common ethnic origins, language and religion (though adhering to different sects) and 
both sides look at each other with sympathy. Second, good relations with Turkey is important 
for Azerbaijan which wants to broaden its policy options against Iran and Russia. Third, 
Turkey as a major western ally and a NATO member,  is able to aid Azerbaijan in opening to 
the West. On the other hand, although Azerbaijan remained very concerned about continuing 
Russian-Armenian military co-operation, gave importance to the relations with Russia under 
Haydar Aliyev’s governance but at the same time, Aliyev stressed that he viewed Azerbaijan 
as an independent state that should never again be "someone's vassal or colony."203 Ties with 
Russia improved in 2001 with Russian President Vladimir Putin's visit to Baku. He became 
the first Russian president to visit Azerbaijan in the post-Soviet period and  that visit 
symbolized  the changing Russian policy towards Azerbaijan. Having condemned previous 
"imperial ambitions", he stressed the importance of establishing good neighborly relations.204 
During Putin’s visit to Baku, Russia and Azerbaijan agreed to the common use of the surface 
of the Caspian Sea while dividing the seabed for use between them in line with a bilateral 
agreement signed between Russia and Kazakhstan. Russia promised Azerbaijan to play a 
more constructive role in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process and  not to introduce a visa 
regime for Azerbaijanis. Azerbaijan, in turn, promised to lease, over a long period, a radar 
station to the Russians located in Qabala and promised increased business opportunities for 
Russian companies in Azerbaijan.205 While relations between Russia and Azerbaijan began to 
improve, Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran deteriorated due to the controversy on the use of the 
Caspian Sea Basin. Iran has proposed either common control by the littoral states or the 
division of the seabed into five equal sectors. But Azerbaijan does not agree to that solution. 
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While Iran comes close to Russia which aims to prevent the US from dominating the 
distribution of oil and gas, Azerbaijan allies itself to America and its oil companies.206 The 
differences between Iran and Azerbaijan was revealed  in July 2001 when  Iranian ships and 
military aircraft chased two Azerbaijani oil-exploration ships out of disputed waters in the 
Caspian, intensifying the hostilities between the two countries over oil rights.207However, 
Turkey reacted immediately and  gave Iran an ultimatum to leave Azerbaijan in peace, or 
failing that Tehran would have to deal with Ankara. The elite "Turkish Stars" squadron 
appeared in the skies above Azerbaijan on 24 August, pointing to  the strategic union between 
two peoples and states. Tehran described the action as a Turkish show of force and  Haydar 
Aliyev postponed his visit to Tehran. As a result , the very cold relations between Baku and 
Tehran became even more tense and today continue to  remain rigid.208 
   2.2.2. Oil and oil export options209 
In the initial days of its independence, Azerbaijan under the leadership of president 
Abulfaz Elchibey , clearly preferred Turkey to Russia. This had been obvious when Elchibey 
did not invite Russian firms to the oil consortium. But after  Elchibey was overthrown with a 
coup by Colonel Suret Husseinov, Turkey  found itself in a different oil bargain with Haydar 
Aliyev. Aliyev learned from his predecessors (Mutalibov: with a strong pro-Russian 
orientation, Elchibey: with a strong pro-Turkish orientation) a lot and  adamantly rejected a 
strong ideological element in Azerbaijan's  policy.210 Unlike Elchibey, Aliyev tried to restore  
relations with Russia and on 17 September 1993, signed an agreement with the president of 
the Russian oil company Lukoil, Vagit Alekperov, on the principle of cooperation with the 
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Azerbaijan State Oil Company (SOCAR). Later,  in accordance with the agreement which 
was signed on 26 September between Russia and Azerbaijan, Lukoil’s share in oil 
development projects in Azerbaijan was guaranteed to be  no less than 10 per cent. On 20 
September  1994, Aliyev signed  an agreement which was named ‘the oil deal of the century’ 
with a consortium of eleven foreign companies (including Lukoil)  and this led to an 
improvement in Azerbaijan in every domain.211 Besides,  after Aliyev came to power,  the 
alternative oil pipeline ( Baku- Novorossisk) had come on the agenda. For Turkey an 
alternative pipeline was not a serious challenge. Because, this pipeline passed through 
Chechen territory, on which there was a conflict at that time. But Turkey’s prediction about 
this pipeline proved false in time. Russia exerted control on Chechnya by using  military 
force. In addition, (AIOC) ,Azerbaijan International Operating Company, a consortium of 10 
major international oil companies, prepared a report showing the cost of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) twice its former cost. Turkey was in a hopeless situation. The most important reason 
for the failure was the political instability in Turkey. Because as the bargains on the pipelines 
were going on seriously, Turkey had changed seven foreign ministers. 212 
However, at that time the USA intervened in the oil and oil pipelines bargains in 
favour of Turkey. The USA wanted to break the hegemony of  Russia on the pipelines and 
isolate fundamentalist  Iran by supporting the multipipeline project. Americans wanted the 
delivery of the huge reserves of oil and gas by the "safe hands" of their loyal NATO ally, 
Turkey. 213 Aliyev also placed great importance on the relations with Turkey, and in 1995 
increased the share of Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) in AIOC from 1.75 per cent to 
                                                 
211 Pavel Baev, Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs,1997), p. 32. 
212 Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu ,Kurt Kapanında Kısır Siyaset,(Ankara: İmge Kitabevi,1997), pp: 49-72.  
213 Joseph Fitchett, “War Alters Caspian Equation,”   Herald Tribune, October 31,2001, Chris Morris and Ian 
Traynor, “Caspian Oil Plan Stirs Political Cauldron” at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archieve/Article/0,4273,3930880,00.html,  “Q & A With Steven R. Mann :American 
Diplomat Sees Encouraging Signs On Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline” at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/qanda/articles/eav110801.shtml   
 
71 
6.75 per cent.214 In addition, in 29 October ,  1998 the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Turkey and Uzbekistan  signed the Ankara Declaration which confirmed their 
determination to implement the Baku- Ceyhan Oil Pipeline.215 Also under an inter-
governmental protocol signed in November 18, 1999 in Istanbul; Turkey, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia agreed to build the one million barrel a-day Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline”.216 
 Russia lacks a common ideology or myth and even economic power to consolidate its 
hegemony over Azerbaijan, thus  , these existing pipelines  through its territory are effective 
weapons against Azerbaijan and  Russia sees these energy export routes as a means for re-
establishing the former power of the  Soviet Union.217 Therefore, the Russian government 
looked with no sympathy to any energy exports from the Caspian region that were not under 
its control. As an alternative to this project, Russia put pressure on Azerbaijan  to carry the 
Azerbaijan oil to the Novorossisk harbor, which was in its region. But  while, the Novorossisk  
terminal  is closed for 87-100 days annually due to climate conditions, then Ceyhan terminal 
can be  used everyday of the year and serve growing markets in southern and western Europe. 
It does not need further investment to activate and it has 300 thousand DWT tanker capacities. 
Besides, TPAO estimates that the cost of shipping 45m ton of crude oil from Ceyhan to 
Genoa at 38 cents per barrel would amount to $124.8, while shipping the same amount from 
Novorossisk will add $115 m additional cost on that price.218 In addition, Russian pipelines 
are very old and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil pipeline will be constructed taking into 
consideration new technological developments.219 Besides, the Turkish government arranged 
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tariff reduction and guaranteed to cover construction costs above 1.4 billion dollars when the 
major oil companies opposed the BTC because of its high cost compared to other possible 
routes and in October 2000, Kazakhstan stated that it would support BTC by supplying 15 
millions of crude oil  in reply to the objections about the inadequacy of reserves.220 Today the 
present low-level Caspian Production ‘early oil’ is being carried by the existing pipelines via 
the Bosphorus. However, in the future the Straits will not be capable of handling the heavy 
flow of tanker traffic due to  geophysical restrictions. Taken all the international safety 
mechanisms and modern precautions in order to avoid collision, the danger in the Straits will 
continue to remain because of the capacity of the Turkish Straits is dictated by nature. The 
speed of the traffic, the speed of the currents and the speed of the wind  can not be changed by 
any precaution. While safety measures can  be increased, no measures can increase the 
capacity of the Straits.221 For example, it took three years and amounted to $ 18 billion to 
clean up the petroleum spillage from the Exxon Walders tanker, which sank off the shores of 
Alaska in 1989.222 After the accident, Exxon had to pay over $5 billion in accident claims and 
compensation.223 Probably, if that accident happened in the Bosphorus, which narrows to less 
than one mile and around which 12 million people live, it would cost more. Before the  
enactment of the 1994 Turkish Straits Maritime Regulations and the amended 1998 
Regulations  went into effect, the number of maritime accidents had risen to the alarming 
number of 49 in 1991. Since 1994, the number of collisions and accidents has been drastically 
reduced in the Straits  but the danger continues to remain. 
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Table 3: Accidents in the Turkish Straits224 
                     Straits of İstanbul                                  Straits of Çanakkale  
Year Total number of accidents Total number of passing vessels Year Total number of accidents Total number of passing vessels 
1990 43     
1991 49     
1992 39     
1993 25  1993 12 35.460 
1994 12     
1995 4 46.954    
1996 7 49.952 1996 10 36.198 
1997 10 50.942 1997 3 36.543 
1998 11 49.304 1998 6 38.777 
1999 11 47.906 1999 7 40.582 
2000 9 48.079 2000 8 41561 
2001 20 42.637 2001 9 39.249 
 
 
Thus, the BTC project is the most suitable project which will avoid all transport by sea 
through the Black Sea and the Turkish Straits. When the assistant  Foreign Minister of Russia 
said to Aliyev: “The capacity of Baku- Novorossisk oil pipeline will be 30 – 40 million tons 
in the future and there will be no need for BCP, Aliyev told  him that: We have our own 
plans. BCP will be implemented absolutely. This pipeline will not only transport Azerbaijani 
oil but also Kazakh and Turkmen oil too”.225 As a result, Haydar Aliyev’s successful oil 
politics brought Azerbaijan into world politics. Russia which was an enthusiastic supporter of 
Armenia became aware of the importance of Azerbaijan and began to maintain close relations 
with Azerbaijan  in order to protect its economic interest and  distanced itself from Armenia 
to some extent.226  
In  cold weather, if one stays away from  fire, one will freeze. If one approaches it 
closely, one can burn. Today Russia is like a fire for Azerbaijan. To consolidate its 
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independence, Azerbaijan tries to strengthen its relations with the other regional states. It 
wants to diversify its sources rather than being dependent on a single state. On the other hand, 
while Azerbaijan has rich gas reserves, it cannot extract it and use it for its own purposes. 
When Azerbaijan wanted to purchase gas from Russia, Russia clearly stated that, this would 
be conditional upon the  flow  of  oil from Baku- Novorossisk rather than Baku-Supsa. While 
Azerbaijan is in favour of BCP, its  dependence on Russia limits Azerbaijan’s political 
manoeuvre capability. With the implementation of this project, natural gas transportation from 
Azerbaijan to Turkey will also be made at lower prices. There is a huge gas reserve in the 
Shah Deniz field of Azerbaijan and Turkey is the most available and closest market for Azeri 
gas (see table 1). Shah Deniz gas is very important for the Baku-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline  because 
it will also contribute to the construction of BCP. If BCP and Azeri gas line are laid parallel, 
the capital and operational expenses will be greatly reduced. In addition, the Baku-Ceyhan Oil 
Pipeline will prevent Azerbaijan from being dependent on Russia and when Azerbaijan gains 
its economic independence, the trade relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey will not be 
limited to oil, will also leap to other domains.227 
 
Table 4: Turkey’s gas demand forecast (million m3) by BOTAS and Turkish Energy Ministry 228   
YEARS      2000      2010      2015     2020 
RESIDENTIAL      2928      8389      9396     9806 
INDUSTRY      2415    10971    12238   15147 
FERTILIZER        839        929        929       929 
POWER      9418    34903    44903   56903 
TOTAL 
   15600    55192    67466 82785 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
226 Kemal H. Karpat, “The Role of Turkey and Iran in Incorporating the Former Soviet Republics into the World 
System,” in (ed) Karen Dawisha, The International Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the 
New States of Eurasia, (London, New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1997), p. 180.  
227 Notes from interview with A. Necdet Pamir (Foreign Policy and Energy Adviser to the ARI Movement, an 
independent political initiative in Turkey). 
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Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline Project, which aims to transport crude oil to Ceyhan 
via Georgia, will consolidate Azerbaijan’s economic independence. On the other hand, this 
project is not simply an economic project, but also it is a concrete symbol of the cultural, 
historical and ethnic ties between the brother states, Azerbaijan and Turkey. 
            2.2.3. Azerbaijan economy 
After its independence, Azerbaijan tried to improve its economic relations with central 
Asia, Turkey and Iran especially during Elchibey’s governance. The APF government signed 
a number of bilateral economic and trade accords with the Iranian government despite 
political problems.229 In November 1992, Baku participated in the ‘Turkic Common Market’ 
consisting of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.230 Although 
Azerbaijan did not face troubles in the economic domain as Georgia and Armenia did, it  met 
with difficulties because of the Nagorno-Karabakh war. In 1992, GNP fell by some 20 percent  
but 60 percent of CIS oil and gas field equipment, including the newest CIS technology which 
is manufactured in Baku, kept alive the economy of Azerbaijan.231Although Azerbaijan 
introduced its own currency -manat- in August 1992, it was not  able to stabilize its value and 
inflation remained about 1,100 percent in 1993 and nearly 1,800 percent in 1994.232 Although 
Azerbaijan joined the IMF and the World Bank in 1994, its economy did not improve like 
Armenia. In addition while in September 1995, Armenia received $505 million aid from the 
US, Azerbaijan received only $72 million US aid because of its use of force and its blockade 
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against Armenia.233 And the US government did not give MFN (Most Favored Nation) status 
to Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan’s exports  faced US general non-MFN tariffs between 1992 and 
2001.234 However after the cease-fire in the Nagorno-Karabakh, the economy of Azerbaijan 
began to develop and Azerbaijan economy has been one of the fastest growing economies in 
the world. The real GDP growth was 10 % in 1998, 7.4 in 1999 and 11.1 in 2000.235 This was 
largely due to the foreign investment in the country in anticipation of the forthcoming oil 
boom. Azerbaijan’s manat strengthened by the country’s oil potential and it  appreciated more 
than the Armenian dram and the Gerogian lari and by over 500 percent in real terms.236  With  
142 million USD exports and 69 million USD imports, Turkey is the second commercial 
partner of Azerbaijan, after the RF. But, Azerbaijan’s imports and exports from Turkey have 
diminished  %40  since 1998, but it is an indisputable fact that, Azerbaijan constitutes an 
economic and commercial gateway for Turkey to Central Asia. Besides, Azerbaijan tries to 
improve its economic  relations with Georgia to develop its oil exports and this 
rapprochement is supported by Turkey and the West eagerly. Today, the oil industry currently 
accounts for 70% to 80% of total foreign investment in Azerbaijan, and foreign direct 
investment increased from $15 million in 1993 to $827 million in 1999, about 20% of 
Azerbaijan's GDP.237 Azerbaijan also ranked  eighth in the foreign direct investment 
performance in the world between 1998-2000.238 
             2.2.4. Military developments in Azerbaijan since 1989 
                                                 
233 Ibid. p. 265.   
234 The average tariff rate imposed on imports from a non-MFN country is around 30 per cent, compared with an 
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Compared with the other Caucasian states, Azerbaijan with its much larger population 
and stronger economic base, was not  able to achieve military success, since the political 
instability and changes in the political leadership affected the military negatively in 
Azerbaijan. As mentioned above, Mutalibov did not establish a national army since he feared 
a probable coup against him. After Mutalibov, although the APF government decided to 
establish a national army, the process had been too slow. Five moths after its creation, at the 
end of January 1992, the Azerbaijani armed forces had only 150 men.239 Although Elchibey 
achieved to gather militias under one command, the  discord between the government and 
army in the first half of 1992 had caused  Azerbaijan to lose the key town of Shusha (against 
practically no resistance) and  faced the establishment of the vital Lachin corridor240 by 
Armenians.241 Elchibey ignored the Russian military presence and its regional dominance in 
the region, and without the asset of effective or loyal armies and interior forces, he tried to 
solve internal and external problems with military means and finally, his strategy also 
collapsed. However, Elchibey achieved  the withdrawal of the Russian military  from 
Azerbaijan which  allowed the subsequent government in Baku to pursue military and security 
policies more freely.242 After Elchibey, Aliyev also gave priority  to the development of the 
armed forces and established firm control over the army. Although the Azerbaijani army 
launched massive offensive attacks on  Nagorno-Karabakh, it was not  successful, since the 
Armenians had achieved an almost impregnable defensive position. The ruined morale of the 
soldiers and the ineffectiveness of the foreign mercenaries also had been effective in the 
defeats of the Azerbaijani army. Like Georgia’s policy towards  Abkhazia, Baku wanted to 
maintain strong control over Nagorno-Karabakh by military means and assumed that it would 
                                                 
239 Jonathan Aves, “Security and Military Issues in the Transcaucasus,” in (ed) Bruce Parrott, State Building and 
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win quick victory, but did not take into account Armenia’s firm alliance with Russia and the 
political instability inside  Azerbaijan. As a result, after the war, Azerbaijan lost control over 
up to a quarter of its territory. Following the serious defeats in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, 
Azerbaijan decided to reorganize its troops and changed ex-Soviet divisional models and 
warfare tactics, replaced Russian and Ukrainian advisers with Turkish officers and established 
the organizational structure of the army as Corps/Brigade/Battalion chain of command which 
increased the mobilization capacity of the Azerbaijani army after the Turkish military experts 
participation.243  As Georgia, Azerbaijan faced difficulty in finding enough officers to 
command and train troops since a very small number of ethnic Azerbaijani officers had served 
in the top ranks of the Soviet army despite the presence of the Higher All Arms Command 
School and the Caspian High Naval School in Azerbaijan. Therefore, in order to increase the 
size and quality of the officer corps, Azerbaijan  signed several military training agreements 
with the Turkish government and several retired Turkish generals arrived in Azerbaijan to 
assist in combat training.244  Although there is a strong air force compared with Georgia or 
Armenia, its combat readiness is not sufficient, due to lack of  spare parts, maintenance 
services, technicians and expert personnel and also Armenian Air Defense Forces are well 
equipped and trained to counter the Azerbaijani Air Forces now. 245 Today Azerbaijan is the 
only country of the three in the South Caucasus that is free of Russian bases. Although 
Azerbaijan allows Russia to use the Gabala early warning system, Aliyev looks suspiciously 
to the joint CIS air defense system since in  case of  war, Azerbaijan does not want to be 
targeted because of the Russian radar installation. In 1997 Azerbaijan established with 
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldavia the GUAM regional organization and in the March 1999 
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Azerbaijan did not extend its participation in the CIS Collective Security Treaty for another 
five years. Besides, Russia’s plans to install 3000 peacekeepers to observe the cease-fire in 
Nagorno-Karabakh frustrated Azerbaijani officials who insisted on a multilateral operation 
with Russian troops comprising no more than 25 per cent.246 Azerbaijan enthusiastically 
follows the enlargement process of NATO and it made clear its desire for membership in 
NATO. On May 4, 1994 the Azerbaijani Republic officially joined the Partnership for Peace 
program. After joining the Partnership for Peace program, Azerbaijan joined   various 
activities conducted by NATO such as military exercises and training programs.247 
Azerbaijani military forces actively take part in the peacekeeping operations conducted by the  
North Atlantic Alliance as in KFOR (The Kosovo Force) since 1999. 
 In 2002 the number of active  personnel in the  Azerbaijani army was 72,100 
(62,000:Army, 2,200: Navy, 7,900: Air Force and Air defense).248 Lack of a strong defense 
industry -even in the Soviet period- is the  weakest point of the Azerbaijani army. Azerbaijan 
expects to increase its defense expenditures and strengthen its defense industry in the future 
with the flow of oil out of the country. Although the command structure and overall discipline 
in the army has improved since  years of fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, effective reforms 
must be implemented to prevent death of soldiers due to poor conditions, ill-treatment and 
corruption.249 
In the last section of this chapter,  the  political, economic and military situation in the 
other South Caucasian state Armenia since 1989 will be explained.  
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2.3. Armenia250 
 
Armenia is the smallest of the three Transcaucasian republics in terms of both territory 
and population. Armenia covers an area of 29,743 sq.km and its population was 3.304.776 of 
whom Armenians accounted for 93.3 %, Azerbaijanis 2.6 %, Kurds 1.7 % and Russians 1.6 % 
according to the 1989 census, Armenians now account for 96 % of the population.251 Thus  
Armenia  is the most ethnically homogenous of the Transcaucasian republics. It has few 
natural resources and much of its territory is unsuitable for cultivation. Armenia differentiated 
itself from Georgia and Azerbaijan in its close relationship with Russia and its interest in the 
development of the CIS because of its handicapped geographical position. In contrast to 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, Armenia sees Russia as an ally rather than a major threat. On the 
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other hand, Armenia as  a landlocked state, does not have warm relations with its neighbors; 
Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia. 
           2.3.1. Armenia’s foreign and domestic policy 
In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Armenian National 
Movement (ANM) came to power in the election, which was held in June 1990. Although 
ANM pronounced its intention for an independent Armenia, it avoided to provoke Russia and 
aimed to follow the procedures laid down by the Soviet law in its path to independence 
.Hence, Armenia was the last state of the Caucasian states  that declared  independence after a 
referendum, in November 1991. 
 In the initial days of its independence, compared with Azerbaijan, Armenia pursued 
more  anti-Soviet politics than that of Azerbaijan. Thus, in the beginning Armenia did not 
receive military support from Russia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and was sent  an 
ultimatum from  Russia to disband its militias within fifteen days.252 Levon Ter- Petrosian, 
leader of the ANM, skillfully persuaded 10,000 militias to hand over their weapons and 
achieved to gather them under government control. However, he could not  controll all the 
militias and  Armenia’s relations with Moscow deteriorated to such a great extent that one 
Soviet general threatened to “ wipe Armenia off the face of the earth” after Armenian 
guerrillas kidnapped a group of Soviet army officers.253Later, Levon Ter- Petrossian who was 
arrested in 1988 as the leader of the Karabakh Committee -in summer 1990 was elected 
Chairman of the Armenian Supreme Soviet and later became the president of Armenia-,  saw 
that Russia was an indispensable and unique partner which could protect Armenia’s interests 
in that volatile and hostile environment and opted for a pro-Russian position. Therefore, 
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Armenia was more enthusiastic to move closer to Moscow and of the three Caucasusian 
states, Armenia was the only one that signed  the CIS pact on collective security at the 
Tashkent summit in May 1992. In addition, Armenia allowed Russian troops to remain on its 
territory as a deterrent power against any attack against Armenia. Armenian-Russian relations 
improved with the visit of a Russian government delegation including Grachev to Yerevan 
just after Turkey warned Armenia because of the extension of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
in accordance with the Kars Treaty of 1921 as a security guarantor for the Azerbaijani enclave 
of Nakhichevan. After that visit an Armenian foreign ministry spokesman declared that 
Russian forces would not leave Armenia. Besides, Russia began to send military experts and 
donate equipment to the Armenian army.254 “Under the leadership of Levon Ter-Petrosian, 
Armenia  claimed to be part of the ‘nucleus’ of the CIS”.255 He  supported enthusiastically 
CIS security structures and CIS economic integration projects, in order to get closer to Russia. 
Although  Russia backed up Armenia in the military domain, Levon Ter- Petrossian 
strained to establish a national army. At the end of November 1992 Ter- Petrossian took 
severe measures to enforce draft which led to the formation of an army involving 60,000 men. 
However, Ter- Petrossian was not so successful in organizing the militias in  Nagorno-
Karabakh. The Armenian detachments in  Nagorno-Karabakh were under the control of the 
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF, Dashnaks), which controlled the government of 
the self- proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). However, Ter –Petrossian 
succeeded to appoint Sergei Sarkisian, an enthusiastic  supporter of himself, to become the 
minister of defense in the NKR. 
 Nagorno-Karabakh received assistance from Armenian sources for its war with 
Azerbaijan, but  the Armenian government seemed to feign a noninvolvement policy. In fact, 
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financial and material help was sent by the Armenian diaspora in France and the United States 
to Nagorno- Karabakh. Furthermore, Armenian people and ex-Armenian officers were 
permitted to join the Nagorno-Karabakh Self-Defense Force (SDF).256Armenia’s military and 
nonmilitary assistance intensified with the opening of the Lachin corridor to  Nagorno-
Karabakh. After the dissolution of the SU, the most successful example of state-building 
process was seen in the NKR. The NKR  government  effectively mobilized limited resources  
at its disposal. Unlike the other Caucasian states, conscription is effective and the NKR army 
of fifteen thousand men are very well disciplined. Besides, the soldiers of NKR have  high 
morale which is a most important factor.257. 
 Although Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenians won victories in the battlefield against 
Azerbaijanis, that did not prevent the  controversial disputes and differences among the 
Armenians and the Armenian parliament. Though Armenia has a very homogeneous 
population, its population is  divided into two main groups; those whose priorities are national 
economic reconstruction and those favoring national reconstruction via the liberation of 
historical lands258 and unification with Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh.259 Most of the 
members of the latter group are outside  Armenia and  they are the  supporters of the 
Dashnaks’ Armenian Revolution Federation, which was founded in Tbilisi in 1890 and 
implemented terrorist activities and set up defense self-defense units and revolutionary 
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cells.260 This group  sees land and people as an indispensable factor for the existence of  a 
strong Armenia and  believes that  the opportunity that they caught with the capture of  
Nagorno-Karabakh must be turned into a concrete gain with the annexation of  that enclave. 
After independence, Ter Petrossian, in order to consolidate national  solidarity,  appointed  
three  officials  from the diaspora261  to high-level positions (senior adviser to president, 
minister of energy, foreign minister) in the government. But in the course of  time, the 
disputes came to surface between ARF and Ter Petrossian. For example, the republic 
advocated to establish relations with Turkey without any conditions. Besides, under Ter 
Petrossian’s governance, Armenia joined the Black Sea Cooperation Organization, and Ter 
Petrossian even attended to the funeral of Turgut Özal, but the ARF put Turkish recognition 
of the 1915 Genocide as a precondition to relations. In addition, while the ARF opposed any 
solution short of complete independence of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave, the republic 
looked at the Karabakh conflict more moderately. On economic issues, Dashnaks did not 
favor the mass privatization of the economy that Ter Petrossian advocated as a solution for the 
worsening economy, but they defended that industries and the country’s infrastructure should 
remain under state control.262. But Ter Petrossian seeing the appalling economic situation of 
the country because of the embargoes mounted by Azerbaijan that has cut off vital oil and gas 
supplies, and a probable attack of Azerbaijan with the support of Turkey which has a strong 
and experienced army, wanted a peaceful solution in the Nagorno-Karabakh affair. According 
to him, a wrong step in the Nagorno-Karabakh affair  could anger Turkey, that had close ties 
with  Azerbaijan and USA,  and SU, that came close to Azerbaijan because of rich oil reserves 
in Azerbaijan and as a result Armenia could lose more than it won. But  many 
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parliamentarians called for a recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence, which could 
ruin all chances for peace according to Petrossian and provoke supporters of Azerbaijan. In 
1994 in a meeting in İstanbul, Raffi Hovannisian, the foreign minister made a speech full of 
insults to Turkey and Ter Petrossian ousted his foreign minister and tried to forge a new 
policy in accordance with the political and economic realities of the region rather than the 
bellicose dreams of the diaspora. After then, he refused to grant dual citizenship to diaspora 
Armenians and in order to prevent a conflict in Armenia and to consolidate his governance, 
Ter Petrossian  banned the ARF on 28 December 1994.263 While Ter Petrossian had claimed 
that economic prosperity for Armenia was impossible in the absence of a Karabakh 
settlement, the Armenian prime minister, (former president of Karabakh) Robert Kocharian 
rejected that policy and asserted “No decision adopted in Armenia will be implemented 
without Karabakh’s consent, irrespective of who is in power in Yerevan”.264 Finally, Ter 
Petrossian was forced to resign in February 1998, claiming that his policies which endorse 
OSCE peace proposals in the Nagorno-Karabakh, had not been supported by others in his 
government. Former Prime Minister Robert Kocharyan won the March 1998 presidential 
elections.265 After he came to power, he immediately lifted the  ban imposed in 1994 by 
Petrossian on the opposition Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the Dashnak Party.  
Unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia, no changes in the essence of Armenian foreign policy 
took place. Armenia’s historical distrust of Turkey which has the ability to amass 
overwhelming military forces near Yerevan, continues and with  Kocharian’s presidency, Ter-
Petrossian’s aim of normalizing  Armenia’s relations with Turkey was replaced with a radical 
policy towards Turkey. Besides the problem of the  so-called 1915 genocide, Nagorno-
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Karabakh is also an obstacle in Turkish-Armenian relations. Armenia  intensifies its 
propaganda of the so called  1915 Armenian-genocide allegations to exclude Turkey from the 
international arena and make Turkey impartial in the events of Caucasus. As Azerbaijan’s 
strongest ally, Turkey claims that  normalization of relations with Yerevan can happen only if 
Armenian forces withdraw from occupied Azerbaijani territory. Armenia’s disappointment 
with the prospects of improved relations with Turkey and with the lack of Western support, 
led to a growing alliance between Russia and Armenia, and this alliance was formalized by 
the signing of the agreement named “Treaty on Friendship Cooperation and Mutual 
Assistance Between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Armenia” in 1997. After this 
agreement five thousand Russian soldiers were stationed in Armenia.266 Unlike Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, Armenia has no borders with Russia and no sizeable Russian minority. These 
factors prevented probable major disputes between Russia and Armenia. Besides, Armenia’s 
domestic political stability hindered Russian intervention into Armenia to a great extent and 
the shared interests between  Armenia and Russia such as  the prevention of Turkish influence 
in the Caucasus, brought the two allies to a common point.267 However, like his predecessor, 
Ter-Petrosian, Kocharian also tried to reduce Armenia's dependency on Russia. Kocharian 
attended the celebration for the 50th anniversary of the establishment of  NATO and tried to 
improve relations with the US despite the extreme sensitivity of its allies Russia and Iran. 
Neverthless, Armenia's uncompromising stance in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute made it 
even more dependent on Russia and Russian military stations on its territory.268 To prove the 
close strategic relationship between Russia and Armenia,  Kocharian visited Moscow on 16 
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January 2003 and signed  military, technical, economic and cultural agreements. Besides, 
Kocharian declared that  Russia’s strategic presence in Armenia is a "strong stabilizing 
factor."  On the other hand, Armenia’s relations with Azerbaijan will remain tense until a 
solution to the Karabakh problem is found. Today relations with Georgia do not present any 
problems but the Armenian community in  southern Georgia is  a potential source of conflict. 
Besides, while Georgia expanded and intensified its ties with the West, Turkey and 
Azerbaijan,  Armenia only came close to Russia.269   
             2.3.2. Armenian economy 
 After 1990, more than a quarter of a million refugees including Armenians who 
suffered from the anti-Armenian riots in Baku and Sumgait,  imposed a big economic burden 
on Armenia, which  was economically too weak to absorb the refugees from Azerbaijan. 
Because of the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, Armenia saw a sharp decline of GDP 
more than 50 percent that brought it nearly to the edge of economic collapse.270 Besides, 
“national income declined 42 percent to equal the level attained in 1975 and industrial and 
agricultural production fell to levels attained in 1971”.271 In addition, Azerbaijan closed the 
gas pipeline which supplied 80 percent of Armenia’s gas, imposed an effective rail blockade 
and Azerbaijanis living in Georgia attacked Georgia’s rail and fuel pipelines which extend to 
Armenia. Because of its agricultural insufficiency and  being dependent on imports for 96 
percent of its energy needs, President Levon Ter-Petrossian focused on privatization and 
searched help from outside. In that energy crisis time in 1992-3, Armenia looked first to its 
traditional protector and unique friend in the Caucasus, Russia. Russia initially provided fuel 
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but later this assistance was hindered by terrorist actions in the territory of Georgia.272  
Petrossian convinced Turkey to supply electricity to Armenia but intense domestic and 
Azerbaijani public opinion hindered this assistance. Turkey also allowed humanitarian 
shipments of food and fuel to transit its territory to Armenia but annulled this relief operation 
after the Armenian attacks on western Azerbaijan in April 1993.273 In addition, Turkey 
refused air transportation except for humanitarian aid. As a result, during the winter of 1992-
93, Armenia as a landlocked state trembled in the dark with only a trickle of natural gas and 
oil from abroad.274  In April 1992, US granted MFN status to Armenia which helped 
Armenian economy to recover  to some extent. 275In 1993 Armenia joined the IMF and the 
World Bank  and received substantial assistance in macroeconomic stabilization and 
liberalization in the development of free market economies276. In November 1993, Armenia 
left the ruble zone,  introduced its own currency-the dram- and with the measures taken by the 
government Armenian economy got almost  better by 1995. Armenia was among the first 
post-Soviet states to record positive growth.277 In addition, as of 30 September 1995, Armenia 
received $505 million from the US , which helped Armenia to continue with its economic 
development.278 Although Armenia’s economic relations with Russia declined in various 
domains as did the other Caucasian states, Russia continued to buy several electronic 
components for military aircraft from Armenia. Russia by its ruble credits and assistance 
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remains the preeminent force in the Armenian economy. Armenia, aware of its geographic 
situation and limited resources, adopted policies at transforming the economy to a market 
basis and integrating into the world system. Armenia's accession to the Council of Europe in 
2001 and the World Trade Organization in 2002 represented significant steps toward its 
integration into the global and European economic systems.  As a result Armenia, whose trade 
dependency was  mostly on former Soviet partners, diversified its trade markets as seen on 
table 5. 
 
Table 5:279 
Armenia-direction of exports                                    Armenia - direction of imports 
   
Since 1999, real GDP has grown at an average rate of 8 percent per year and  Armenia 
reduced inflation from 4,964 percent in 1994 to 3.1 percent in 2001.280 The official 
unemployment rate declined from 11.7 percent at end-2000 to 9.5 percent by mid-2002.281 
Despite a number of structural changes and recent strong economic growth, Armenia is failing 
to attract significant foreign direct investment because of  insufficient legal framework, 
corruption and the lack of a political settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Since 
Armenia can not attract significant foreign direct investment, it remains dependent on 
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assistance from international financial institutions. In  December 2002, Armenia obtained a 
$20 million loan from the World Bank, and arrived at an agreement with the bank under 
which an additional $40 million in funds will be released in 2003.282  
            2.3.3. Military power in Armenia 
While Mutalibov relied on Soviet troops for the security of Azerbaijan, Armenia’s 
development of military forces began even before independence. Like the other Caucasian 
states, paramilitary groups became the foundation for a national armed force. In the 
beginning, these militias were militarily too weak, therefore they attacked Russian bases to 
get weapons and from  January 1990 to June 1992, they seized large quantities of weapons by 
raiding the Russian military depots and posts (356 raids in entire Transcaucasia, of which 164 
were in the territory of Azerbaijan and 130 in that of Armenia).283 But unlike Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, Ter-Petrossian achieved to gather the militia under the control of the government.  
Besides, Armenia kept the 7th Russian army stationed on its territory under Russian 
jurisdiction, thus guaranteeing its own security. While Armenia, aware of its geographical 
situation and limited resources, exploited  Russia for its security interests; Russia, which did 
not want to lose its influence in the Caucasus  exploited  Armenia for its geo-strategic 
interests.284  Russia provides Armenia with defense assistance and has 4,000 troops stationed 
in Armenia in three bases.285  Since  the establishment of the Armenian  Armed Forces, 
Armenia  got arms supplies from Russia without any agreement as donation, and this reality 
was also admitted by the Defense Minister of Armenia, Serge Sarkisian, in March 1997 “over 
the past two years we have doubled our defense capacity at no cost to the budget”. 286 On 
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March 1995, Ter-Petrossian and Boris Yeltsin signed a treaty which would allow Russia to 
maintain a military base near Gyumri- close to the border with Turkey-287, a command group 
and a motorized rifle regiment in Yerevan for the next 25 years.288 Besides, the Armenian 
government requested from Russia to reinforce the 7th army with some air force units and one 
year later, one squadron of MiG 23 fighters arrived to be based near Yerevan.289 In addition, 
Russian forces carried out joint military exercises with Armenia which were aimed at 
repulsing an ‘invading force’ during 1994-1996 and according to several serious reports, 
Russia made large quantities of arms transfer to  Armenia.290 Moreover, in 1999 Russia 
deployed S-300 air defense missiles to Armenia and now, Russian S-300 divisions guard CIS 
borders in Transcaucasia in alliance with the Armenian Air Defense Forces.291 Despite its 
military alliance with Russia, Armenia did not distance itself from the West and  signed the 
Partnership for Peace Framework Document (PfP) on 10 May 1994. Armenia  also concluded 
military agreements with Greece that had problems with Turkey. Contrary to Azerbaijan and 
Georgia, there is not a serious internal threat to the Armenian Armed Forces and threat 
perception and its military doctrine just depend on the Turkish threat either from the West or 
East. The Armenian armed forces which fought a successful war against Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh, is now “better armed, better funded and better organized” than in 1993-
1995. The Armenian Army  has 16,790 active personnel including 8,620 army,1,040  navy 
and 1,330 of air force personnel.292 The present structure of its armed forces has common 
similarities with ex-Soviet systems or the new Russian model. However, Russian military 
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traditions cause serious problems within the armed forces. Beating and the rigidity of army 
life causes several unprecedented undisciplined behavior and there is also unhappiness among 
the people whose sons are killed or died due to the bad conditions in the army, but despite 
these problems, training is given high priority. Armenian armed forces make joint exercises 
with Russian troops and implement small-scale exercises to be ready for  combat. Since it is  
the supporter of Karabakh army, it always keeps the military forces on semi alert.293 
 Like Georgia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, Armenia also has a nuclear research center. 
Besides, Armenia has two types, 440 VVER V230 nuclear power reactors and they represent 
a proliferation threat by virtue of its spent fuel.294 When Armenia’s geographic situation is 
examined, it is seen that  it has  serious problems with its neighbor Azerbaijan such as in the  
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and  has a long and deep adversity to its much more powerful 
neighbor Turkey. In addition, Armenia has not a non-proliferation export control policy as an 
Armenian official pointed in late 1996, “We do not have the leisure to ponder the best way to 
develop an export control system. We are fighting wars and trying to stabilize an inherently 
unstable region”. 295Thus, Armenia fits the motivational profile of a potential proliferator.  
In the first chapter, Turkish-American alliance is examined in a chronological manner 
and in the second chapter, the political, economic and military situation in the South Caucasus 
is analyzed. These chapters  are written to give a  background to the reader. The third chapter 
will be an intersection of these two chapters. After examining the bases of Turkish-American 
alliance and the general situation in the South Caucausus, the similarities and differences of 
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the global interests of US and regional interests of Turkey in the South Caucasus will be 
presented in the third chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
3. SIMILARITIES AND DIVERSITIES IN THE TURKISH-AMERICAN 
ALLIANCE    POLITICS IN   THE SOUTH CAUCASUS  REGION 
  
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the South Caucasus presented several 
opportunities and challenges  in the political, economic and military domains to the US as the 
unique super power of the world and to Turkey as a strong regional power. Therefore, both 
states whose interests converged as encouraging the development of democratic pro-Western 
regimes and free-market economy, preventing terrorism, expanding NATO’s membership, 
securing  oil reserves in the Caspian, opening of new oil pipeline routes in the Caucasus, 
preventing  rebuilding of the Russian Empire, establishing non-Russian/non-Islamic lines of 
communication for the newly independent states (NIS) of the South Caucasus. Therefore, they 
decided to pursue  active politics in the South Caucasus as a duty for the sake of their own 
global and regional interests. However, there were also differences in the allies’ politics such 
as in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. 
During the Cold War, Turkey as a NATO member and as a candidate to the European 
Community,  (European Union since 1992) focused on evolving its relationship with western 
countries  for its economic and military needs, and ignored the rest. Hence, Turkey’s 
dependence on the West on economic, political and military domains, restrained its foreign 
policy options. Besides, due to the bipolar structure of the world, Turkish leaders  attributed a 
defensive and cautious approach in the formulation of Turkish foreign policy and avoided  
taking risks.  However, in the aftermath of the demise of the Warsaw Pact and then of the 
Soviet Union, the new geopolitical configuration of the world relieved Turkish foreign policy 
of certain constraints. Thus, Turkey caught an opportunity to extend its relations towards the 
post-Soviet world and due to its multi-regional identity and  its ethnic, cultural and religious 
ties with the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey aimed to pursue an active policy as stated by 
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the former Foreign Minister of Turkey, İsmail Cem “Contemporary Turkey aspires to be the 
leading economic and political actor in Eurasia. We envisage an international mission which 
is no longer peripheral and confined to the outskirts of Europe. Our mission envisions a 
pivotal role in the emerging Eurasian reality ”.296 In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the US  supported the territorial integrity and independence of the South Caucasian 
states and US policymakers presented Turkey as a model for the NIS to strengthen democracy 
and free-market economy in these states.  Turkey and the US attach great importance to the 
South Caucasus because of its rich oil reserves and   geographic location, which is  Russia’s 
gateway to the Middle East and Mediterranean via the Black Sea. Although these states 
dispatched diplomats to the South Caucasian States; signed cultural, trade and security 
protocols; beamed radio and television broadcasts (TRT-INT); provided loans; trained 
students, increased commercial relations, and proffered export credits, allies could not have 
pursued an active policy in the beginning of 1990s. Before the collapse of the Russian 
Empire, the former Soviet Republics were managed from Moscow and therefore, though 
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia gained their independence after the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union, they could not have  coped with the challenges of the new geopolitical and 
economic environment due to the lack of  their own military power,  strong economy. 
Thereupon, these states’ first years of independence were fraught with economic, political, 
and social difficulties. Although, the USA, Turkey and Iran tried to set up relations with the 
NIS, Russia, which viewed the South Caucasus as a bulwark against Iran and Turkey, and  an 
important element of the Russian sphere of influence, was the main political actor in the 
region and tried to take advantage of instability in the region. Russia, by using its military 
power,  obtained permanent bases in Armenia and Georgia, and instigated coups in 
Azerbaijan in 1993 and 1994. Therefore, the allies initially pursued a policy which aimed at 
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stability in the South Caucasus region without challenging Russia’s hegemony over the NIS.  
Also, Turkey’s mixed and complex relations with Europe ,Russia and the US in economic, 
political and military domains and its own limited capabilities prevented Turkey from  taking 
unilateral steps in the South Caucasus at the expense of its interests and its relations with the 
other regions.   
In the wake of the Soviet collapse in 1991, the United States strengthened its relations  
with the Soviet successor states by recognizing the states as independent and viable entities, 
supporting their transition to market economies and democratic societies, facilitating their 
integration into international institutions, and encouraging regional cooperative arrangements. 
President Bush proposed the Freedom Support Act in early 1992. Signed into law in 1992, 
P.L.(Public Law) 102-511 it authorized funds for the NIS for humanitarian needs, 
democratization, creation of market economies, trade and investment, and  other purposes.297 
However, compared to the other NIS, the US neglected the South Caucasian states in its 
foreign policy making in the early 1990s  as Elizabeth Sherwood emphasized, 
“…preoccupation with the four “nuclear successor states” (Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus) prevented the Caucasus and Central Asian states from getting much serious attention 
until 1994”.298 While the United States  supported its ally Turkey, which has common 
interests like itself in the region as the independence and territorial integrity of the NIS; 
keeping Iran and Islamic fundamentalism in check; ensuring access to energy resources; and 
preventing a reemergence of Russian imperialism,299 in its role as a new regional leader in the 
Caucasus region, it still feared Russian radical response and thus at the same time preferred 
Russia to controlling events in the volatile region.  Washington showed much respect to 
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Russia’s military (nuclear and conventional) capabilities at the time and treated Russia almost 
as equal to the USSR in this sense.300 Thus, containment of political Islam, influence of the 
Armenian lobby and fear of negatively influencing Russian domestic politics dominated  the 
essence of Washington’s policies in the early 1990s.301 For the first four years of the Clinton 
Administration, Russia was the center of  US policy in the NIS and American policymakers 
attached  importance on the democratization and economic development of Russia, because 
the US officials thought that   transformation of Russia to a democratic state would be in favor 
of the United States and the Caucasian states. The priority for the USA in dealing with Russia 
and post-Soviet republics has been the issue of non-proliferation of the Soviet nuclear heritage 
that remained in some former Soviet republics such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus. 
Therefore, the Clinton Administration, which gave  strategic priority to dismantle the Soviet 
military machine and nuclear arsenal and confine it within the Russian region in accordance 
with its  Russia-first policy, gave Moscow a free hand in the South Caucasus302 in order not to 
complicate the nuclear issues. As a result of this US policy,  withdrawal of former Soviet 
troops from the Baltic States was secured in August 1994, and the removal of nuclear 
weapons from Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan was completed by 1996.303 
In short, Washington was not keen on asserting its influence in the region, 
acknowledging it as Russia's sphere of influence304 and understood  Russia’s security 
concerns in the  South Caucasus as in the statement of the US President Bill Clinton : “ You 
[Russians] will be more likely to be involved in some of these areas near you, just like the 
United States has been involved in the last several years in Panama and Grenada near our 
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area”.305 The Clinton Administration—intent on placating Moscow—wavered to take 
advantage of the strategic opportunities that the South Caucasus presented. During the first 
term of the Clinton Administration, the Department of State and the National Security 
Council neglected the Central Asian and Caucasian capitals, creating a policy vacuum in  the 
region.306  
 In addition to the respect for the former Soviet Union’s status as a superpower, lack of 
information and plans concerning the Caspian region, and a lack of comprehension of 
American interest had been effective on this policy. Generally, Washington controlled its 
policy by supporting the Turkish model for the NIS, backing Turkey’s demand for influence 
there as well as independence of the NIS.307 Turkey, which had  more success in economics; a 
better-equipped and more experienced armed forces;  greater regional opportunity; and a 
greater sense of policy independence marked by the ending of risks forced by the Cold War 
was an ideal model for the South Caucasian states.308 Besides Turkey’s secularism, 
democracy, common culture, and the Turkish experimentation in economic change made it 
appealing for Western and the US  support, to be emulated by the newly independent states.  
However, the US which  was careful not to provoke Russia in order to support Turkey  
until 1995, made the crucial decision to back pipelines running through Turkey, and not 
Russia  contrary to its ‘Russia first policy’.309 The revolutionary event that changed the US 
politics, was the war in Chechnya, which showed to the US officials the real (conventional) 
military capabilities of Russia: it could create substantial amounts of trouble, but not meet a 
serious military challenge. To wit, much of the US respect for Russia was lost. Consequently,  
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the US policy in the Caspian became increasingly assertive from the second half of 1996, and 
the US has declared that it considers the Caucasus and the Caspian region of 'vital US 
interests'.310 The Caspian Basin's importance for the US was strongly emphasized for the first 
time in the speech of the National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, in March 1997, when he 
"…singled out China, Turkey and the Caucasus as areas of special emphasis and stressed 
Washington's intent to step up its involvement in the Caucasus and Central Asia."311 Contrary 
to its ‘Russia first policy’, the United States accepted the South Caucasus as a zone of free 
competition and began to pursue active politics to prevent Russian imperialistic hegemony or 
Iranian conservative influence in the South Caucasus.312 On 21 July 1997, the political 
objectives of the US in the Caucasus and Central Asia became visible  with the speech of 
Deputy Secretary of State, Strobe Talbott, at the Central Asia Institute. He  outlined four 
dimensions of the US support to the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia: 1) promotion 
of democracy; 2) creation of free market economies; 3)  sponsorship of peace and cooperation 
within and among the countries of the region: and, 4) integration into the larger international 
community.313  
 However,  some observers pointed out that developments in this region were largely 
marginal to U.S. interests and looked with suspicioun to the changing US policy. They 
suggested that the oil and other natural resources there were not vital to  US trade and security 
and were, in any event, unlikely to be fully developed and available to Western markets for 
many years. They urged great caution in adopting policies that would heavily involve the 
United States in a region beset by ethnic and civil conflicts. They did not believe that  there 
was a “power vacuum” in the region that the United States must fill. They  claimed that, the 
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US aid for humanitarian and security purposes should continue, but other aid should be 
curtailed.314 
On the other hand, some observers believed that the US policy toward the South 
Caucasus should be far more active, given the new security situation. They called for greater 
U.S. aid and conflict resolution efforts to bolster weak states and counter regional instability 
caused by warfare, crime, smuggling, and terrorism. They saw  Russian policies as attempts to 
pull the NIS back into the Russian orbit. Thus, they claimed that a fundamental U.S. policy 
goal should be to prevent the emergence of a new Russian empire in the Caucasus. Besides, 
they  argued that improved U.S. relations with the NIS would serve to contain Russian and 
Iranian influence, and  improved U.S. ties with Azerbaijan would benefit U.S. relations with 
other Islamic countries, particularly Turkey and the Central Asian states. Also if US 
strengthened its relations with Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani  oil and natural gas deliveries would 
expand world supplies, making the United States and the West less vulnerable to supply cut 
offs in the Middle East.315 Advocaters of an active US policy in the South Caucasus asserted  
that the US regional engagement should be targeted to further the goal of breaking Russia’s 
monopoly, demonstrate  U.S. power projection capability, help tie the region to the West 
through the PfP program, enhance local military capabilities for self-defense, prevent military 
reliance upon Moscow and cement a local presence to defend U.S. energy interests.316  
Furthermore, they argued that if Washington failed to give heed to this region, the South 
Caucasus would  return to Russian or a new Iranian hegemony, and  the US and its allies 
would not have access to vital and strategic energy resources.317  
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Consequently, the priority in American policy changed from placating Russia to  
strengthening civil societies, markets and armed forces within the three Caucasian states, 
supporting the stability and independence of the states through multilateral and bilateral 
conflict resolution efforts, and developing an East–West coalition of Georgia and Azerbaijan 
supported by Turkey and Israel. Besides, US-Azerbaijan relations were deteriorated  since 
1992, due to an amendment (Section 907) that precluded assistance to the government of 
Azerbaijan. The amendment was pushed through Congress by the representatives and 
supporters of the US Armenian Diaspora in response to Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenia 
during their territorial conflict over the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.318 Neglected 
American-Azerbaijani relations  developed only after the Azerbaijani President Haydar 
Aliyev's triumphal official visit to the United States in July 1997 and the US-Azerbaijani 
cooperation fortified with the contracts worth of $10 billion. By this way, American energy 
companies were able to establish  oil and gas pipelines in a western direction to the Black Sea 
and the Mediterranean instead of the north (to Russia) and south (to Iran). In addition, the 
amendment was lifted by 2001. Today, the Bush Administration supports US private 
investment in Azerbaijan’s energy sector as a means of increasing the diversity of world 
energy suppliers, and encourages building multiple oil pipeline routes to world markets.319 
It was seen that if a power vacuum emerged in the region and if Washington failed to 
pursue active politics, its own interests as well as those of key U.S. allies, such as Turkey and 
Israel, would be imperiled and anti-Western elements in Russia and Iran would reap the 
                                                 
318 Fiona Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia since 199,” at 
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global energy supplies through multiple East-West pipelines. According to the report, by achieving these 
objectives the US would increase its own and its allies’ energy security, eliminate traditional energy monopolies, 
support Turkey and the new states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, and invigorate their ability to defend their 
borders against transnational threats like arms, drug smuggling, and ethnic conflict. Stephen J. Blank, “U.S. 
Military Engagement with Transcaucasia And Central Asia,” at www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/ 
2000/milengag/milengag.pdf 
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benefits.320 In accordance with this politics, there appeared genuine specialists on the region 
within the United States Government instead of the diplomats specializing on the former 
Soviet Union in general. Also, the United States has fostered these states’ ties with the West, 
including membership in the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
and NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), to end the dependence of these states on Russia for 
trade, security, and other relations. Besides, the  US interest in GUUAM has grown 
considerably from the outset of GUUAM.321 At a US-sponsored "GUUAM Workshop" in 
Stanford University in November 2000, the Azerbaijani ambassador to the USA, Hafiz 
Pashayev, declared that "GUUAM has not been directed against any state," but went on to 
declare that greater US support for GUUAM was necessary in order to reduce Russian power 
in the region. 322 Then, US encouragement  played an important part in pulling the group back 
together again, as symbolized in the Stanford seminar, when the cooperation seemed to break 
up with Uzbekistan and Moldova drifting away towards Russia. Besides, in the final Defense 
and Security Assistance Act of 2000, the US Congress provided $8.5 million  for GUUAM 
countries and Armenia “to promote the independence and territorial sovereignty of such 
countries.323 However, the ineffectiveness of GUUAM in implementing its decisions since its 
creation in 1997 was underlined with the decision of Uzbekistan to suspend its membership in 
the organization in June 2002.324 Also  the “Silk Road Strategy Act” in Consolidated 
                                                 
320 Ariel Cohen, “Ethnic Conflicts Threaten U.S. Interests in the Caucasus,” at 
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Appropriations for FY2000 (P.L.106-113), that calls for enhanced policy and aid to support 
conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, border controls, transport 
and communications, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and 
Central Asia was signed into law.325 The significance that the US gave to the region is also 
revealed in its growing economic assistance to the South Caucasian states as seen below. 
Table 6: Total US Economic assistance in $US millions326 
 
As a result,   US policy in the Caucasus  matured and it articulated that it had five 
main foreign policy interests in the Caspian region: (a) The independence and sovereignty of 
the NIS and their democratic and market development; (b) Promotion of regional conflict 
resolution; (c) The increase and diversification of world energy supplies; (d) Continued 
support for US companies and; (e) Continued pressure on the Iranian regime to change its 
unacceptable practices.327 
 Turkey has also similar interests in the region like its ally the US, but there also 
appeared  disputes about  Turkey’s role in the region as United States’ ally. Some  cautioned 
                                                                                                                                                        
transportation of goods among them. See Antoine Blua, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Withdraws From GUUAM, 
Remaining Members Forge Ahead,” at www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/06/18062002164458.asp  
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that the United States and NATO were liable to be drawn by their ties with Turkey into 
regional imbroglios. Conversely, others  claimed that Turkey was an important state which 
would protect vital American interests in the region and an ideal model for the South 
Caucasian states. Therefore, the “Turkish model” had been the main theme that brought allies 
together on a common point. The US desired that the Turkish republics, including Azerbaijan 
adopt and adhere to the “Turkish model”. 
Turkey's  relations with Central Asia and the Caucasus were almost absent despite 
common ethnic and cultural ties; moreover Moscow tried to diminish contact between Turkey 
and the Turkic peoples under its rule.328 However, after the Cold War, Turkey’s geopolitical 
environment has changed and  Turkey, that has common interests in the region with the USA, 
promoted membership of Turkic states in the leading international organizations such as 
OSCE, NACC, IMF, and the World Bank, hoping to integrate them into the world and 
consolidate their independence in this way. The Ministry of Culture of Turkey has established 
the Turkish World Research Agency under the auspices of the Folk Cultures Research and 
General Directorate of Development, and this was followed by new establishments, such as 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) and 
the Turkish Culture and Arts Joint Management (TÜRKSOY) to facilitate the multi-sided 
relations with the Turkic republics.329 On April 27, 1992, Turkey began broadcasts of its TRT 
INT – Avrasya TV channel via satellite to  Central Asia and Azerbaijan, which has 
strengthened the existing cultural and social ties with these countries. Turkey also opened 
credits via Turkish Eximbank for the NIS. Besides, Turkey supported Georgia and Azerbaijan 
to strengthen their armed forces. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Washington, DC:October 23, 1997) available at 
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 Though, Turkey was supported as a model for the NIS by the United States, there 
appeared challenges to Turkey’s efforts to expand ties in Caucasus. First, Turkey’s own 
domestic problems— the growth of Kurdish separatism and the challenge posed by the rise of 
Islamic forces in Turkish politics—diverted Turkish attention from the region. Second,  
Turkey was preoccupied by other, more pressing security concerns, including threats from 
Syria and Iraq; instability in the Balkans; and,  the deterioration of relations with Greece over 
Cyprus and the Aegean. Third, Turkey lacked the economic means to provide the type of 
large-scale economic assistance and investment that the states in the region need and want. 
Fourth,  Turkey’s cultural arrogance and pretensions to become the leader of the Pan-Turkic 
movement in Caucasus and Central Asia offended the Turkic republics including Azerbaijan. 
These factors have dampened Turkey’s initial high expectations in the region. However, today 
there is a more sober and realistic understanding of the difficulties involved and the length of 
time that the process may take.330 As a result, Turkey preferred to set up equal relations with 
Turkic states rather than to play the role of “big brother”. 
If the South Caucasian states’ attitudes towards the allies are examined, it is seen that 
since independence, Azerbaijan and Georgia saw American and Turkish support as a balance 
to Russia’s hegemonic aspirations and tried to pursue a policy of geopolitical pluralism, 
fostering external security ties with the Western countries. But, Armenia, in order to gain and 
preserve military superiority over Azerbaijan,  was interested in increasing Russian military 
presence on its soil contrary to Azerbaijan and Georgia.. These conflicting security interests 
eventually increased the possibility of emerging of informal alliances along North-South and 
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East-West axis, which resulted in the excessive militarization and polarization of the 
region.331 
Figure:2  Informal Alliances of States in Caucasus-Caspian Region332  
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As put forward above, the United States and Turkey, which had similar objectives 
towards the South Caucasian states except some limitations,  met with the resistance of Russia 
and Iran in their policies especially in the military and energy domains. Therefore, in  this 
chapter, while examining the  allies’ politics toward the Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, the 
role of the regional powers as  Russia and Iran will also be taken into account. As mentioned 
above, the US began to strengthen its relations with Azerbaijan when it realized the 
significance of the Caspian Basin oil reserves. On the other hand, Turkey since the 
independence of Azerbaijan, became an enthusiastic supporter of Azerbaijan, but later it 
understood that its own resources alone would not be enough to support Azerbaijan. In the 
section below, the allies’ variant attitudes to Azerbaijan  between 1990 and 2003 will be 
analyzed.    
3.1. Analysis of  the allies’ attitudes towards Azerbaijan   
Though Turkey was the first state to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan, the US  
did not support the demands for Azerbaijan’s independence from the beginning and even 
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backed the leader of the SU, Mikhail Gorbachev in repressing Popular Front activists on 
January 20, 1990.333 While the US administration was supporting the independence  of the 
Baltic states, it  preferred Azerbaijan to be under the control of the Russian Federation as 
Margareth Tutwiler, State Department spokeswoman said “the Administration saw a clear 
distinction between the Baltic republics, who were trying to win their independence through 
negotiations within the Soviet constitution, and the Azerbaijanis, who were basically 
rioting."334 Though, Washington recognized Armenia’s independence unconditionally, it 
made the recognition conditional for  Azerbaijan in that it should adhere to responsible 
policies in the spheres of security, democratization, and human rights.  Azerbaijan  made such 
assurances and indeed recognition was accelerated  when  Washington realized that its non-
recognition policy toward Azerbaijan was only encouraging Armenia to continue pursuing its 
hard stance in the conflict.335 Then, the US recognized  Azerbaijan  in February 1992, six 
months after its independence  and opened its embassy in Baku on 15 March 1992. .  
In the beginning of the 1990’s,  the US took sides de facto in the Armenian-
Azerbaijani dispute instead of being neutral. For example, in the US Congressional 
investigations, the number of witnesses representing the Armenian side routinely 
outnumbered those from the Azerbaijani side. Moreover, delegations visiting Armenia in the 
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past did not always go to neighboring Azerbaijan. Such difficulties undermined the U.S. 
government as an "honest broker" from Baku's point of view. 336  
Contrary to Americans, there is a sympathy between Turks and Azerbaijanis. Turks 
consider Azerbaijanis as first cousins, and their languages are mutually comprehensible. Thus, 
naturally, Turkey was the first state to recognize  Azerbaijan, which it saw as the  closest state 
to its own  ethically, culturally and religiously (though adhering to different sects). Since the 
independence of Azerbaijan, Turkey endeavored  to help Azerbaijan in its struggle to have a 
stable democracy and become an independent state outside the  Russian sphere of influence. 
After a pro-Turkish politician,  Abulfaz Elchibey, came to power in Azerbaijan in June 1992, 
Turkish-Azerbaijan relations extended to a great extent. For example, in an interview with 
Abulfaz Elchibey, he said, “In the past, there was only one independent Turkish state, it was 
the Anatolian Turks who were our symbol for independence... . We have fifty million Turkish 
brothers in Anatolia... .”337 and President Turgut Özal told Elchibey: "This is your second 
country and Azerbaijan is our second motherland”.338 Turkey concluded many economic and 
commercial agreements with Azerbaijan, beamed Turkish state television channels and radio 
broadcasts. Turkey has offered assistance in Azerbaijan’s transition to the Latin alphabet by 
sending books and typewriters to Azerbaijan. 
However, after Haydar Aliyev came to power in Azerbaijan, he reversed  Elchibey’s 
pro-Turkish decisions. He also decided to join the Commonwealth of Independent States, 
hoping that Russia would take a more balanced stand in the Azeri-Armenian conflict. Though 
Turkish-Azerbaijani relations stagnated for a while, it improved with  Aliyev’s visit to Turkey 
on 8  February 1994. During his visit, he came together with a  strong delegation consisting of 
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80 person, to show  the importance that he attached to closer relations with Turkey. President 
Süleyman Demirel and Haydar Aliyev  used the stock phrase "one nation, two states" to 
describe the links joining them and Süleyman Demirel. once more stated that Turkey would 
carry on backing Azerbaijan's "just claims" in the international fora.339 In addition, Aliyev 
gained a major strategic commitment from Turkey by signing a declaration on  Deepened 
Strategic Cooperation, which would establish the necessary mechanisms for developing this 
strategic cooperation along economic and social lines as well. This  agreement demonstrated 
Turkey’s deeper strategic commitment to Azerbaijan’s national security. According to the 
declaration, two sides will help each other within the context of their strategic partnership and 
using methods foreseen by the United Nations, in the event that their sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, the inviolability of their borders are endangered"340  
While Turkey and Azerbaijan were strengthening their relations in political, economic 
and military domains, the US policymakers who assumed democratic states more stable, more 
peaceful, and easier to do business with, began to pay more attention to democratic 
development  in the region. But some observers opposed  that policy, arguing that democracy 
was nearly impossible without stability.341 In this regard Haydar Aliyev also criticized US 
policy: 
I believe the greatest fortune for America has been that since the North-South           
[Civil] War [1861-1865], there have been no wars on America's land. In contrast, 
consider how many wars have been fought on European territory. Azerbaijan has 
become an independent state now, but Armenia is still occupying our territory [since 
1992]. And even here in Azerbaijan, there is a struggle for power. There are armed 
groups and other criminals. In such a situation, it's impossible to bring democracy 
from America and impose it here.342 
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 Though the US, under the influence of the Armenian lobby, pursued a biased policy 
towards Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan  since its independence tried to ameliorate its relations with 
the US. President Elchibey made it clear that Azerbaijan would give priority in its foreign 
policy to relations with the United States and NATO member countries and  indicated that 
Azerbaijan was ready to become a US ally in the region by pursuing an officially active 
campaign against Iran. Besides, the US and Azerbaijani governments cooperated in the area 
of non-proliferation despite Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act. This cooperation turned 
out to be successful. Azerbaijani customs officials  stopped a shipment of Russian nuclear-
capable ballistic missile parts bound for Iran and seized  21 ton and, 700 kilograms  of 
stainless steel plates to build ballistic missiles  in the town of Astara on the Azerbaijani-
Iranian border.343  
However, despite Azerbaijan’s cooperative politics, the US and the American people  
viewed Azerbaijan as a country that was openly violating the rights of Karabakh's Armenians. 
But, after the  visit of  Aliyev to Washington on July 30 1997, Azerbaijani-American relations  
transformed into a new positive stage. President Aliyev met with President Clinton and also 
with several members of Congress during his visit. Then, the US administration, which 
recognized the importance of the Caspian oil reserves, embarked on a newly focussed policy 
towards the Caucasus. Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger called on the 
Clinton Administration to, "encourage closer relations with Azerbaijan and persuade 
Congress to change its priorities on aid. Our long-term security interests are at stake."344 Like 
Weinberger, some policymakers and writers  claimed that the section 907 act did not limit, 
either U.S. assistance to Azerbaijan or pursduit of  U.S. influence in Azerbaijan. Besides, they 
argued that the Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act of 1992, which restricted American 
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government assistance to Azerbaijan, prevented the United States from playing an impartial 
role in the mediation of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.345 Then,  Senator Sam Brownback 
introduced the Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999, which made Azerbaijan eligible for US 
assistance, just like the other eight former Soviet republics in that region.346 Besides, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell urged Members of Congress to remove the restrictions put in 
place by Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act in order to "reward Azerbaijan for their 
cooperation in the war on terrorism" on October 2001.347 In January 2002, George W. Bush 
executed his right to waive section 907 and  then , the US administration extended $4.4 
million in military assistance to Azerbaijan to improve Azerbaijan’s coastal defenses, upgrade 
its airfields to NATO standards and train a peacekeeping unit.348 
 Although, the United States and Turkey had different attitudes towards Azerbaijan in 
the beginning of the 1990s, today they share similar objectives as to bolster the energy 
security of the region and both aim to develop closer relationships with Azerbaijan. When the 
transition of the allies’ politics toward Azerbaijan is examined, it is seen that the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict has been a test for the US which has been under the influence of the 
Armenian lobby and for Turkey which has  common linguistic, ethnic and cultural roots with 
Azerbaijan. In the section below, the significance of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in allies’ 
policy making towards Azerbaijan will be examined.   
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          3.1.1. Nagorno-Karabakh ;the conflict that puts allies on the opposite   sides 
 
In 1988, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict broke up and within a few months, the 
conflict flared up into a full-size war. Armenian leadership in Yerevan, launched a military 
campaign to seize the control of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), a 
mountainous area populated by Armenians but located within Azerbaijan's borders. As told in 
detail in the second chapter, well equipped Armenian forces fared well on the battlefield by 
occupying the entire territory of the NKAO, but also many of its neighborhood and 
surrounding areas. In the end of the war Azerbaijan lost nearly 20 percent of its territory. 
The United States ,  which has been influenced by the powerful Armenian lobby in the 
congress in its formulation of  foreign policy, accepted the Section 907, (took effect in 
January 1993) which denied all forms of governmental US aid to Azerbaijan unless 
Azerbaijan terminated the  blockade of Armenia, ceased its use of force against Armenia and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and sought a peaceful solution to the conflict. The Section represented 
the partisan US policy in the region and the clear support for Armenia for several reasons. 
First, the United States, which gave importance to human rights and became  the major donor 
to refugee programs in the area, deprived approximately 1 million Azerbaijani refugees of 
humanitarian aid. Second, Azerbaijan, with 20,000 dead, about one million refugees and some 
20% of its territory occupied, was absolutely exposed to military attack by Armenia, but the 
US showed Azerbaijan as being offensive side. Thus, Congress’ allegation of offensive use of 
force was not also at odds with  reality. Third, on the contrary to the claim of Azerbaijan’s 
blockade of Armenia, 130 kilometers of the railway line, which came from Azerbaijan and 
went to Armenia passing through the Iranian border was under the occupation of Armenia.349  
Of course, the strong Armenian lobby in the United States has been effective on US 
foreign policy. It must be noted that, the Armenian National Committee of America, 
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possesses significant political power in the US and controls the most important electorate 
states like New Jersey, New York, California, and Illinois, which comprise nearly half of the 
total electoral votes needed to be elected  President of the United States.350 As a result, while 
Azerbaijan remained the only former Soviet republic to be deprived of US aid until 2001, 
Armenia has constantly been the highest per capita recipient.351 
In examining Turkey’s policy towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it should be 
first mentioned that Azerbaijan never officially asked for Turkish intervention in the conflict. 
According to Azerbaijan’s ambassador in Ankara, Mehmet Novivzoğlu Aliyev, the main 
support Azerbaijan wanted from Turkey was to tell Azerbaijan’s side of the story to the world 
by using its western alliance contacts.352 Initially, Turkey pursued a policy of neutrality by 
presenting itself as an impartial mediator between the parties. Taking into account,  
Azerbaijan’s deteriorating situation, Ankara tried to explain and promote the Azeri view of 
the conflict in the international fora. Besides, Turkish diplomats played an active role in the 
OSCE -Minsk Group- seeking to settle the Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh. On 8 March 1992, Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin, by calling the US Foreign 
Minister James Baker and on 13 March 1992, Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, by calling 
the American President George Herbert Walker Bush, wanted the US to intervene in the 
conflict towards a peaceful solution.353 On 10 March 1992, on the North Atlantic Cooperation 
Council (NACC), Hikmet Çetin proposed a meeting for the resolution of the conflict with the 
participation of the US, Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia but Armenia did not accept 
that proposal.354 As Turkey’s diplomatic initiatives continued, huge anti-Armenian 
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demonstrations, which favored intervention on Azerbaijan’s behalf, were held  in various 
places of Turkey because of the continuance of the Armenian massacres of the Azerbaijanis. 
Besides, opposition parties also severely criticized the government for pursuing an inactive  
policy on the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. On 13 March 1992, The Nationalist Movement Party 
of Alparslan Türkeş, criticized the government harshly for allowing ‘Armenian genocide of 
Azerbaijanis’ and of leaving Azerbaijan alone.355 On 16 May 1992, Former Prime Minister 
and leader of the Democratic Left Party, Bülent Ecevit, blamed the government of  giving 
Armenia the green light to attack Azerbaijan and to encourage Armenia.356 Influenced by 
these pressures,  Turkey refused to normalize relations with Armenia as long as Armenia 
continued to stay in Azerbaijan’s occupied territories.. Turkey, which allowed humanitarian 
shipments of food and fuel to transit its territory to Armenia, annulled this relief operation 
after the Armenian attacks on western Azerbaijan 357 and  closed its border with Armenia to 
all passage in  April 1993. In addition, Turkey refused air transportation except for 
humanitarian aid. Although Petrossian convinced Turkey to supply electricity to Armenia in 
November 1992, Turkey cancelled the deal which would have supplied 300 million-kilowatt 
hours of electricity in January 1993 due to the intensity of  Azerbaijani and Turkish public 
opinion. Turkey warned Yerevan  that Armenia's attacks on Azerbaijani forces "would 
inevitably affect Turkish politics, and could even destabilize the country." As Armenian 
aggression intensified, so did Turkish rhetoric, with Prime Minister Demirel going so far as to 
warn the Armenians, "If you are enemies of Azerbaijan, so you become enemies of 
Turkey."358  
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Although, Turkish foreign policy makers worried that Turkey’s failure to support 
Azerbaijan would undermine the confidence of the Turkic republics in Turkey, and the 
decline of Turkey’s status as a regional power might result in the growth of Russian and 
Iranian influence in the region,359  did little to help Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia and 
Turkey stayed out of the conflict. Turkey strenuously asserted that “Not a single Turkish 
soldier serves in the Azerbaijani Armed Forces”and admitted only to sending humanitarian 
aid and  training Azeri officers.360 It is difficult to understand Turkey’s policy in this conflict 
without taking into account Turkey’s general foreign policy patterns and relations with the 
West and the USA. Despite,  pressure from the opposition parties,  media and public to get 
militarily involved in the conflict on the Azerbaijani side, several reasons had discouraged  
Turkey from applying  military solutions. First, as Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel stated 
on 3 March 1992, Turkey refrained taking a wrong step (as military intervention) which 
would lead the whole world to support Armenia and move against Azerbaijan and 
Turkey.361In July 1974, Turkey, as a guarantor state in accordance with the Zurich and 
London agreements, to prevent the massacre of Turkish Cypriots, intervened in the Cyprus 
island,  but after the peace operation Turkey could not receive any  support from the world 
and no state recognized the TRNC (Turkish Republic of North Cyprus). Therefore, Turkish 
policymakers tried to solve the problem by political means. Second, since the independence of 
the Turkish Republic, Turkish policymakers, that  adhered to the principle of  "Peace at home, 
peace abroad" in their policymaking, refrained to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh problem by 
military means. Turkey tried to be an impartial mediator in the conflicts around its 
neighborhood and aimed to preserve this image in the eyes of the world. Thus, Turkey 
concentrated on diplomatic efforts and took an active role in the OSCE for the prevention of 
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the escalation of the conflict. Third, there was a high risk that if Turkey intervened in the 
conflict by military means, the conflict would have turned to a war between Turkey and 
Russia, Armenia, possibly involving Iran as well.That risk came to the surface when the 
Russian Commander of the CIS armed forces, Marshall Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, declared that 
Turkish military intervention could result in the outbreak of a third world war.362 Besides, 
according to  article four of the 1992 Tashkent Collective Security Treaty, which was signed 
by Russia, Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: “If one of the 
participating states is subjected to aggression by any state or group of states, this will be 
perceived as aggression against all participating states to the Treaty”. Since Russia and 
Armenia were signatories to the treaty, Turkey’s attack on Armenia would have been treated 
as an attack on Russia.363 Fourth, if Turkey supported Azerbaijan with military forces or 
equipment, the US, which was closer to Armenia than Azerbaijan, could have put an arms 
embargo regarding the human rights situation as Germany had.364 Fifth, Turkish military 
intervention in the Caucasus would not serve its interests on the 'western front', for Turkey  
was negotiating for a customs union with the European Community  and striving to be a 
member of the EC in the future.365 Postponement of Turkey's full membership to the 
European Community in 1989 had also been effective because of these suspicions on the EC’s 
part. Sixth, after the Cold War, Turkey and Russia maintained close relations in the political 
and especially in economic domains. Thus, Turkey did not want to jeopardize its political and 
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economic relations with Russia.366 Seventh, Ankara feared that any Turkish move to support 
Azerbaijan would be exaggerated by the powerful Armenian Diaspora in the West so that 
Turkey would be depicted as planning “new atrocities on Armenians”.367 
Though, politics and public opinion in Turkey and the US were diametrically opposite,  
Turkish peace plan for settlement of the Karabakh dispute, which  envisaged territorial swap 
between Azerbaijan and Armenia was  supported by the US State Department  in March 1992. 
According to the plan, Karabakh was to become part of Armenia whereas Armenia would 
give the Megri region to Azerbaijan, thus connecting Azerbaijan with Nakhcivan.368 This 
solution would have excluded both Russia and Iran from  these regions' oil reserves, therefore, 
the US enthusiastically supported this plan..369 But, Armenia  rejected that plan since 
Armenia's transportation networks would have  been dependent on Turkey and Azerbaijan, 
and would also be deprived of a "window" to Iran and the Persian Gulf.370 
  While the US Congress has adopted a decidedly pro-Armenian position and hardly 
criticized  human rights abuses against Armenians,  the position of the State Department of 
the US towards Armenia became a bit more severe as the Armenian offensives continued and 
intensified. Washington rejected  the Armenians’ claim that Yerevan wasn’t engaged in the 
fighting and officially Yerevan was named by the State Department as the warring party.371 
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The State Department also condemned the July 1993 Karabakh Armenian seizure of Agdam, 
stating that "[it] cannot be justified on the grounds of legitimate self-defense".372 
The US and Turkey  continued their diplomatic initiatives in order to find a peaceful 
solution  within the framework of the CSCE probably in the hope of preventing unilateral 
action by Russia, or Iranian involvement in the region. In 1996,  the United States indicated 
that it was ready to take over the Minsk Group's co-chair position  as a welcome (especially in 
Azerbaijan) balance against the other two co-chairs - Russia and France.373 After the US took 
over the Minsk Group's co-chair position, in 1996 in the Lisbon summit, Azerbaijan proposed  
to negotiate the Mountainous Karabakh settlement on the basis of three broad principles 
which included preservation of Azerbaijan's integrity, Mountainous Karabakh people’s right 
to self-determination through the "highest degree" of autonomy within Azerbaijan as well as 
security guarantees for the parties to the conflict. In the end of the summit, under a US-
sponsored compromise, the proposal was read as a "Chair-in-office" statement that affirmed 
all three of the principles entailed in the proposal, including the provision that Karabakh 
should have the "highest degree" of autonomy within Azerbaijan. The Chair also affirmed that 
the statement had been approved by all member-states except Armenia. The Lisbon summit 
showed that Washington's role in the conflict resolution sphere had grown and the 
geopolitical priorities of the White House in the region began to take shape 374 as in the 
statement of  the  US Ambassador in Yerevan Peter Tomsen : "No country recognizes 
Karabakh's independence. This is US policy and it is the policy of the OSCE. In other words 
all of these countries  recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, and that Karabakh is 
within the borders of Azerbaijan."375 
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  Although the US struggled to find a peaceful solution to the conflict, its policies did 
not bring any positive results. But, Washington at last understood the necessity to repeal 
Section 907 for the sake of its national interests in the region as in the statement of Secretary 
of State Madeleine Albright, “ Section 907 damages US national interests by undermining the 
administration's neutrality in promoting a settlement in Mountainous Karabakh , its ability to 
encourage economic and broad legal reforms in Azerbaijan, and efforts to advance an East-
West energy transport corridor."376 But, though the repeal  of  Section 907 came on the 
agenda in 1988, it had to wait until 2002.  
In sum, in the Nagorno-Karabakh case, Turkey lost prestige in Azerbaijani eyes. 
However, they  understood that despite Turkey's shortcomings, it is the only country that 
Azerbaijan can rely on as an ally against the Armenians. Besides, for Azerbaijan, the Turkish 
military remains the best regional deterrent against Armenia. In this case, Turkey understood 
its capability and incapacities, and began to pursue more realistic policies taking into account 
the stance of the US, Europe and Russia rather than policies based on the rhetoric of 'Turkic 
21st century" or "the big Turkic world from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China". On the 
other hand, US politics towards Azerbaijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict radically 
changed  in  favor of Azerbaijan since 1996. Azerbaijan sees the US and Turkey as a balance 
to Russia and wants to find a solution to the NK conflict under the auspices of the OSCE with 
the support of the US and Turkey. The US and Turkey, which have common interests in the 
region as the diversification of energy supplies, want stability in the region since Armenian 
terrorism may hinder the implementation of the Baku-Ceyhan route.In the section  below, the 
allies’ energy politics in the region will be examined as supplementary to the ‘section 2.2.2: 
Oil and oil export options’, which was examined in  chapter 2.  
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3.1.2. Energy reserves and diversification of energy  supplies 
Two key members of NATO, the United States and Turkey, which share major 
economic and strategic interests  in the region, want  access to the oil resources of the Caspian 
Sea377 and safeguard their secure transportation to Western markets. For Turkey, the oil 
resources of the Caspian are pivotally important to the country’s future energy needs as its 
energy demand stands to rise by 400 percent by 2010. Besides, Turkish oil companies have a 
major stake in the Caspian,378 and  the Caspian axis has assumed even greater strategic 
importance for Turkey due to the loss of Iraqi oil.  On the other hand, the US,  which imports 
over 40 percent of the oil it needs, is  aware that oil in Azerbaijan, is enough to keep 
American industry and cars running for more than 30 years.379 Besides, the focus of American 
interests in the Caspian is the 40 percent American-owned Azerbaijan International Operating 
Company (AIOC).380 In addition to its commercial opportunities for the US and Turkey, 
Caspian oil will diversify world oil supply and lessen the dependence on exports from the 
volatile Persian Gulf . 
However, Caspian energy resources also play a major role in Russian calculations, 
since approximately 50 percent of Russia's foreign currency revenues are generated by oil and 
gas sales.381 Russian officials are aware that if Azerbaijan  can produce and ship oil without 
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Russia, it will win some of Russia's customers, depriving it of its major source of hard 
currency at a time when it can ill afford that.382 Rather, oil explorations in the Caspian are 
considered to damage Russia’s political interests in the region. Russia was against 
internationalization of the Caspian hydrocarbon exploration because it was to increase 
Western involvement in the Caspian basin and strengthen economic independence of the 
Caspian littoral NIS from Russia, thus depriving Russia of economic and political leverages in 
dealing with these states.383  
As mentioned before, the Clinton Administration—intent on placating Moscow—
hesitated to take advantage of the strategic opportunity to secure U.S. interests in the 
Caucasus.384 However, while the war in Chechnya altered US  policy, the “Contract of the 
Century” changed the US energy policy in the region. "Contract of the Century," which was 
signed in September 1994 between SOCAR, (State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic), 
and the Consortium of major international companies, the Azerbaijan International Operating 
Company (AIOC). The aim of the contract was to exploit the oil fields offshore in the 
Azerbaijanian waters of the Caspian Sea. In this contract which amounted to $7,5 billion\ 
American private companies including AMACO, UNOCOL and Pennzoil, had 44% of the 
agreement's shares and began playing a leading role in  oil exploration under the 
agreement.385 Several  factors forced the US to pursue more active energy politics in the 
region: 
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•U.S. policymakers became increasingly concerned about the possible re-emergence 
of a new Russian empire that might seek to gain exclusive control over the region’s pipelines 
and limit U.S. access. 
•Besides, if a power vacuum emerged due to the US’ passive politics in the region, 
Iran  and  China  had  the  potential  to fill the vacuum with Russia against American interests. 
•With the oil exploration and transportation, the economies of Georgia and Azerbaijan 
would improve. Therefore, economic growth would secure the sovereignty of these states 
which would be  stronger to counter the radical Iranian influence and hegomonic Russian 
pressure. 
• The people and the policy makers of Georgia and Azerbaijan would look to the 
United States  for  leadership in the region by distancing themselves from Russia and Iran. 
•The region  would also provide lucrative markets for U.S. goods and services, and  
business opportunities for American companies and, ultimately, jobs for American workers. 
•The US would also be able to make  the energy resources a tool that would   improve 
the NIS’ own economies and societies rather than a tool that would  enrich Russia or Iran. 
•Though the Caspian oil cannot replace the volumes from Saudi Arabia and other 
Persian Gulf states, it can contribute to the world oil market by weakening OPEC`s price and 
political manipulation 
•Diversification of oil sources is also an important factor since a dramatic change in 
oil markets can put the oil importing countries in big difficulties. 
•Another  factor that makes the Caspian oil indispensable for energy security is  the 
expected decline of North Sea oil output after it reaches its peak in 2006.  
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•The  most important factor that shaped US energy  politics in the region was the 
private American companies, which  were powerful enough to successfully lobby for their 
interests in Washington.386 
Besides, the establishment of the Caspian energy coordinator in the State Department, 
rather than in Commerce or Energy Departments, underlined the fact that by 1998, the 
geopolitics of energy development had become more important for the U.S. than other 
commercial considerations.387 In addition, due to US oil companies' activities in the region 
and their subsequent lobbying in Washington, the embargo imposed on Azerbaijan was lifted. 
As seen in the table below, foreign investment in Azerbaijan significantly increased after the 
"Contract of the Century" and reached its peak after the annulment of the embargo.  
Table 7: Foreign investment in Azerbaijan388 
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However, Caspian Sea is  landlocked and at the time of independence of Caucasian 
and Central Asian states, all of the pipelines were designed to supply the Soviet industrial 
heartland, and any exports to the West would have to go across Russian and Ukrainian 
territory before they can gain access to international markets.389 Russia has sought to use the 
pipeline issue as a means of reasserting its political influence over Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, insisting that a northern pipeline route from Baku to the Russian port of 
Novorossisk on the Black Sea should be the main transit route for the transport of South 
Caspian oil.390 But Turkey and the US supported the multiple pipeline strategy. Allies saw the 
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline391  as a tool that would end Russia’s monopoly over energy 
routes from the Caspian and offer the West an alternative means for transporting Caspian oil 
outside of Russian control. Despite some objections on the viability of the BTC, some recent 
developments boosted the implementation of the BTC.392 
  In addition to its oil reserves, the  region has also abundant natural gas reserves, 
larger than those in all of North America. The sum of  the proven and estimated gas reserves 
of the region equals to 11-12 percent of the world total.393 Though the US and Turkey share 
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the same views on the transportation of the Caspian oil, Turkey’s gas deals with Russia394 and 
Iran395 produced tensions between Turkey and Washington. On the other hand, Turkey in 
accordance with its energy diversification strategy, signed a natural gas purchase agreement 
with Azerbaijan.396and Turkmenistan.397 The United States  welcomed Turkey’s agreement 
with Azerbaijan on  the Shah Deniz natural gas project, which will contribute to the economic 
development of Azerbaijan, enhance Georgia's energy security by diversifying supply; and 
bring a reliable and competitive supply of gas into the Turkish market.398In addition, the US 
also gives  priority to the  Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) for obvious geo-political 
considerations (to isolate Russia and Iran) but opposes to the SWAP deal between 
Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey, which would require three new pipelines to Turkey. Although 
economically reasonable, it faces fierce US opposition, which is targeted to continue to isolate 
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Iran in the region, though supporters of the SWAP deal  claim that it would not violate the 
American Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA ), because Iran would only receive transit fees for 
moving gas to Turkey, rather than exporting gas themselves.399   
  The other dispute issue in the region has been on the use of the Caspian Sea.400 
Russia’s policymakers during much of the 1990s insisted that the legal status of the Caspian 
Sea must be determined before resources could be exploited. Iran and Turkmenistan initially 
endorsed Russia’s view of a “closed sea” or “lake,” where resources are commonly 
exploited.401 Russia changed its stance somewhat by agreeing on seabed delineation with 
Kazakhstan in 1998 and with Azerbaijan in January 2001.402 But Iran’s stance on the division 
of the Caspian Sea did not soften.403 The US and Turkey support the definition of the Caspian 
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Sea as a sea, not a lake. For example, after the Iranian navy allegedly forced an Azeri oil-
exploration ship to leave a disputed oilfield, Turkey dispatched a small number of fighter jets 
to Azerbaijan under the pretext of participating in a previously arranged air show to show its 
support to Azerbaijan.404 
405 
 
 
3.2. Divergences in the allies’ politics towards Armenia 
Since the end of the Cold War, in contrast to Azerbaijan, Armenian-American 
relations has been warm from the beginning. After Armenia declared independence on 23 
September 1991, President George  Bush received the Armenian President and Foreign 
Minister in the White House in November 1991 and a month later, on December 25, Armenia 
was the only Transcaucasian state that was included in Bush's official recognition of five of 
the former Soviet republics.406  Besides, as put forward above, the US supported Armenia in 
the NK conflict though it changed its policy after 1998. The US Congress, under the influence 
of the  Armenian Assembly of America and the Armenian National Committee, implemented 
an embargo on Azerbaijan and accepted Azerbaijan as the offender though Armenia occupied 
one fifth of the Azerbaijani territory.  
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  Turkey also attached importance to its relations with Armenia. When  
Armenia experienced a devastating earthquake in 1988, Turkey provided  
substantial aid407 and although  Armenia's campaign to absorb Nagorno-Karabakh began the 
following year,  Turkey  recognized the independence of Armenia on 16 December 1991, and 
due to the difficult economic conditions following its independence, Turkey was one of the 
first countries to help Armenia during the drought408 by  facilitating the transit of 
humanitarian aid to Armenia through its territory. Besides, Ankara invited Armenia to the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization as a founding state. But Turkey, which 
allowed humanitarian shipments of food and fuel to transit its territory to Armenia, annulled 
this relief operation since Armenia continued its attacks on the Azerbaijani territories. 
However, in April 1995 Turkey  reopened its air space to Armenia in order to contribute to 
peace in the region. Despite Turkey’s cooperative politics towards Armenia, Armenia 
continues to repeat its territorial claims on Turkish territory. In Article 11 of the Armenian 
Declaration of Independence, the Eastern Anatolia Region, which is part of Turkey is referred 
to as “Western Armenia”. Furthermore, Armenia does not officially recognize the existing 
common border between Turkey and Armenia as established by the Kars Agreement of 1921, 
thus Yerevan questions the territorial integrity of Turkey. Also, according to   Article 13, 
paragraph 2 of the Constitution of Armenia, Armenia depicts that the Mount Ararat, which is 
situated in Turkey,  is described as  part of the coat of arms of Armenia. Moreover, Armenia, 
disregarding historical facts,  accuses Turkey of having committed a so-called “genocide” 
which has never taken place. This allegation has also been included in the Armenian 
Declaration of Independence. Besides, Armenia’s support to the terrorist organization, PKK-
KADEK (Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress) hinders Turkish-Armenian relations. 
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The terrorist group is being provided with a safe haven in Armenia and  is preparing to carry 
out activities from Armenia under the label, "the Kurdish-Armenian Friendship Committee.409 
Also, recent visits to Armenia by high-ranking members of the PKK leadership raise 
suspicions that Armenian-PKK collaboration is intensifying410 and  according to the decision 
of the meeting, coded as "Sevan 3", the parties agreed to move the HQ of PKK terrorist 
organization to the territory of Armenia till June 19, 2005.411 In addition, Since Kocharian’s 
takeover, the Armenian position regarding Karabakh’s secession has hardened and Turkey’s 
relations with Armenia were deteriorated even further. Yerevan even  has refused to recognize 
the Lisbon Protocol, sponsored by the OSCE.412 The new Armenian government also 
demanded a limit on the number of Turkish officials entitled to carry out inspections of 
Armenian military bases under the CFE Treaty and the Armenian officials refused to 
participate in the OSCE meetings taking place in any Turkish city.413 Therefore, 
confrontational policies persistently pursued by Yerevan and the Armenian Diaspora, have 
not made it possible for Turkey to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia.414 Therefore, 
the state that sabotages the Turkish-Armenian relations is the latter.415 But, Turkey is still 
willing to normalize its relations with Armenia, however Yerevan’s failure to develop good 
neighborly relations as well Yerevan’s breach of basic principles of international law and the 
relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, impede Ankara to establish diplomatic relations 
with its neighbor.416  
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 Although, Armenian-American relations had been warmer than Turkish-Armenian 
relations, some Armenian policies were at odds with the US interests. Armenia due to its 
geopolitical restraints, looked to Russia as its chief guarantor for security, while Turkey and 
Azerbaijan clearly preferred the US to Russia. While the United States expanded its military 
relations with the Baltic states, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the process of NATO enlargement 
and under the PfP military activities, Armenia preferred to improve its military relations with 
Russia. Thus, Armenia has been  the cornerstone of Russia’s forward defense in the 
Caucasus.417 Russia has obtained a long-term base and treaty that governs relationships with 
Yerevan. The treaty reaffirms Russia’s lasting military presence in Armenia and commits 
Armenia not to join NATO. It also reconfirms Russia’s determination to counter U.S. 
presence and remain the exclusive regional hegemon as well as its greatest 
power.418Moreover, deepening Armenian-Iranian ties revoked anger in Washington. Hence, 
the US implemented  sanctions on some Armenian firms due to their contacts with Iran in the 
nuclear sector.419 Contrary to Americans, Iran is regarded by many Armenians as their most 
supportive and friendly neighbor. Iran provided Armenia economic assistance in breaking out 
of its physical isolation by helping to construct a bridge over the Araxes River at Meghri for 
transportation over Zangezur to and from Yerevan.420  
Though in 2000 Armenia was receiving $42 per person from the US, which was an 
enormous indicator as compared to other countries: $34 per head for Bosnia, $1 for Rwanda, 
and $1,40 for Russia.421 Besides, security-related assistance for Armenia has almost doubled 
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to $10 million in 2002, up from $5.6 million in 2001422 and Armenia has become the second-
largest US aid recipient after Israel on a per capita basis.423    
3.3. Georgia, where the allies’ interests converge 
Georgia is viewed as “an important geopolitical linchpin in the Caucasus region,” 
since it is “the western portal to the Great Silk Road and the newest conduit of Caspian oil to 
world markets ... a strategic gateway of energy and trade routes linking East and West”.424 
Due to its vital geostrategic situation and its complex domestic structure, after the break-up of 
the Soviet Union, Georgia has experienced a difficult  state-building and independence 
process. Besides, Russia that sees Georgia as a key component in its security policy in the 
South Caucasus,  supported the separatist moves in Georgia, which caused Abkhazia and  
South Ossetia’s  de facto separation from Georgia. Several reasons had been effective on 
Russia’s policy towards Georgia. First, Azerbaijan took an open anti-Russian stand, therefore, 
Russia was endangered to  become isolated from its traditional ally in the region – Armenia. 
Thus, a pro-Russian Georgia was crucial for Russia to have land access route to Armenia 
which the Russian military bases. Otherwise, maneuvering capabilities of Russian troops in 
the region could potentially decrease.425 Second, Georgia and Armenia was a natural corridor 
for trade and communications networks with Iran for Russia. Third, Russia whose coastline 
was reduced to 300 km.  after  the conflict with Ukraine over the division of the Black Sea 
fleet and dispute over the access to naval bases in the Crimea, could not afford the loss of 
naval infrastructure along the Georgian Black Sea coast.426 Therefore, when Georgia seemed 
reluctant to join the CIS, Georgia’s reluctance  was overcome by the Kremlin that has 
                                                 
422 U.S. Assistance to Armenia, Fiscal Year 2002 Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs 
Washington, DC, June 6, 2002, at www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/11027.htm  
423 Ariel Cohen, “U.S. Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Buildıng A New “Sılk Road” to 
Economic Prosperity,” at http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1132.cfm 
424 Jim and Julie Kim, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. 
Interests,” at www.fas.org/man/crs/IB95024.pdf  
425 Rovshan Sadıgbeyli, Stability in the South Caucasus: The Role of Russia and Turkey, (Ankara:Bilkent 
University, (Master's) Thesis ,2002), p.35. 
426Ibid.  
 
132 
strategic interests in the region,  through inciting riots in Abkhazia in 1992. Consequently, in 
exchange for Russian support against Abkhaz secessionists, Shevardnadze was forced to join 
the CIS in October 1993. At that time Shevardnadze accepted Russia’s dictate of Georgia’s 
policies, which includes discouragement of Georgia’s attempt to set up independent regional 
cooperation mechanisms, the manipulation of Georgia’s access to energy resources,  the 
introduction of a visa regime on Georgia, affecting hundreds of thousands of its citizens 
resident in Russia and implementing severe cuts in electricity leaving the capital with a couple 
of hours of current daily and parts of the countryside totally devoid of it.427 Hence, Russian  
dominance in the region.428 
After its independence, Georgia  looked to the West and especially to the United 
States in order to acquire a greater independence from Russia. But initially, the US support 
was limited mostly to humanitarian assistance since the US was primarily interested in 
Russia. But the US humanitarian assistance had been useful for the newly independent 
Georgia at that time as President Shevardnadze has often stated, “U.S. humanitarian aid made 
a critical difference in averting famine in Georgia in the early 1990s and helping it maintain 
its stability and independence”.429  
Besides,  in the South Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts, the US supported the territorial 
integrity of Georgia rather than the self-determination rights of Abkhazs and Ossets. In its 
relations with Georgia, Washington  relied upon extensive bilateral assistance programs that 
aimed at improving administration and governance under the Tbilisi regime, allocating 
funding to international nongovernmental organizations such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross to help address social problems. In addition, the United States supported the 
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efforts of multilateral intergovernmental institutions such as the OSCE.430 In addition, the US 
had also become a member of the FOG grouping (Friends of the UN Secretary-General for 
Georgia)431 to promote a movement toward a settlement in the Abkhazia conflict.432  
The United States' involvement in the regional conflicts of Georgia, was based on the 
assumption that Russia's attempts to reach a peaceful settlement of this frozen conflict were 
fruitless. So the US aimed to  replace Russian attempts of conflict resolution with the 
instruments of the United Nations. However, the only positive outcome of that policy under 
the Geneva Group and the Friends of Georgia Group, was the fact that the conflict was further 
internationalized.433  
Although, the US also  supported the UNOMIG434, which played a secondary role in 
the process and had to monitor the activities of the CIS peacekeepers, military engagement of 
the United States whether unilaterally or in the framework of NATO was not  realized in the 
beginning of the 1990s. When Shevardnadze called for an international "peace enforcement 
operation in Abkhazia on the Bosnian model"435, the US looked reluctantly at this proposal 
since the United States was  overburdened with other peacemaking missions and  reluctant to 
provoke Moscow's anger. This reality was publicly stated by  Shevardnadze. He said that 
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President Clinton advised him not to try and rush the withdrawal of Russian troops from 
Abkhazia.436  
In other words, the Clinton Administration, which gave  strategic priority to dismantle 
the Soviet military machine and nuclear arsenal, and confine it within the Russian region in 
accordance with its  Russia-first policy, gave Moscow a free hand in the South Caucasus437 
Thus, the U.S. Administration, which does not want not just Abkhazia and Georgia, but the 
entire Caucasus, to become an area of international competition between Russia and the 
United States, has officially viewed the cooperation of the Russian “peacekeepers” with 
UNOMIG as mainly unobjectionable. On 7 March 1994,  US President Bill Clinton told 
reporters that he endorsed the proposal to dispatch to Abkhazia a UN peacekeeping force, a  
Russian contingent, but no US troops. However, he also announced that the US would provide 
Georgia $70 million in humanitarian aid for 1994 in order to avert what Shevardnadze termed 
the danger of famine.438 Besides, U.S. aid to Georgia has included setting up a business 
service center in Tbilisi to encourage small business development, and technical aid for 
monetary and fiscal reform, including through the FY1996, creation of a Center for Economic 
Policy Analysis and Reform (CEPAR) and with U.S. support, Georgia was formally admitted 
to the World Trade Organization in June 2000, the second NIS (after Kyrgyzstan) to gain 
admission.439  
As put forward above,  Washington did not prefer  to rely on military power and  
concentrated its efforts on increased diplomatic ways of reaching a solution. But the US 
officials were aware that the security of Georgia located at the nexus of Europe and Asia,  
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with ports on the Black Sea, was vital for the United States’ vital interests since Georgia was  
the principal outlet for bringing Caspian oil and gas to international markets.440  
However, since 1997, the US also began to assist Georgia in the military domain. In 
1997, the US and Georgia signed CTR II (Cooperative Threat Reduction) assistance program, 
which  provided Georgia equipment and training for export controls and the safe storage of 
weapons materials. Also, the agreement on the "Cooperation in the Area of Prevention of 
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Promotion of Defense and Military 
Relations" signed by Georgia and the United States in 1997 also meant cooperation in  
promoting defense and military contacts and other cooperative military activities.441 
Georgian-American relations developed after Georgia gave unequivocal support to the 
US and offered unlimited access to its air space after the September 11 attacks. Georgia 
obviously gained most among the South Caucasian states from the 9/11 event and the anti-
terrorist campaign as regards military cooperation with the US. For the first time in history the 
US decided to deploy its troops in the Caucasus region. Generally the military support for 
Georgia included $64 million on training and another $100m in development aid,442 equipping 
approximately 1,200 Georgian forces, deployment of 180 troops to train Georgians for anti-
terrorism purposes. This aid relieved Georgia, which had been under severe pressure from 
Russia that accused Georgia of turning a blind eye to terrorists in Pankisi.443  The United 
States made clear to Russia at the highest levels that no excuse that endangered Georgia's 
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stability and territorial integrity would be acceptable.444 As well, while the US supported 
Georgia against Russia, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze’s administration has 
strongly backed the US campaign to oust Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Before Operation 
Iraq Freedom,  U.S. officials inspected air facilities in Georgia for possible use in Iraq 
military operations, which solidified Tbilisi’s image as Washington’s chief strategic partner in 
the Caucasus.445  
Ankara just like the US realized that Georgia’s stability was crucial for Turkey’s 
regional policy and for the successful implementation of the regional projects as stated by the 
then Turkish Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz during his visit to Ajaria in 1998, “Georgia’s 
stability is no less important than Turkey’s own stability”446 Georgia is reliant on Turkey for 
its economic improvement, and Turkey is reliant on Georgia for its land-ties with Azerbaijan 
and Central Asia. Besides, for Turkey, Georgia  is the gateway to the Caucasus and a key 
transit state in the transport of Caspian oil to Western markets and in the implementation of 
the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi oil pipeline.447 Thus, like the US, from the outset Turkey supported 
the peaceful resolution of the conflicts in Georgia within the framework of the sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity of Georgia.448 Turkey has backed both the UN observer 
force in Abkhazia and international endeavors to solve the crisis449 that Georgia faced after its 
independence. 
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In the diplomatic fora, like the US did under the Geneva Group and the Friends of 
Georgia Group, Turkey took place in the international and regional organizations, which 
aimed at stability in the South Caucasus including Georgia. In this regard, Turkey and 
Georgia participated in the  “South Caucasus Stability Pact”. In fact Turkish President 
Suleyman Demirel expressed his idea to form a "Caucasus Stability Pact"  at Tbilisi in 
January 2000. The main goal of Demirel's "Caucasus Stability Pact" was to create a stable 
political landscape for the "energy corridor" that Ankara hopes will bring the oil riches of the 
Caspian region to its Mediterranean port of Ceyhan.450 Besides, Turkey and Georgia 
participate in “Great Silk Road”, TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe - Caucasus – 
Asia)451  and INOGATE (Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe) projects. 452 Today, 
Turkey and Georgia engage in also on several joint civil-engineering projects such as the 
Kars-Tbilisi railroad, Sarp-Batum-Poti highway, hydro-power projects, modernization of 
Batumi’s airport, Batumi’s and Poti’s harbour, construction of communication links between 
Poti and Baku, and, most important, the Baku-Ceyhan-Tbilisi Oil pipeline453and  Turkey has 
replaced Russia as Georgia's main trading partner.454 
 Not only economic and political cooperation, but also military cooperation455 between 
Turkey and Georgia expanded. In March 1999, Turkey and Georgia signed a treaty on 
military assistance and collaboration, which.  provides for training of Georgian troops in 
Turkey and for Ankara’s assistance in modernizing training facilities in Georgia. The accord 
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envisages further Turkish assistance in creating training centers in Kodori and Gori and a 
modern shooting range outside of Tbilisi.456  
While the allies expanded their relations with the South Caucasian states in political, 
economic and military domains, Russia looked suspiciously to the allies’ expanding policies 
in the South Caucasus and initially used regional conflicts and domestic instability in the 
South Caucasian states as an instrument to prevent unwanted external penetration as in the 
example of Georgia. In the section below, allies’ attitudes towards Russia in their foreign 
policy making in the South Caucasus and the role of Russia in the region will be analyzed.  
3.4. From competition to cooperation; Russia 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russian Federation mostly focused  on 
domestic economic and political reforms, and chose simply to “get rid” of the “Caucasian 
problem” by withdrawing both militarily and politically from the region. However, since mid-
1992, when “Eurasianist” views gained popularity in Russia’s political discourse, the 
Caucasus once again became one of the key regions towards which Russian political and 
security elite re-defined its policy.457  
In fact, the Caucasus land has always been a strategic area for  Russians. Russia has 
always recognized the Northern Tier and Turkey not only as a gateway to the peripheral seas, 
but also as a possible occupation route to Russia.458 Besides, Russian policymakers were 
aware that South Caucasus could be a buffer or barrier for Russia from the Middle East, 
which is a vital and important supplier of oil, if it were in the control of hostile powers.459 
Thus,  politico-military presence of Russia in the southern Caucasus would at a minimum help 
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Russia to preserve and possibly expand its interests in Central Asia, the Black Sea region460 
and the Middle East. Then, a clear Russian policy towards the South Caucasus developed 
based on three major principles. Firstly, non-Russian republics of the former Soviet Union 
must be reintegrated into the CIS.461 Secondly, the external boundaries of these states were to 
be protected by Russia. Thirdly, Russian military bases should be present on the territory of 
the three states.462  
To realize its objectives, Russia exploited regional conflicts and domestic instability in 
the South Caucasian states as told in the second chapter,  as an instrument to prevent the 
growing involvement of NATO countries, and the USA and Turkey in particular. In this 
regard, Russia has coerced Georgia, threatened Azerbaijan with both internal coups and major 
support for Nagorno-Karabakh, negotiated a peace and a long-term base agreement with 
Georgia and Armenia, and become the arbiter of their fates or security guarantor. Russia has 
acted to gain bases, lasting strategic footholds, overturn the Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE) treaty, monopolize the local energy business, and create an exclusive sphere of 
influence.463 In short, Russia has not hesitated to manipulate the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS) as an instrument of Russian expansionism, imperialism and 
aggression.464  
According to Russia, these policies were natural and necessary steps to maintain its 
influence in the region. Unfortunately, the rhetoric of “Turkic world”, which caused  the fear  
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of “Pan-Turkism” and “Neo-Ottomanism465, also has been effective on legitimising Russia’s 
hegemonic policies. At that time,  Russia's economic  weakness and  Turkey's membership of 
NATO added to fuel Russian ambivalence.466 As for the Russian officials, Turkey could 
present a security problem  indirectly, manifesting itself through its support of regimes, 
movements, or policies in the Transcaucasus and in Central Asia which are directed against 
Russia or its allies.467 On the other hand, according to the Russian policymakers, the US was 
aiming to  force Russia out altogether468 and compel Russia to accept a very inferior position 
compared to its regional ambitions. After NATO’s Kosovo campaign, these fears have gained 
renewed immediacy and urgency since the Russian military-political elite interpreted it as a 
prelude to a similar future anti-Russian campaign in the Transcaspian.469  
On the other side of the coin, the US and Turkey, saw Russia’s over reliance on 
military means and desire to emplace military bases on the soil of NIS  as a  first step in 
enforced absorption of these states back into the Russian “sphere of influence” and supported 
the South Caucasian independence struggle as told before. Russia, so as not to lose its 
influence in the South Caucasus,  gave importance to its connection with Armenia. But,  
Russia’s  excessive emphasis on “strategic partnership” with Armenia and ever-deepening 
military relations between Russia and Armenia on the one hand, and overt pro-Abkhaz stand 
on the other, contributed to the formation of a negative image of Russia in the eyes of 
Azerbaijanis and Georgians.470 To keep its own military-industrial complex solvent, and  to  
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build a coalition in Eurasia to counterbalance U.S. military superiority, Russia developed its 
relations with Iran471,  but that policy also did not bring tangible gains to the RF in the South 
Caucasus region.  
Nevertheless, although Turkey and Russia had intersecting interests, Turkish-Russian 
relations arrived at a 'Golden Age' in the post-cold war era. Though, Turkey's traditional 
apprehensions and Russia’s anxieties in the South Caucasus have not been completely 
eliminated, cooperation rather than competition has dominated in Turkish-Russian 
relations.472 Turkey and Russia, by participating in the Black Sea Economic Cooperation,  
committed themselves to improving economic and technological co-operation, to encouraging 
social interaction and free circulation of private enterprise. By the BSEC, Russia seeks to 
offset its isolation and regain its former prestige via multilateral partnerships in the South 
Caucasus. Boris Medvedev, deputy director for the Department of Economy within the 
Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that “BSEC is part of guaranteeing stability not 
only in the Black Sea itself, but also in the area of international trade and economic ties.”473  
Some of the projects of the BSEC have already been completed, including the establishment 
of fiber optic communications networks and radio link systems to connect Turkey to i) 
Bulgaria, Romania and Moldova (KAFOS); ii) Italy, Ukraine and Russia (ITUR), and iii) 
Azerbaijan and Georgia (DOKAP). The work on other projects aiming to integrate highways, 
railways and maritime lines so as to improve the efficiency of transportation networks 
between members is currently under way. 474 Moreover, Turkey and Russia have signed an 
agreement on the transportation of Russian natural gas to Turkey via an underwater pipeline 
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in the Black Sea, known as "Blue Stream Project".475 which is already in place despite the 
dispute on the price of the gas.  In addition, the extent of Turkish-Russian economic relations 
greatly exceeded those established with Azerbaijan and all the Central Asian states. Turkey's 
economic relations with Russia reached a peak in 1997. The overall bilateral trade volume, 
including non-registered trade (the so-called "luggage trade") by tourists, reached around $10 
billion in 1997, making Russia the second largest trading partner for Turkey. Furthermore, 
Turkish builders did $8.5 billion of business in Russia in 1997.476 Shortly, while 
“multidimensional cooperation in so many fields would have seemed pure fantasy some 10-15 
years ago [between Turkey and Russia” as former ambassador of the Russian Federation to 
Turkey Alexander Lebedev  stated477, today Turkey and Russia understood that the 
unnecessary rivalry in the areas that once were a buffer zone between these two states 
exacerbate risks emanating from regional sources of instability.478 
American-Russian  and Russian-NATO relations also expanded after 1997. On 27 
May 1992, NATO and the Russian Federation, in order to contribute to the establishment of 
common and comprehensive security in Europe that is based on allegiance to shared values, 
commitments and norms of behavior in the interests of all states, signed the  Founding Act on 
Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security. In accordance with this act, NATO and Russia  
created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, whose objective is to build increasing 
levels of trust, unity of purpose and habits of consultation and co-operation between NATO 
and Russia, in order to enhance each other's security and that of all nations in the Euro- 
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Atlantic area and diminish the security of none.479 Today, although, Russia still takes a critical 
stance on continuing NATO enlargement, in particular the admission of the Baltic republics,  
its former categorical rejection has softened somewhat.480 The changing face of the Russian –
American relations were also revealed in the declaration on  “the New Strategic Relationship 
Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation”, which stressed that in 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus, both countries recognize  common interest in promoting 
the stability, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of all the nations of this region. The United 
States and Russia rejected the failed model of ``Great Power'' rivalry that can only increase 
the potential for conflict.481 Also President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin , being 
the first visiting president of RF to Azerbaijan in January 2001, stated that “regional conflicts 
should be solved without victors or vanquished”.482 Besides, Russia  supported the US 
military operation in Afghanistan and finally accepted the establishment of US bases in 
Central Asia and the secondment of American advisers to Georgia. 
  Although there had been changes in Russian foreign policy in favour of the US and 
Turkey, allies are  aware that, if Russia becomes expansionist and aggressive in the South 
Caucasus as in the recent Russian war in Chechnya, Russia could sabotage many if not all of 
the forthcoming energy projects by relatively simple and tested means and there is not much 
that the US and Turkey  could do without  a strong and lasting regional commitment.483   
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Therefore, Russia has the capability to  damage Turkish and American interests in the region. 
Besides,  if a military encounter between the US and Russian armed forces (or their proxies) 
occurs anywhere, Caucasus  is a likely place, whether in joint peace operations or in hostile 
confrontations.484 Therefore, the US and Turkey try to enhance military, economic and 
political relationships with Russia, but are also ready to react to Moscow’s threats  and lessen 
the negative effects of the probable Russian disturbing  foreign policies. Allies, to make the 
NIS completely independent of Russia, try to legitimize their policies  in the area as well as 
implicitly asking Russia to view the region as an area of international cooperation rather than 
its own backyard.485  
 On the other hand, while allies aimed  to cooperate with RF in their foreign policy 
making in the South Caucasus, allies - especially the United States -  refrained to cooperate 
with Iran due to Iran’s  severe Islamic regime, energy politics, its military relations with 
Russia and supposed nuclear programs. In the section below, the allies attitudes towards Iran, 
which is seen mostly as a rival rather than a partner in the region,  will be examined.  
3.5. Clashing interests between Iran and the  Turkish-American alliance  
 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there appeared a power vacuum in Eurasia 
including the South Caucasus, and Iran as a  great regional power with its religious ties with 
the NIS appeared as a candidate to fulfill the vacuum. Tehran looked at the newfound 
independence of the states in the north as a diplomatic opportunity to break out of the 
containment imposed by the United States.486 Iran perceives the Muslim Central Asian states 
and Azerbaijan as a potential sphere of influence in its strategic rear—a market for its goods 
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and ideology. Iran, which is an is an attractive outlet for Caspian Sea oil and gas,  would like 
to profit from transit fees from energy resources exported to the Persian Gulf via Iranian 
territory.487  
However, the US, which does not want these states to fall into sphere of influence of 
Islamic Iran, increased its  strict measures against Iran488 According to the US officials , Iran 
sponsored international terrorism and was pursuing a nuclear weapons program. Besides, 
militant Islamic leaders in Iran make no effort to hide the fact that they want to destroy the 
United States and its ally, Israel and that affected  US foreign policy towards Iran 
negatively.489 In 1992 the USA also banned weapon sales to Iran. By August 1996, with the 
passage of the Iran Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA), Washington imposed penalties on major 
international investors in Iran's oil and gas industry. As a result, Iran was excluded from the 
probable projects of multiple pipelines for the export of Caspian oil. Although oil companies 
as Mobil explicitly challenged U.S. sanctions policy against Iran, which offers  the cheapest 
route for Caspian oil, so far there have not been any changes in the politics of the USA.490 
 While the US sees Iran as an evil491, naturally, Iran also does not look at the US 
with sympathy. U.S. support for the coup against Mosaddeq in 1954, subsequent U.S. backing 
of the Shah,  the long-term U.S. support for Israel, US support for Iraq during its war with 
Iran, (1989-1988)492 U.S. sanctions to Iran, which isolates it from the region, excluding Iran 
from the consortium of oil companies and oil export routes had been effective on the hostility 
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of Iran towards the US. Broadly speaking, most Iranians would agree with the following 
criticisms of the United States: 
• The United States is arrogant and bullies lesser powers. It uses its power in a 
discriminatory and punitive fashion. 
• The United States is a cultural threat to Islamic civilization. 
• The United States finds it difficult to have normal relations with states that disagree 
with it. Independence and good relations with the United States are often 
incompatible.493Thus, there does not seem  an improvement in the American-Iranian relations 
in the near future. 
While the NIS of the South Caucasus presented opportunities to Iran like  Turkey and 
the United States, there also emerged new threats to Iran’s national security. With the 
independence of  Azerbaijan, under Elchibey`s governance Azerbaijan saw an opportunity for 
the unification of Southern and Northern Azerbaijan and a single, independent state of 
Azerbaijan. Hence,  that led to raise acute tensions between Tehran and the newly 
independent government in Baku since loss of Northern Iran  would reduce Iran’s population 
by about one-fourth and  it would provide a land bridge between Turkey and northern 
Azerbaijan, now separated by Armenia. 494 Iranian authorities who are afraid of  the union of  
Azerbaijanis, split Iranian Azerbaijan into two provinces (Sabalan and East Azerbaijan, with 
capitals in Ardebil and Tabriz ), in an apparent effort to reduce a sense of Azerbaijani 
nationhood. Although,   Iran takes measures against the unification of Azeris, it can not hinder 
connection  culturally through poetry as in the poem of Balash Azeroglu-; 
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The sorrows and wounds of this land are one.  
The battles of Baku and turmoil of Tabriz - Do these not lead to one goal?  
The fatherland is neither separated nor divided! 495  
 
 Thus, while the allies want  a strong, politically independent, secular, pro-Western 
Azerbaijan, this is not in the interest of Iran. Azerbaijan, by developing its energy resources 
and emerging as a strong petroleum-producing country, can be increasingly charming for the 
20 million Azerbaijanis living in Iran496  and also after the Operation Iraq Freedom, a 
democratic pro-American Iraq, in which the Shias constitute %65 of the population may also 
be charming for the Iran Shias, whose freedoms are restricted.497 Therefore, the territorial 
integrity of Iran could  be jeopardised in the near future.  
  Iran, with the aim of making the US policies ineffective, developed its relations with 
Russia in the political, military and economic domains. Russia welcomed Iran’s 
rapproachment with itself since Iran is a perfect arms client and market for nuclear reactors. 
The sale of Russian arms has hence become a major source of hard currency earnings for the 
hard pressed Russian budget. Iran has received a range of types of weaponry from Russia, 
including submarines and  fighter jets. 498  In October 2001, Iranian Defense Minister Admiral 
Ali Shamkhani signed a multibillion- dollar contract with Russia for a supply of sophisticated 
weapons to Tehran even though a 1995 secret agreement signed by then-Russian Prime 
Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and U.S. Vice President Al Gore called for limiting advanced 
arms sales from Russia to Iran.499 Besides, Iran is an ideal ally against US hegemony, since 
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Iran helps avert the US from fully dominating the Persian Gulf.500 From Iran’s point of view, 
Russia is a secure source of complex arms; a   diplomatic ally at a time when the US has 
sought to isolate it, and an ally in helping to limit Azerbaijan’s possible irridentist threat.501 As 
a result, Tehran and Moscow, which see the emergence of a unipolar world as troubling502, 
identify their cooperation as “strategic”, each side considering the other as vital to its own 
national security, internal stability, and territorial integrity.503 However, although Russia and 
Iran share similar interets in the region, Russia’s rapproachement with the US and increased 
economic relations with Turkey, worry the Iranian policymakers about  Russia’s reliability. 
In addition, Iran, which does not want a strong Azerbaijan,  worked closely with 
Christian Armenia, supporting it tacitly in its conflict with Shi’a Azerbaijan, while Turkey 
supported Azerbaijan. In this respect, Armenia has become a logical part of the grouping, and 
actually a practical Moscow-Yerevan-Tehran partnership has emerged, whose main function 
is to neutralize Turkish influence.504  
While Iran,Russia and Armenia formed a de facto coalition to counteract Turkish 
influence, the United States continued to support the "Turkish model" as  a counterbalance to 
the “Iranian-Islamic model” and further exclusion of Iran out of the region.505 But due to its 
poor economy,  complex relations with Armenians and internal security problems, Turkey 
was not able to assume thre role that the US wanted.506 
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Like the US, Turkish-Iranian relations have not been so warm due to Iran’s support to 
the PKK and Islamic militant groups in Turkey. The movements of the PKK increased 
through the Iranian border, when a pro-Turkish president –Elchibey- was in power in 
Azerbaijan.507 Iran has blocked Turkey's TIR (Transit Highway International) trucks from its 
highways, effectively obstructing overland trade with Azerbaijan and Central Asia.508 
Besides, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani,  warned Azerbaijan against allowing NATO 
forces on its soil, saying that "it will pay a high price" if the forces reach the Caucasus and the 
Caspian Basin region509 and in August 2001  Iranian warships and fighters attacked an 
Azerbaijani research vessel. However, after that event, Gen.Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu, the Turkish 
Chief of the General Staff, paid a visit to Baku and participated in the graduation ceremony of 
the first group of cadets from the Turkish-run military academy, and confirmed Turkey’s 
support for Azerbaijan’s independence and territorial integrity. The elite "Turkish Stars" 
squadron appeared in the skies above Azerbaijan, pointing to  the strategic union between two 
peoples and states. Tehran described the action as a Turkish show of force.510  
Though there are problems with Iran and Turkey,  there is also considerable scope for 
economic cooperation between the two states. Iran has oil and gas that it can export to energy-
thirsty Turkey, and Iran can act as a transit route of energy exports from Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan.511 In 1996, energy-starved Turkey negotiated a $20 billion gas pipeline project to 
bring Iranian and Turkmeni gas to its fast-growing economy, and further to the European 
market. This decision was undesirable from the U.S. point of view, however, because of 
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Iran’s continuing support for terrorist organizations in the Middle East and attempts to export 
to the  Islamic revolution to neighboring states. However, since Turkey is just trading with 
Iran, the US has decided that technically, Turkey is not in violation of the Iran-Libya 
Sanctions Act (ILSA), which imposes sanctions on companies investing more than $20 
million in Iran's oil or gas industries. For its part, Turkey has persistently maintained that it 
needs to diversify its suppliers of natural gas away from Russia and that Turkmen and Iranian 
gas represent economically good options.512 Although Turkey and Iran aim to develop their 
relations with projects such as the reestablishment of  the passenger train links between 
Istanbul-Tehran513, close cooperation between Turkey and Iran  awaits the resolution of Iran’s 
problems with the United States, which has strongly protested Ankara’s cooperation with 
Tehran. 
 While allies supported the NIS of the South Caucasus in their state building process , 
they also placeimportance on the improvement of these states’ armed forces in order to stand 
on their own feet. In the fourth chapter, the allies’ military politics in the region will be 
examined.   
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CHAPTER 4 
4. MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE ALLIES    
    IN  THE SOUTH CAUCASUS  
4.1. Russia’s military policies and the US attitude to the Russian military  
activities 
Before analyzing the military-strategic interests and activities of the US and Turkey, it 
is  necessary to look at  Russia’s military policies in the South Caucasus. During the USSR 
period the Caucasus was divided into Trans-Caucasus Military District (MD), the 
Transcaucasus Border Guard District and North Caucasus MD. This region represented one of 
the most militarized areas, not only in the former Soviet Union but also in the world.514 The 
importance that Russians gave to the South Caucasus region, which is located between the 
Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and   served throughout the centuries the role of a bridge or 
barrier for Russia, depending on the international situation,515 did not  decrease in the post-
cold war era either Russian policymakers, to maintain control over borders between the South 
Caucasian states and Turkey and Iran, aimed to maintain military bases and forces in 
Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. For this purpose, the first step by Russia was the 
implementation of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Collective Security Treaty 
by Armenia, Russia, and others in 1992, which called for mutual defense consultations. Since 
then, Russia pressured Georgia and Azerbaijan to join the CIS and sign the security treaty.516 
But, in May 1992, Azerbaijan became the only former republic of Soviet  Union (excluding 
the Baltic states) to get the Russians to pull out their forces (about 350 Russian troops remain 
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at the Gabele radar site). Besides, Azerbaijan also refused to approve joint Russo-Azerbaijani 
border patrols. However,  Russia   secured permission for two military bases in Armenia and 
three in Georgia. In addition, at that time Washington showed much respect to Russia’s 
interests in the region as put forward in the third chapter and  Russia has been granted changes 
in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty to allow added weaponry in the 
area.517 The United States has gone so far as to insist that there is "no linkage" between 
Russian efforts to destabilize the Caucasus region and the revision of the Conventional Forces 
in Europe Treaty, even though a treaty revision could legitimize Russian forces being used for 
this purpose518 and that is neglected security concerns of two Transcaucasian states - 
Azerbaijan and Georgia - and those of Turkey. 
 In September 1995, Georgia and Russia signed a military treaty, which enabled 
Russia access to bases in Vaziani, Akhalkalaki, Batumi, and Gudauta in Abkhazia for an 
indefinite period, and substantial control over Georgia's borders. Also, military cooperation 
and air defense agreements were signed by Russia with Georgia in April 1996 and with 
Armenia in May 1996, the latter including the creation of some "coalition" forces.519  
Besides, Russia by peacekeeping operations, sought to boost its role as a “key security 
guarantor” in the CIS. But resource shortages fundamentally restrained Russian military 
engagement as  joint border protection, air defense and peacekeeping operations in the 
conflicts around the CIS. Thus, Russia’s inaction and failure to take the lead in conflict 
resolution caused Georgia, which viewed Russian military buildup with concern from the 
beginning, to be alienated from Russia and  prompted the direct military involvement of 
                                                 
517 Jim Nichol, “Transcaucasus Newly Independent States: Political Developments and 
Implications for US Interests,” at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-024.htm 
518 S. Frederick Starr, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian," The National Interest, Spring 1997, at 
http://www.treemedia.com/cfrlibrary/library/policy/powerfailure.html  
519 Jim Nichol, “Transcaucasus Newly Independent States: Political Developments and 
Implications for US Interests,” at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-024.htm 
 
153 
Western powers and NATO in the CIS.520 Shortly, the deadlock in conflict resolution and 
Russia’s over reliance on military means in pursuing its interests forced Azerbaijan and 
Georgia to seek security guarantees in other security institutions and arrangements. In January 
1999, Georgia assumed full control over guarding its sea borders, and in October 1999, most 
of the Russian border troops left, except for some liaison officers, and Georgia also withdrew 
from the   CIS Collective Security Treaty in April 1999.521 In accordance with an agreement 
reached at the 1999 OSCE summit in Istanbul, Russia left Vaziani military base nearby 
Tbilisi.522 Today, the total number of Russian troops is estimated at about 5,000 in Georgia.523  
Conrary to Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia developed its military relations with the 
RF. Today, Russian forces guard the Armenian-Turkish border. According to Armenia, 
Russia's lasting military presence in Armenia provides  regional stability by protecting it from 
a possible attack on its territory. On March 1995, Ter-Petrossian and Boris Yeltsin signed a 
treaty which would allow Russia to maintain a military base near Gyumri- close to the border 
with Turkey-524, a command group and a motorized rifle regiment in Yerevan for the next 25 
years.525 This treaty also prevents Armenia from joining NATO and  reconfirms Russia's 
determination to oppose US presence and to remain the regional hegemon.526 Besides, with 
this treaty  Russia committed itself to defend Armenia militarily if attacked by a foreign 
country.527 In April 1999, Armenia and Russia formally completed the integration of their air-
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defence systems with "joint command point" near Yerevan going on duty. Armenia thus 
became part of an integrated air defence system that also includes Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
The joint air defence has been substantially reinforced recently with the deployment in 
Armenia of Russian S-300 anti-aircraft systems and MiG-29 fighter jets Russian air force 
squadron, which consists of 13 MiG-23 fighters/interceptors, providing air cover to local 
Russian bases from a possible attack by NATO missiles and fighter aircraft stationed at the 
Incirlik base in southern Turkey.528 Today, the total number of Russian troops has been 
estimated at about 3,100 in Armenia.529  
From the point of American view, in the early 1990s ,the US Department of Defense 
accepted the Central Asia and the Caucasus Area of Interest and not  Area of Responsibility 
(as the Gulf  for example). Thus, the US  in order not to jeopardize the CFE treaty overall and 
not to worsen relations with Russia,  accepted Russian deployments exceeding its quotas as 
“technical non-compliance… that is not militarily significant to NATO, though the United 
States, have indicated they would not ratify the so-called adaptation agreement, until Russia 
meets the weapons limits set out in the agreement”.530 In addition,  the Clinton Administration  
viewed a democratizing Russia as able to play a stabilizing role in the Transcaucasus and was 
satisfied with Russia taking over the responsibility for the region.531 The US policymakers 
assumed that   Russia, preoccupied with its own problems, would not have  time to fill the 
power vacuum that emerged in the South Caucasus. But, contrary to the US perspective, the 
Soviet Union had been a destabilizing force in the region.  
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4.2. Allies’ increasing influence in the region through NATO 
Then the US pressured on  Russia to cooperate with the United Nations in this sphere 
and other international organizations, and due to Russia’s economic and military weaknesses 
and Russia’s imperialist politics, the US engagement in the region  increased through NATO 
mechanisms especially with the PfP programs , which aimed to strengthen the military 
structure of Azerbaijan and Georgia. In February 1997, NATO Secretary-General Javier 
Solana  visited the South Caucasian states as the highest ranking representative of NATO to  
ever tour the Caucasus and this historic visit to the Caucasus was accepted as the emergence 
of the Caucasus as a key component in American and European security planning in the 
pivotal energy crossroads of Eurasia.532  
Since NATO protects its members from the spillover of military hostilities, prevents 
other countries from either intervening or being drawn into such conflicts, stabilizes the 
former Soviet bloc through expansion of membership and organizational tasks like PfP, and 
reduces the former Soviet bloc states’ fear of being left alone face-to-face with Russia533, the 
US military engagement through NATO was welcomed by Azerbaijan and Georgia. In the 
South Caucasus the most important instrument of NATO was Partnership for Peace (PfP) 
Program that was actually introduced in Brussels in 1994. The US-led PfP program was a 
very useful instrument  for integrating the region into the European security system. The 
program also delivered a signal from the United States that it was there and accomplished this 
at a very low economic and political cost. These two achievements were reached through the 
US strategy of "extraordinary power projection.534 Through the PfP program, which  enables 
practical military cooperation between NATO, former Warsaw Pact members, militarily non-
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aligned countries and former Soviet states across Eurasia, NATO planners hoped to enhance 
regional stability by offering military assistance and training in a variety of areas in order to  
bolster regional security.  No security cooperation was proposed and no security guarantees 
were extended for the Partner states. However, it would be wrong to state that the PfP didn't 
increase the security of the participants. In order to understand this, one should just look at the 
objectives of the Program: 
• promotion of civilian control over the military forces 
• carrying out joint operations with NATO "peace support" humanitarian missions 
aimed at improvement of peacekeeping and peacemaking skills. ( Azerbaijan for example 
"…dispatches motorized infantry company of 130 persons, unit of a civil defense (30 
persons), unit of a medical service, two helicopter MI-8, training center for improvement of 
access to national services of the control over airways during flight of NATO countries' 
planes over territory of Azerbaijan." 535 
• developing interoperability between the forces of NATO allies and participants  
• training and assisting the military forces of participating states  
• standardization process of the military forces of the countries wishing to put their 
military on the row with those of NATO members.536 
To sum, the PFP program, which consists of 19 NATO countries and 26 partner 
nations,  covers a wide range of defense-related activities, including air defense, 
communications, crisis management, democratic control of defense structures, defense 
planning and budgeting, interoperability with NATO forces, military training and exercises, 
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peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations.537 In the meantime, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia are militarily weak, NATO is reluctant to accept them, and Russia has strong 
objections to Azerbaijan and Georgia’s NATO membership. Therefore, PfP is a suitable 
alternative, which is designed to establish a broad band of security in the South Caucasus and 
Central Asia rather than creating new dividing lines between east and west, for Georgia and 
Azerbaijan  to join NATO.538 
Like Javier Solana, NATO’s new  Secretary-General, George Robertson stated that 
Europe cannot be fully secure if the South Caucasus and Central Asian states remain outside 
European security in September 2000539 and stressed the importance of the PfP programs. 
But, there also appeared objections to  NATO’s active involvement in the region. According 
to objections, three bad scenarios were possible, if NATO actively engaged in the region. 
First, local crises could drag the alliance into unexpected crises in a volatile area and into 
unwanted military confrontations because of some other's interests. Second, actors such as 
Russia, Iran, and China have established interests in the region which could lead them to view 
NATO expansion in the Caucasus and Central Asia as directly threatening. Third, competing 
economic and political interests among NATO members could reverberate back and affect 
alliance cohesion.540 But some policymakers as the former Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher and former Secretary of Defense William Perry urged that NATO needs to adapt 
its military strategy to today’s reality: the danger to the security of its members is not 
primarily potential aggression to their collective territory, but threats to their collective 
interests beyond their territory such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
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disruption of the flow of oil, terrorism, genocidal violence, and wars of aggression in other 
regions that threaten to cause great disruption. Therefore, they argued that to deal with such 
threats alliance members need to have a way to rapidly form military coalitions that can 
accomplish goals beyond NATO territory.541 Taking into account the  objections,   it was  
decided among the NATO members that the most appropriate tool that will enlarge NATO 
and increase the level of cooperation between allies and regional states, without weakening 
the alliance and without provoking a hostile response from Russia was PfP.542 Consequently, 
in its activities and policies in the South Caucasus, there emerged two points that NATO must 
make clear and regard. First, NATO must be careful in determining the limits of  its 
commitment to the region as it trains and supports local forces. Second, NATO must choose 
whether to support Turkey and the Caucasian states and demand a reduction in Russian 
forces, or support gains in Central Europe under the CFE flank and allow Russia to remain in 
violation of the treaty.543  
Besides, Russia seeing its incapability in the South Caucasus, chose to cooperate with 
the US, though it openly announced its intention to limit the presence of the US and NATO. 
At the recent Moscow and Rome summits in 2002, the United States, NATO, and Russia 
formally agreed to work towards a cooperative security regime throughout the CIS. They even 
agreed to discuss joint peace operations and apparently consider a generic concept for them. 
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This includes joint and cooperative endeavors to bring peace to Chechnya, Moldova, and 
Nagorno-Karabakh, and wage war on terrorism.544 
Turkey also actively participated the PfP activities. Due to its already established 
military attaché network in the Caspian region and proximity to the region, Ankara has been 
well-suited to set up and run the PfP exchange programs. PfPTC (Partnership for Peace 
Training Center) was established on 9th March 1998. The headquarters is located in Ankara. 
The PfPTC was inaugurated on 29 June 1998 and according to NATO’s “Concept of PfP 
Training Centers”, all procedures were completed and NATO recognized and accredited PfP 
Training Center on 12 February 1999. Military training cooperation activities conducted by 
Turkey concentrate on improving the ability of partner nations to conduct operations with 
NATO. These include military visits, military school, college and academy training or field 
training and education, various short term courses, on-the-job training at units, headquarters 
and institutions, unit/personnel exchange, cooperation in the field of military history, archives 
and museology, joint exercises, and sending observers to exercises. All of these activities are 
compatible with NATO/PfP spirit and lead to develop friendly relations, and Turkey’s 
military cooperation activities significantly contribute to the security and peace in the region 
and in the world. 545 Since the introduction of the program, over 4,000 military officers from 
the Caspian region have attended Turkish military academies.546 In June 2001, with the 
participation of Turkey, the US, Azerbaijan, Georgia and other six members, NATO within 
the framework of PfP held the first  NATO/Partner full-scale field exercise - Cooperative 
Partner 2001- in Georgia.547  
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Georgia was the most active participant of the NATO programs in the South Caucasus. 
Shevardnadze  made Tbilisi a sort of "conference hall" of NATO in the region by placing the 
Georgian capital at the disposal of NATO meetings and conferences on regional security.548 
NATO has sponsored several conferences on conflict resolution there since Georgia joined 
PfP. In October 1996, NATO sponsored a workshop on regional security in Tbilisi that 
brought together key representatives of the national security bodies from Armenia, Azerbaijan 
and Georgia. High-ranking delegates from NATO, the United States, the European Union, 
Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Georgia, and Azerbaijan convened there to discuss the geopolitical 
future of the Caucasus, including the impact of PfP.549 The “Cooperative Partner” PFP 
amphibious assault landing and natural disaster response exercises were held on Georgia’s 
Black Sea coast in June 2001, involving 4,000 mostly U.S., Georgian, and Turkish troops.550 
Besides, naval assistance from NATO members as Turkey, the United States, and Great 
Britain, has been pivotal for Georgia in the formation of its coastal defense forces, which 
would be capable of protecting Georgia’s maritime borders, since Georgia inherited virtually 
no vessels from Russia that previously belonged to the Soviet Black Sea fleet.551 However, 
Russia, which has been unwilling to give up its traditional role in the Black Sea area, has 
become increasingly anxious about NATO’s naval assistance to Georgia and Turkey’s naval 
force (while Turkey has 116 vessels and 16 submarines, Russia possesses 52 vessels and four 
submarines) in the Black Sea.552 Though Shevardnadze aimed to develop relations with 
NATO, he has been careful not to voice his support for NATO too loudly lest Moscow fear 
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that he intends to break Georgia’s ties with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
The Georgian leader has emphasized that NATO peacekeeping operations should only be 
conducted in cooperation with the United Nations and the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).553 On the other hand, On 13 September , 2002 the Parliament 
of Georgia adopted a resolution urging the Georgian government to take the necessary steps 
to start the accession process to NATO. On 1 October 2002, a memorandum of understanding 
on logistic cooperation was signed between Georgia and the NATO Maintenance and Supply 
Organisation (NAMSO), opening the way for the implementation of a PfP Trust Fund Project 
for the demilitarization and disposal of missile stockpiles and the remediation of Georgian 
military sites.Georgia officially applied to join NATO at the NATO Prague Summit in  
November 2002554 and waits to be included in NATO in the future. 
As for Azerbaijan, its first serious contacts with NATO began with President Aliyev’s 
visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels in April 1996. During the visit the Azerbaijan 
President asked for specific sorts of NATO military communications equipment and 
suggested that NATO assist training Azerbaijani units for peacekeeping purposes, creating in 
Azerbaijan a modern defense program under civilian control.555 . It was in 1997 when Baku 
deployed its first ever contingent of Azerbaijani soldiers to NATO military exercises in 
Norway. During the North Alliance's operation in Kosovo, Azerbaijan and Georgia sent their 
respective platoons there to take part in the operation within the Turkish contingent. 
Azerbaijan continued to modify its military doctrine according to that of Turkey and 
Azerbaijan’s officers were trained by the Turkish military experts and the change in the 
Azerbaijan army doctrine is verified in the statement of Azerbaijani army spokesman Uzeyir 
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Cafarov in 2001, “We participate more in NATO events than in the Commonwealth of 
Independent States' joint exercises. Our armed forces attended 200 NATO events last year and 
this year this number will also be about 200”.556 Azerbaijan officially applied to join NATO at 
the NATO Prague Summit in November 2002.557 
  While Azerbaijan and Georgia, which have been encouraged by the statement of the 
US Admiral Harold Gehmen about the enlargement of the NATO - "there were no restrictions 
and the doors were open"-558, have been more eager to develop their military links with 
NATO within the PfP framework in order to escape geopolitical dependence on Russia,  
Armenia's stance toward the PfP was cool due to its forging close strategic cooperation with 
Russia. Thus,  Armenian military representatives registered little official interest not only to 
the joint activities in the PfP program but also to the NATO-sponsored regional conferences 
and meetings. But Armenia began to  participate in the PfP program after NATO Secretary 
General Javier Solana’s visit to Yerevan in February 1997. Armenia’s participation in the PfP 
activities since 1997 can be explained by the Armenians' fear of the rapidly developing 
Azerbaijan-NATO  relations.559 Besides, the dramatic turnaround in Armenia’s participation 
in PfP may be strongly attributed to Russia’s participation in the NATO summit in Madrid in 
mid-1997 where the Alliance created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. This event 
signaled Armenia that it would have greater flexibility in pursuing its ties with NATO.560 
Although, in October 2002, Armenian soldiers took part for the first time in military exercises 
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held in Greece under PfP auspices and NATO military exercises will be held in Armenia on 
16 June 2003561, Armenia argues that NATO involvement in the Caucasus should not 
encroach upon the CIS collective defense treaty.562 Despite the warming of ties with NATO, 
Armenia veered away from its Western course in mid-1997 when it signed a Treaty on 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Aid with Russia, which strengthened already significant 
military relations between the two nations, by granting Moscow an exclusive military basing 
agreement in Armenia for the next 25 years, in August 1997.563 As a result, Armenia sees the 
Partnership for Peace activities  as supplementary to the alliance with Russia and continues to 
remain a loyal ally of Moscow, as it sees Russia as the only possible protector against the 
potential threats of Azerbaijan and Turkey.564 Besides, Armenia’s ‘Military Cooperation 
Treaty’ with Iran in March 2002, Russia’s continued military technology, weapons and 
equipment assistance, Armenian-Russian common military exercises near the boundaries of 
Azerbaijan and Turkey, formation of common Armenian and Russian military troops in 
Armenia, training of Armenian officers and noncommissioned officers in Greece are all seen 
as activities against the Turkey-Azerbaijan military cooperation. 
The growing importance that the US gave to the Eurasia was also seen in U.S. 
strategic planning. From 1991 to early 1998, no regional command authority had existed for 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. The US, to adapt its political and military structures to 
improve its ability to meet new regional challenges, developed a new military command 
structure that is better adapted to the challenges for managing regional crises and conflicts. 
U.S. European Command, which had overseen the PfP program, assumed military 
responsibility for the Caucasus, while U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for the 
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Middle East, received responsibility for Central Asia. The decision marked a prolonged 
period of confusion in U.S. strategic planning in Eurasia that left the region outside any type 
of U.S. regional command authority, though Russian commentators reacted harshly to the 
Pentagon decision, noting that the creation of a Caspian ‘zone of responsibility’ is a step 
aimed at drawing the Caspian region into the U.S. sphere of responsibility.565 The inclusion of 
the Caspian region in the European command's zone of responsibility also  meant that, in the 
event of an armed conflict, not only U.S. troops but also servicemen from the NATO member 
countries could take part in it.566  
4.3. Allies’ bilateral military relations with the South Caucasian States 
Though military ties between Washington and Baku began in 1997, Section 907 of the 
Freedom Support Act hindered  the implementation of closer ties.567 After abandonment of 
Section 907 in 2002, a first consultation between the U.S. Department of Defense and the 
Azerbaijani military took place in Baku in  March 2002568 and and both sides signed a major 
security assistance agreement. Under this document the United States will assist Azerbaijan 
in; upgrading air space control and air traffic safety at civilian and military airports, in 
accordance with NATO standards, training officers in the United States, training an 
Azerbaijani peacekeeping unit; improving the protection of its land borders, and enhancing its 
naval capabilities, so as to secure its maritime borders and protect its economic zone and 
territorial waters.569 The US government and military are now directly assisting Azerbaijan to 
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enhance its naval capacity to secure its maritime borders against Iran’s threats about energy 
exploration in the Caspian and Azerbaijan’s coastline.570 Besides, the USA assigned  $1 
million for expanding Azerbaijan military forces' peacekeeping activity in 2002.571   
Contrary to Georgia and Azerbaijan, Armenia has rather developed military relations 
with Russia. Washington tried to expand its military relations with Armenia., in order to  
break or lessen the degree of Armenian-Russian military cooperation. After Armenia opened 
its airspace to the U.S. military shortly after the 11 September terrorist attacks, the United 
States has dropped its nine-year ban on weapon exports to Armenia and Azerbaijan, citing 
"positive developments" and national security interests in developing military ties with both 
countries in March 2002572 and opened a demining center in the same month.573 In 2002 the 
US Congress allotted Armenia $4.3 million ($4 million in foreign military financing, and 
$300,000 for military training).574  
In its bilateral relations with the South Caucasian states, though  Washington tried to 
expand its military relations with Armenia, in order to  break or lessen the degree of 
Armenian-Russian military cooperation, and with  Azerbaijan, in order to  overcome the 
negative effect of the Section 907 and to prevent Azerbaijan’s falling into the sphere of 
Russia, the main target for the US bilateral activities in the region has been Georgia that  
serves as an important transportation route for oil that originates from Kazakhstan and 
Azerbaijan and travels to Western markets via Georgia's ports on the Black Sea. Washington 
approved the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program that resulted in Georgian purchases 
of military equipment from the United States. Pentagon granted Georgia 14 transport 
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helicopters and provided finance for the production of Su-39 (the latest improved 
modification of Su-25) combat aircraft at the Tbilisi Aircraft Works575. Besides, in the 
framework of the FMF, the USA granted to Georgia $17.5million  aid and 140 Georgian 
officers received  military training. Though  the US provided military aid to Georgia in order 
to stand on its own feet, Georgian government’s problems with Abkhazia continue and 
Georgia can not maintain control over Abkhazia. RF, by supporting the Abkhazian 
administration, exploits Georgia’s ethnic problems and aims to put Georgia under its 
influence. Therefore, RF keeps military forces in Georgia  and peacekeeping troops in 
Abkhazia for this purpose. The instability in Georgia and the Russian military presence in 
Georgia and Abkhazia provide several advantages to Russia. First, it enables  Russian forces 
to interfere to Chechen militants in Georgia’s territory. Second, the instability in Georgia will 
jeopardize the implementation of the BTC project and facilitate the implementation of the 
alternative pipeline which will come from Kazakhstan to Novorosisk harbor. By this way, 
Russia will have the control of the energy reserves and penetrate in Georgia more easily. 
Therefore, the United States granted coastal patrol boats to Georgia in 1997, $20 million in 
1998 to replace Russian border units along the Black Sea Coast and set up maritime and land 
border controls, 576committed over $10 million in FY2000, to facilitate the closure of Russian 
military bases in Georgia,577 which is an obstacle in front of Georgia’s genuine independence. 
Georgia has drastically improved its military capabilities since the  launch of the US-funded 
Georgia Train-and-Equip Program (GTEP) in 2002. A $64-million effort is planned to build a 
corps of Georgia’s rapid reaction forces, drawing on the expertise of US military instructors. 
So far, the first command battalion has completed training, in the process earning 
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compliments from its instructors. Training of the second unit, the Sachkhere Mountain 
Batallion, began on 1 February 2002.578 Besides, the Pentagon has transferred 10 combat 
helicopters to Georgia in 2002579 The USA and Georgia have military agreements on Nunn-
Lungar Program, assistance in army building, ceding military hardware and equipment, 
training and technical assistance, anti-aircraft defense and aviation management, financial aid, 
financing Su-39 production, open skies observation, flight agreement and PfP cooperation.580 
In the aftermath of September 11, it has deployed  40 US soldiers, who will be replaced by up 
to 200 Special Operations troops that will provide training and tactical direction to Georgian 
forces.581 This deployment   further reduced Russian influence in the region and defended 
Georgia from Russian attacks to a certain degree. Most analysts interpreted the US’ sending  
military advisers to Georgia in April 2002 as a change in its policy, which avoided 
involvement in regional conflicts or direct confrontation with other major powers. In a 
statement on September 14th, U.S. President George  Walker Bush affirmed full support for 
the Georgian government security operation in the Pankisi gorge and appealed to Russian 
President Vladimir Putin to allow the Georgian government to fulfill this task.582 However, 
though  Putin declared his desire  to form an equal partnership with NATO and the US, 
Russia’s behavior in Georgia, which shows that Moscow's imperial ambitions continue, 
stands in stark contrast to Putin’s declarations. Consistent use of economic warfare and recent 
bombings of Georgian territory show Russia's interest in preventing Georgia from slipping 
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from Russian control583. After Georgian-American military cooperation in counter-terrorist 
activities, in April 2002, Russia deployed peacekeeping troops in the Kodori valley of 
Abkhazia in order to maintain security.584 
While, the US mostly focused on Georgia in its military relations, Turkey focused on 
Azerbaijan. The military cooperation activities between Azerbaijan and Turkey began after 
the independence of Azerbaijan in 30 August 1991 and continues in the framework of 
‘Education Technique and Scientific Cooperation in the Military Domain Treaty’ and 
‘Military Training Cooperation Treaty’. Turkish military forces reconstituted the facility,  
training, sports and shooting foundations, language laboratories and classrooms of the 
Azerbaijani War School  and this school gave its first graduates in 25 August 2001. Like the 
Azerbaijani War School, with the cooperation of Turkish and Azerbaijani military forces,  
National Security  Academy, Land War Academy, Air War School, Air School, Navy War 
School and Nakhichevan Military High School is constituted. Azerbaijani Air War School 
gave its first graduates in 27 July 2002 and the Air School is going to give its first graduates 
in August 2003. Since 1993, Turkish military experts, who are commissioned in  Azerbaijan 
and Nakhichevan train the personnel of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. The largest quota is 
allocated to Azerbaijani military personnel in Turkish Military Forces’ training and education 
foundations. In mid-1997 the first group of over 500 field-grade Azerbaijani officers 
graduated from Turkish military schools. Also about 1000 servicemen are undergoing 
instruction and trainimg in Turkey on defense related sciences.585 In addition, according to  
Glenn Howard , Azerbaijani special forces units benefitted from Turkish armed Forces’ 
valuable combat experience  by  participating in Turkish-led military operations against the 
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Partiya Karkere Kurdistan (PKK) in southeastern Turkey.586 Turkish Military Forces in order 
to accommodate Azerbaijani Military Forces’ necessities, provided some vehicles, 
communication equipments, portable facility units and huntering boats. Also with the 
cooperation of Turkey and Azerbaijan two peace forces platoons are constituted and one is in 
Kosovo and the other one is commissioned in Afghanistan under the command of the Turkish 
Battalion Task Force. The cost of the  projects that are given to Azerbaijan by the Turkish 
Military forces about training amounted to $90  million, and logistic support activities is 
amounted to $130 million until today. Azerbaijan ‘Counselor Group’, which is formed by the 
Turkish officers in order to restructure the Azerbaijani Military Forces and their 
transformation to a structure similar to the Turkish Military Forces also continuework. 
Besides, Turkish officers  established the organizational structure of the army as 
Corps/Brigade/Battalion chain of command which increased the mobilization capacity of the 
Azerbaijani army after the Turkish military experts’ participation.587 In addition, projects 
about border security, control of air and sea territory and activation of command and control 
systems are executed with the cooperation of the Azerbaijani offices. In these projects, issues 
such as security of the pipelines, preventation of terrorist and smuggling activities are given 
utmost importance. The biggest difficulty that Turkey confronted in reestablishing the 
Azerbaijani Military Forces is the maintenance  and care of the Russian weapons and 
equipment in the Azerbaijani army and completion of these weapons’ ammunition in a 
probable military operation. Until today, 11 military agreements were signed between 
Azerbaijan and Turkey. But, though Azerbaijan was the first to resist the allocation of Russian 
border troops and Russian peacekeeping forces, it leased  the early-warning "military facility" 
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in Gebele588 that is able to identify even a soccer ball from 700.000 km. distance in 2001 to 
RF. According to some analysts, in return for this base, Azerbaijan and Russia agreed that 
Turkey would establish military bases in Azerbaijan.589 However, Turkish military officers do 
not regard the Gebele base as a threat to Turkey’s security and do not see an obstacle to 
Turkish-Azerbaijani relations. 
  Turkey also expanded its security ties with Georgia. On 14 July 1997, Turkey and 
Georgia signed ‘ Military Training Cooperation Treaty’ and in September 1997 Turkey 
granted Georgia two coastal guard cutters and agreed to train Georgian coast guards.590 In the 
summer of 1999, Turkey decided to grant an additional $1.7 million and $3.7 million.591 
Turkish experts helped the Georgian government repair the Vaziani airfield after the Russian 
withdrawal and  helped train Georgian army officers after the defense cooperation agreement 
with Georgia in June 1997.592 Until today, 15 military agreements were signed between 
Georgia and Turkey. Georgia is given  precedence in the states that  will receive  aid in the 
planning of Turkish General Staff. Since 1997, many Georgian officials are trained in Turkish 
military training centers. According to the March 1999 agreement, Turkey accepted to  
provide for training of Georgian troops in Turkey and assistance in modernizing training 
facilities in Georgia. The accord envisages further Turkish assistance in creating training 
centers in Kodori and Gori and a modern shooting range outside of Tbilisi.593 Besides, 
Turkish Military Forces give Turkish language education in Georgia at three Turkish 
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language classrooms. The cost of the  projects that are given to Georgia  by the Turkish 
Military forces about training  amounted to $9 million, and logistic support activities  
amounted to $31million until today. In addition, Turkish officers are commissioned at  
UNOMIG since  15 October 1994 and at the present time 5 Turkish officers work at the 
UNOMIG. Also one officer participates in the OSCE Observer Mission since 20 February 
2000. Turkey and Georgia have military agreements on training and assistance in all branches, 
assitance in army building, transfer of non-combat military equipment, frontier cooperation, 
establishing regional security system and PfP cooperation.594 But bilateral defense 
cooperation with the US and  Turkey has taken off since Vardiko Nadibaidze, a career Soviet 
army officer, was replaced as Georgian Defense Minister last spring by West Point graduate 
Davit Tevzadze.595 However, Turkish-Georgian relations continue to expand in several areas. 
In 1998 an ex-Turkish Navy AB-25 Patrol Craft was delivered to Georgia.596 In January 2000, 
Turkey and Georgia launched a joint initiative to create a “South Caucasus Stability Pact.”597 
to legitimize Western involvement in the area.598 In September 2000, Turkey and Georgia 
executed ‘Turkey-Georgia Border Maneuver’ at the border regions. Furthermore, Turkish 
Military Forces efforts to make a Georgian brigade to make a sample brigade continue. In 
2001 Turkey also delivered 2 UH-1H helicopters and in 2003 Turkey also indicated that it 
would assist in training a marine anti-terrorism unit for Georgia’s Black Sea flotilla.599 
Besides, Turkey encouraged Georgia to join its new regional cooperation scheme the "Black 
Sea Naval Cooperation Task Group" (BLACKSEAFOR) created in 2001.600 
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 4.4. Military problems between the allies 
 Though Turkey and the US have similar strategic interests on Georgia and 
Azerbaijan, there are some military problems between the allies. There are a lot of issues that 
the Turkish administration does not  favor in the ‘Defense and Economic Cooperation 
Agreement’ (DECA)601, which was signed between Turkey and the US in 1980. As for  
Turkish officials, Americans were not   undertaking their responsibility on the modernization 
of the Turkish Military Forces.  Turkish officials wanted the American- Turkish security 
relations to be isolated from issues such as Cyprus, human rights, alleged Armenian 
genocide...But after American administration’s unwillingness to make changes in the DECA 
in favor of Turkey and propping up its military aid, which was approximately 8 billion dollars 
after the Gulf War by alleging the Cyprus, Kurd, and  human rights, shook Turkey’s faith in 
the US. As a result, Turkish leaders perceived that their nation's long contributions to NATO, 
support to the U.S.-led coalition during the Gulf War, and, especially, their difficult economic 
sacrifices in support of the embargo of Iraq have not been adequately recognized by the 
United States602 and the Çiller government refused the US military aid which was conditioned 
upon  to the issues above. Besides, there had been no difference between Turkey’s borrowing 
from a commercial bank and  taking military aid from the US due to the US administration’s 
decreasing the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit under 400 million dollars, implementing 
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 Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere,William T. Johnsen, Turkey's Strategic Position At The Crossroads of 
World Affairs at www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/1993/turkey/turkey.pdf 
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%10.8603 interest on this aid and stipulating some conditions which are interpreted as US 
interference in Turkey’s internal affairs. A 1996 deal for Bell-Textron Cobra helicopters was 
also shelved due to concerns about Turkey's so called use of U.S.-supplied helicopters against 
Kurdish civilians in its war on the PKK.604 
Table 8: U.S. Military Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey, fiscal years 1980-1997605 
 Arms imports* Grant Aid Direct Loans** 
FY80 $136 million $202.9 million $0 
FY81 $109 million $250 million $0 
FY82 $197.6 million $343 million $0 
FY83 $155.1 million $290 million $0 
FY84 $327.4 million $585 million $0 
FY85 $423.4 million $485 million $0 
FY86 $303.7 million $409.4 million $0 
FY87 $332.9 million $177.9 million $0 
FY88 $735.5 million $156 million $178 million 
FY89 $961.8 million $340.7 million $90 million 
FY90 $943.0 million $412.2 million $85.6 million 
FY91 $697 million $500 million $100 million 
FY92 $741 million $475 million $25 million 
FY93 $878.7 million $0 $450 million 
FY94 $951.8 million $0 $405 million 
FY95 $536.9 million $0 $328 million 
FY96 $547 million $0 $320 million 
FY97 $1.27 billion $0 $175 million 
FY98*** $642 million $0 $0 
FY99**** $803 million    
Totals $10.424 billion $4.627 billion $1.982 billion 
* Arms imports here means the total dollar value of arms Turkey took delivery of from the United States through the 
Foreign Military Sales (government to government) program and through direct commercial sales from industry.**As of 
30 September 1997, Turkey had an outstanding balance of $3.1 billion for military loans from the U.S.*** FY98 direct 
commercial sales deliveries are estimated at $201 million.****FY99 figure includes only direct commercial sales estimated 
by the State Dept. based on previously issued export licences. 
                                                 
603 FMS (foreign military sales) loans initially started at 3 %, and now it has reached the level of 10.8 %, which 
is, of course, 
a rather heavy burden. The growing Turkish discontent has been repeatedly brought to the attention of the White 
House, but 
no progress was made on this matter. Mehmet Ögütçü, “The Turkish-U.S. Strategic Partnership: Broadening and 
Deepening in the 21st Century ,” at http://www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/ogutcu5.pdf 
604 ‘US Arms Sales to Turkey,’ at www.geocities.com/tziakas/arms1.htm However, the problem is solved and the 
US company Bell Helicopter Textron Inc. have been selected to sell the Turkish Army attack helicopters and 
will provide 145 King Cobra AH-1Z aircraft. The first phase of the contract, for 50 helicopters, is worth 
approximately $1.6 billion. TAI are to be the prime contractor on the deal. The first 2-3 AH-1Zs are to be made 
in the US (and scheduled to be delivered in 2005), the rest in Turkey ‘Turkey and the Arms Trade 1998 - 2002: 
A Precis Nurturing Turkey's War Machine ,’ at www.caat.org.uk/information/publications/ countries/turkey-
0303.php  
605 Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales Facts, FY89 and FY97; Defense Security 
Assistance Agency, letter to the Speaker of the House, 31 January 1996, "Section 655 Report" on U.S. arms 
tranfers: FY 96, 97 and 98, Congressional Presentations Document for Foreign Operations, FY2000 cited in 
‘U.S. Military Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey,’ at www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_weapons.htm  
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Because, US security assistance was offered only at market-rate loans and Congress 
often tried to attach political conditions to economic assistance606, Turkish-American military 
relations  worsened. Because of worsened Turkish-American relations and the US` budgetary 
constraints  8 of 12 NATO bases were closed in Turkey in 1994. Turkey’s dependence on the 
US on logistic, care-repair, training issues - 80 percent of its military inventory is U.S.-made- 
restricts Turkey’s trading weapons and equipment from other states. As a result, Turkey must 
have the support of the US in its military policies in the Caucasus.    
607Table 9: Sources of Turkish arms imports 1997-99 (Turkey is the fifth largest recipient of 
US arms) 
 
Supplier Value ($m) % of total Turkish arms imports 
USA 4,900 79 
Germany 650 11 
Other NATO 210 3 
China 140 2 
UK 90 1 
France 90 1 
Eastern Europe (excl. Russia) 50 1 
Middle East 20  
 
 
 Though there had been military problems between Turkey and the US, the 
geopolitical features of the Caucasus necessitate Turkey and the US to work together. 
Compared to Boris Yeltsin, Putin took a more aggressive attitude in Russian foreign policy 
and clearly criticized the enlargement of NATO. Taking into account Russia’s power 
compared to the newly independent states of the South Caucasus, Turkey and the  US must 
cooperate to strengthen these states in order not to fall in the hegemony of Russia. Turkey has 
been a key strategic partner of the United States for decades and Turkey, as a regional actor 
and a NATO member, with the support of the US is able to be a model for the Caucasian 
                                                 
606 Mehmet Ögütçü, “The Turkish-U.S. Strategic Partnership: Broadening and Deepening in the 21st Century ,” 
at http://www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/ogutcu5.pdf 
607 ‘Turkey and the Arms Trade 1998 - 2002: A Precis Nurturing Turkey's War Machine ,’ at 
www.caat.org.uk/information/publications/ countries/turkey-0303.php  
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states and is able to aid Georgia and Azerbaijan in military domains due to its geographic 
proximity and experienced army. If the US continues to decrease military aid due to issues 
like human rights,  it may complicate US efforts to bring peace and stability to the Caucasus 
and harm its  relations with Turkey, its unique strategic partner in the region. On the other 
hand, Turkish military will seek to ensure that U.S.-Turkish military ties will remain intact 
despite disagreements over Iraq, and will increase for the sake of allies’ common interests in 
the South Caucasus. 
To sum, none of the states that emerged from the wreckage of the Soviet Union had 
any experience as self-governing political communities, or as independent states with their 
own armed forces.608 The US and Turkey’s military engagement in the South Caucasus, 
which aimed to   create democratic, professional, and loyal armed forces that can maintain 
legitimate order, avoid internal political participation and reliably defend the national interests 
of the NIS, strenghtened the military forces of these states, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan 
to a great extent, and  prevented Russian military monopoly in the region. Closer military 
cooperation with the countries of the Caspian region should prove useful in the future to draw 
the region out of Russia’s control.609 However, more difficult problems wait the alliance in 
the future since the demands of Georgia and Azerbaijan increased proportionally with the 
assistance of the US and Turkey. For example, President Edvard Shevarnadze of Georgia has 
frequently proclaimed his intention to pursue a “Bosnia” or “Dayton” type solution to the 
conflict with the Abkhaz nationalist movement and to bring Georgia into NATO by 2005 and 
similarly, Azerbaijan constantly urges NATO to provide F-16 planes from Turkey for the 
security of the oil-pipelines.610 
                                                 
608 Stephen J. Blank, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia And Central Asia,” at 
www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/ 2000/milengag/milengag.pdf  
609 Walter Schilling, “the return of Geopolitics in the Caucasus and central Asia,” cited in Erhan Altın, NATO 
Enlargement in the Caucasus: Implications for the Caspian Security, (İstanbul: Yeditepe University, (Master’s) 
Thesis , 2000), p.91.  
610 Stephen J. Blank, “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia And Central Asia,” at 
www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/ 2000/milengag/milengag.pdf 
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                                       CONCLUSION  
 As told in the first chapter, Turkish-American cooperation turned into an alliance 
with the adoption  of the Truman Doctrine in 1947. With this treaty, the US accepted  to 
supply weapons, ammunitions, military experts and roads, financial and technical support in 
building harbor and military foundations. After Turkey’s acceptance in NATO, Turkish-
American relations strengthened to the extent  that Turkish leaders did not  hesitate to think 
and declare that US was going to support Turkey on every issue. However there had been 
several problems as examined in the first chapter such as the Baghdad Pact     ( while the US 
did not join the pact in order to avoid Arab reaction, involving in groupings in the region, 
losing its ties with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, damaging its relations with Israel, and  provoking 
the  SU, with the US and British incitement, Turkey  joined the Baghdad Pact, which caused 
Turkey to be further alienated from the Arab world),  Jupiter missile crisis, which which 
made  Turkey a nuclear target, Johnson letter, which  hindered Turkish intervention in Cyprus 
to save Turkish Cypriots from a massacre and was written in an undiplomatic style, American  
bases and military personnel in Turkey that led   Turkish leaders and public to suspect 
Turkey’s sovereignty due to transportation of  1600 American soldiers from West Germany to 
İncirlik without giving information to Turkish administration, U-2 reconnaissance flights from 
Turkish soil, which deteriorated Turkish-Russian relations and undisciplined behaviors of 
American military personnel,  poppy problem (the US blamed Turkey as the culprit  for the 
whole narcotics traffic and Turkish-American relations worsened until the Ecevit government 
took strict steps that were appreciated by the whole world to hinder the illegal poppy traffic),  
arms embargo that  the US Congress  enforced  on transferring military equipment to Turkey, 
claiming that American-supplied military equipment had been used against the US law during 
the Cyprus operation, Gulf War when Turkey supported the US willingly, but suffered much 
because of  this war. As a result of this war, Turkey  lost million dollars in the crisis by 
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closing the pipeline, accepted refugees , most of the whom were PKK (Kurdistan Worker 
Party) members or sympathizers, and  PKK was empowered because of the vacuum of 
authority in  Northern Iraq that emerged due to the declaration of the US  a safe zone on the 
north of the 36th  parallel.611 On the other hand, the US, in return for Turkey’s support of the 
U.S.-led coalition during the Gulf War, decreased the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit 
under 400 million dollars, implemented %10.8612 interest on this aid and stipulated some 
conditions which are interpreted as US interference in Turkey’s internal affairs. 
 Despite fluctuations in Turkish-American relations, this alliance remained quite 
strong since the US has been the main supporter of Turkey in the economic and military 
domain613 and  this alliance has been the concrete symbol of the Westernization policy of 
Turkey. Turkey is a strong, stable and trustworthy partner that sits at the juncture of the 
unstable regions; Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. The two countries share 
common objectives and there are numerous areas where the interests of the US and Turkey 
converge as encouraging the development of democratic pro-Western regimes and free-
market economy in the Caucasus and Central Asia, establishing non-Russian/non-Islamic 
lines of communication for the newly independent states of Eurasia, curbing the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, preventing the accumulation of weapons in the 
hands of the irresponsible states and illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, expanding NATO’s 
membership, opposing terrorism, securing  oil reserves in the Caspian and Gulf, opening of 
new oil pipeline routes in the Caucasus, preventing the rebuilding of the Russian Empire, 
keeping Iran and Islamic fundamentalism in check, supporting Israel and the Middle East 
Peace Process. 
One of the areas that Turkish – American interests met have been the South Caucasus. 
As examined  in the second chapter, the South Caucasian states, including Azerbaijan, 
                                                 
611 Nasuh Uslu, op.cit. , pp: 297-300. 
612 FMS (foreign military sales) loans initially started as 3 %, and it has reached the level of 10.8 %.  
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Armenia and Georgia  faced enormous difficulties in enhancing their national security, 
implementing the process of state building and improving their economic situation after the 
dissolution of Soviet Union. Independence for these states did not initially provide political 
stability nor a strong state to handle  the problems. Internal conflicts such as the Abkhazia and 
the  South Ossetia conflict undermined Georgia’s state building efforts and due to the Russian 
pressure, Georgia  found itself as a strategic ally of Russia reluctantly. On the other hand, 
despite having rich oil and gas reserves, internal instability and the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict, which caused  Azerbaijan to lose 20 percent of its  territory, hindered Azerbaijan to 
be a strong state. Armenia, which is the smallest of the three Transcaucasian republics in 
terms of both territory and population and which has few natural resources,  differentiated 
itself from Georgia and Azerbaijan in its close relationship with Russia and its interest in the 
development of the CIS because of its handicapped geographical position. Since Armenia had 
a homogenous population, it did not confront internal conflicts like Georgia but because of its 
agricultural insufficiency and  being dependent on imports for 96 percent of its energy and the 
economic burden that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict brought, deteriorated Armenia’s 
economy to a great extent. Shortly, although Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia gained their 
independence after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they could not have  coped with the 
challenges of the new geopolitical and economic environment due to the lack of  their own 
military power,  strong economy and  thereupon, these states’ first years of independence 
have been fraught with economic, political, and social difficulties.    
 As put forward  in the third chapter, with the collapse of the Soviet Union , the South 
Caucasus due to its  geopolitical position which is a barrier or a bridge for Russia’s expansion 
to the West and South, a natural land corridor for the transportation of oil from the Caspian to 
the Mediterranean Sea and Europe, and its  vast untapped natural resources,  has emerged as a 
                                                                                                                                                        
613 % 80 of Turkey’s  military inventory is US made. 
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vital geostrategic area, which presented several opportunities in the political, economic and 
military domains to the US as the unique superpower of the world, and to Turkey as a 
regional power. It is seen that, while Turkey’s interests intersect with Russia in  the Caucasus, 
they are harmonious with the US to a great degree. As a result, both states whose interests 
converged  as stated above, regarded to pursue active politics in the South Caucasus as a duty 
for the sake of their own global and regional interests. 
In the wake of the Soviet collapse in 1991, the United States strengthened its relations  
with the Soviet successor states by recognizing the states as independent and viable entities, 
supporting their transition to market economies and democratic societies, facilitating of their 
integration into international institutions, and encouraging regional cooperative arrangements. 
However, initially Washington was not  keen on asserting its influence in the region, 
acknowledging it as Russia's sphere of influence614 and understood  Russia’s security 
concerns in the  South Caucasus. The Clinton Administration, which gave strategic priority to 
dismantle the Soviet military machine and nuclear arsenal and confine it within Russia region 
in accordance with its  Russia-first policy, gave Moscow a free hand in the South Caucasus615 
in order not to complicate the nuclear issues.   
On the other hand, in the aftermath of the demise of the Warsaw Pact and then of the 
Soviet Union, the new geopolitical configuration of the world relieved Turkish foreign policy 
of certain constraints. Thus, Turkey caught an opportunity to extend its relations towards the 
post-Soviet world and due to its multi-regional identity and  its ethnic, cultural and religious 
ties with the Caucasus and Central Asia, Turkey aimed to expand its influence and be a 
regional stabilizing power. Turkey has also supported these new states to institute bilateral 
and multilateral affairs with all of the international community. In this respect, it has worked 
                                                 
614 Svante E. Cornell, “ The Caucasian States and Eurasian Strategic Alignments,” at 
www.geocities.com/svantec/geop1.html  
615 Fiona Hill, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia since 1991,” 
Politique étrangère, February 2001, http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fhill/2001politique.htm 
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to help their involvement in the UN, OSCE, NACC, and other international institutions.616 
Besides, like the US, Turkey has been careful not to antagonize Russia while pursuing its own 
interests. But, many of the Turkish expectations have not materialized because of  Turkey’s 
own domestic problems- the growth of Kurdish separatism and the challenge posed by the rise 
of Islamic forces in Turkish politics-, external security concerns, including threats from Syria 
and Iraq; instability in the Balkans;  the deterioration of relations with Greece over Cyprus 
and the Aegean, and  economic weaknesses.  
However, due to Russia’s economic and military weaknesses, which was revealed 
with the Chechen war, and Russia’s imperialist politics, the US engagement in the region  
increased after 1994. While the war in Chechnya altered the US military policy, the “Contract 
of the Century” which was signed in September 1994 between SOCAR, State Oil Company of 
Azerbaijan Republic, and the Consortium of major international companies, the Azerbaijan 
International Operating Company (AIOC) changed the US energy policy in the region and  
the US has declared that it considers the Caucasus and the Caspian a region of 'vital US 
interests'.617 
Afterwards, the US policy towards Azerbaijan changed radically. While Turkey had 
been the first state to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan and it tried to do its best for 
Azerbaijan since its independence, the US under the influence of the Armenian lobby, 
pursued a biased policy towards to  Azerbaijan, instead of being neutral. But, after the  visit of  
Aliyev to Washington on July 30 1997, the US administration, which recognized the 
importance of the Caspian oil reserves, embarked on a newly focussed policy towards the 
Caucasus. In January 2002, George W. Bush executed his right to waive section 907 and  
                                                 
616 “Foreign Policy of Turkey: The Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Official Declaration of 
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at internet. Available at http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/for-pol-
98.htm 
 
617 Svante E. Cornell, “ The Caucasian States and Eurasian Strategic Alignments,” at 
www.geocities.com/svantec/geop1.html  
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then, the US administration extended $4.4 million in military assistance to Azerbaijan to 
improve Azerbaijan’s coastal defenses, upgrade its airfields to NATO standards and train a 
peacekeeping unit.618 Although the United States and Turkey had different attitudes to 
Azerbaijan in the beginning of the 1990s, today they share similar objectives to bolster the 
energy security of the region and both aim to develop closer relationships with Azerbaijan. 
 Armenian-American relations had been warmer than Turkish-Armenian relations, 
since the US policies in the region always has been under influence of the strong Armenian 
lobby. On the other hand, Turkish-Armenian relations has been cool due to Armenia’s 
territorial claims on Turkish territory, accusation of Turkey of having committed a so-called 
“genocide” which has never taken place, support to terrorist organization, PKK-KADEK. 
Neverthless, Turkey is still willing to normalize its relations with Armenia, however 
Yerevan’s failure to develop good neighborly relations, and Yerevan’s breach of basic 
principles of international law and the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, impede 
Ankara to establish diplomatic relations with its neighbor.619 On the other hand, though the 
US grants huge amounts of economic assistance to Armenia, deepening Armenian-Russian 
and Armenian-Iran relations invoke anger in Washington. In the Georgia case, since its 
independence Turkey and the US supported the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of Georgia. Allies made great assistance to Georgia in order to secure oil 
transportation routes and in order to prevent Russian imperialistic policies on Georgia. 
Besides, as analyzed in the fourth chapter, while allies supported the NIS of the South 
Caucasus in their state building process , they also put importance on the improvement of 
these states’ armed forces  by providing bilateral military assistance or multilateral assistance 
by way of NATO.  
                                                 
618Aynura Akhmedova, “Azerbaijan, Georgia Move To Secure Oil Pipelines,” at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/pp042102.shtml, “Section 907 of the Freedom Supporty 
Act,” at www.aaainc.org/press/Section907.pdf. 
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 Between 1990 and 1994, it was seen that the power vacuum that emerged in the 
region was fulfilled by Russia that  spoiled the regional stability by using local conflicts. As a 
result, this situation only had been in favor of Russia. But the vigorous efforts of the US and 
Turkey prevented the South Caucasus to fall into Russian hegemony as examined in this study 
and in the future for the sake of their interests and the stability in the region, the US and 
Turkey should pay attention to the points below:620 
• Allies should strengthen the independence  and prosperity of the new Caspian states, 
and encourage political and economic reform. Allies should interact with these countries as 
they do with the other independent countries of the world, and they should expect every 
country to respect the independence and sovereignty of the Transcaucasus countries. As a 
regional power, Turkey is able to reinforce American policy to support the independence of 
those states and to draw them more closely to the West. 
•   Allies should mitigate regional conflicts by building economic linkages among the 
states of the region. Peace is important for future economic developments especially in the 
energy domain,  therefore, the US and Turkey should increase their diplomatic involvement in 
the resolution of regional conflicts such as those in the Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia. The 
                                                                                                                                                        
619 “Turkish Foreign Policy,” at  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm#06 
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United States should respond to such requests with support for further peacekeeping efforts 
for example, assistance in monitoring peace agreements, refugee resettlement, and attracting 
foreign investment. The United States must balance its relations with  Azerbaijan and  
Armenia. This balance should include equalizing the levels of assistance to both countries and 
they should cooperate militarily with Azerbaijan to offset the Russian military support of 
Armenia.  
•  Allies should enhance commercial opportunities for Turkish, U.S. and other 
companies. In this framework, allies should promote market reforms and assist in the 
development of communication, transportation links and oil export routes to help create a 
viable East–West axis. This will allow Turkish and American companies to participate in 
building the new Silk Road into Central Asia and the Far East, generating jobs at home and 
markets abroad for billions of dollars of American and Turkish goods and services. 
Infrastructure projects in the region are especially lucrative for the U.S. heavy equipment, 
aircraft, transportation, petrochemical, and telecommunications industries. Such Turkish and 
the US  involvement in the region’s economy will deter Russia and Iran from dominating their 
smaller pro-Western neighbors. 
•  Allies should bolster their own energy security, and the energy independence of the 
Caspian region by ensuring the free flow of oil and gas to the world market place in order to 
prevent a concentration of resources that could prevent the allies from being denied energy 
sources and monopolization of the energy reserves by Russia. Allies also should increase 
political and security support for the proposed BTC pipeline. It is in Turkey and America’s 
strategic interests to ensure the flow of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea basin via Georgia 
and Turkey rather than south to Iran or north to Russia. By this way, the BTC will help 
diversify the West’s enery resources and lessen somewhat its dependence on the Middle East. 
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Otherwise, a north–south main route would allow Russia and Iran to control an even larger 
share of the world energy market than they do now. 
•  The US should support Turkey, which is   a moderate, pro-Western state in an 
unstable area; a rare, probably unique,  example of democracy, a barrier to potential 
reappearance of Russian violent behavior; a powerful but peaceful and anti-separatist 
supporter of the cause of besieged Azerbaijan Muslims in the region; an important non-
Russian line of contact with the West and a potential opening for Caspian Basin energy 
supplies as an alternative to Russian and Iranian routes, an ideological counterweight to Iran; 
for the stability in the region. Besides, Turkey’s ability to facilitate U.S. power projection and 
preference for close bilateral ties count heavily. 
• Allies should  avoid any form of conflict with Russia. Russian Federation, although 
lost its full control of the region and global political influence, still boasts a massive nuclear 
arsenal, and continues to be a great power with formidable might and potential. In the event of 
a sharp deterioration in strategic relations with Moscow and a resurgent military threat, 
Ankara would once again play a critical containment role and therefore, the US should 
continue its military assistance to Turkey that provides insurance for the U.S. as a land buffer, 
a sea-lane bottleneck, a forward base, and an intelligence-gathering post, as in Cold War days. 
Therefore, the US should restructure Turkey's foreign military sales debt to optimize Turkey's 
ability to repay.  
• The US should increase coordination between governments and American 
companies involved in the oil and natural gas industry and pipeline routes in the region. 
Congress and the executive branch need to formulate a well-defined Silk Road strategy that 
integrates their energy, trade, geopolitical, and security concerns for the region.  
 • Allies should foster security cooperation with Georgia, which is a strategic gateway 
of energy and trade routes linking East and West  and susceptible to Russian pressure due to 
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its inefficient  military force. Allies  should strengthen Georgia’s military by providing 
assistance in building its command-and-control, communications,  intelligence capabilities; 
training instructors for Georgian military schools; modernizing training facilities, executing 
common maneuvers. Allies should also expand Georgia’s military capabilities through its ties 
with NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PFP). 
•  Allies also should expand Azerbaijan’s military capabilities through its ties with 
NATO and the Partnership for Peace (PFP). Besides, Turkey which is   the sole effective 
regional counterweight against the Russia-Armenia-Iran triangle against Azerbaijan, should 
help Azerbaijan’s military forces in transforming a  structure similar to Turkish Military 
Forces and in increasing  the mobilization capacity of the Azerbaijani army. The US also 
should assist Azerbaijan in order to enhance its naval capacity to secure its maritime borders  
against Iran’s threats about energy exploration in the Caspian and Azerbaijan’s coastline. 
• Washington should make it clear that U.S. assistance to Russia and U.S. support for 
Russia’s requests to international financial institutions cannot continue as long as Moscow 
works to destabilize the Caucasus. 
• The engagement of the allies in the region should also be within the multilateral 
framework including NATO, OSCE and  UN, and the allies should support the regional 
organizations like GUAMM and Blackseafor. 
• As stated in the first chapter,  in the event of crisis in Turkey - U.S. relationships, Turkey  
always came out the loser in the end but the alliance remained strong due to the US and 
Turkey’s strategic interests. Therefore, the allies must not permit the deterioration of their 
partnership after Turkish parliament’s disapproval of the US’ using Turkish soil to attack Iraq 
and allies must cooperate to achieve their aims in the south Caucasus region. 
 
186 
SELECT    BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS : 
 
Abdullazadeh, Fatma. 1999. Karabakh. Baku:“XXI” YNE. 
 
Abrowitz, Morton. 2000. Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy. New York: The 
Century Foundation Press. 
 
Athanassopoulou, Ekavi. 1999. Turkey-Anglo American Security Interest 1945-1952. 
London: Frank Cass. 
 
Aydın, Mustafa. 2000. New Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus: Causes of 
Instability and Predicament. Ankara: SAM Papers. 
 
Aves, Jonathan. 1996. Georgia from Chaos to Stability. London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 
 
Baev, Pavel. 1997. Russia’s Policies in the Caucasus. London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. 
 
Beschloss, Michael R. 1991. The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960-1963. New 
York: HarperCollins. 
 
Bostanoğlu,  Burcu.   2000.   Türkiye-ABD   İlişkilerinin   Politikası.  Ankara:İmge Kitabevi. 
 
Byman ,Daniel L., and et al , Iran's Security Policy in the Post-Revolutionary Era,available 
at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1320 
 
Company, Richard C. 1986. Turkey and the US: The Arms Embargo Period. New York: 
Praeger Publishers. 
 
Dawisha, Karen, and Bruce Parrott. 1994. Russia and the New States of Eurasia. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Harris,George. 1972. Troubled Alliance. Washington :AEI- Hoover Policy Studies. 
 
Herzig, Edmund. 1999. The New Caucasus: Armenia,Azerbaijan and Georgia. London, 
New York: The Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Hiro, Dilip. 1995. Between Marx and Muhammad: the Changing Face of Central Asia. New 
York:  Harper Perennial. 
 
Hollis, Martin, and Steve Smith. 1990. Explaining and Understanding International 
Relations. Oxford: Clarendon. 
 
İbrahimli, Haleddin. 2001. Değişen Avrasya’da Kafkasya. Ankara: ASAM Yayınları. 
 
Kocaoğlu, Mehmet. 1995. Uluslararası İlişkiler Işığında Ortadoğu. Ankara:Genelkurmay 
Basımevi. 
 
187 
Lenczowski, George. 1980. The Middle East in World Affairs. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.  
 
Lynch, Dov. 2000. Russian Peacekeeping Strategies in the CIS: The Cases of Moldova, 
Georgia and Tajikistan. New York: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Matveeva, Anna. 1999. The North Caucasus: Russia’s Fragile Borderland. London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Öke, M.Kemal.1990. Unutulan Savaşın Kronolojisi: Kore 1950-53. İstanbul: Boğaziçi 
Yayınları. 
 
Roberts, John. 1998. Caspian Pipelines.London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.  
 
Sarıibrahimoğlu, Lale. 1997.Kurt Kapanında Kısır Siyaset. Ankara: İmge Kitabevi. 
 
Sever, Ayşegül. 1997. Soğuk Savaş Kuşatmasında Türkiye- Batı ve Ortadoğu. İstanbul: 
Boyut Yayınları. 
 
Som, Deniz. 1989.  Gozleri Bagli Şahin. İstanbul: Tekin Basımevi. 
 
Sönmezoğlu, Faruk. 2001. Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi. İstanbul: Der Yayınları. 
 
Synder,Glenn H. 1997. Alliance Politics.Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Şimşek, Halil. 2002. Türkiyenin Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi. İstanbul: IQ Yayıncılık. 
 
Şirin ,Nurettin and Suat Kara. 1997.  Kafkasya ve Ortadoğu Petrollerinin Akdenize 
Ulaştırılması ve NATO Güvenliğine Etkileri, İzmir: Güneydoğu Avrupa Müttefik Kara 
Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı. 
 
Tunçkanat, Haydar. 1970. İkili Antlaşmaların İçyüzü. Ekim Yayınları: Ankara. 
 
Turner, Barry. 2003. The Statesman’s Yearbook 2003. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Tişkov, V.A., and  E.İ.Filippova. 2001.  Eski Sovyet Ülkelerinde Etnik İlişkiler ve Sorunlar. 
Ankara: ASAM Yayınları. 
 
Toker, Yalçın.1992. Büyük Uyanış. İstanbul: Toker Yayınları. 
 
Tsalik, Svetlana. 2003. Caspian Oil Windfalls:Who Will Benefit? at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/caspian.oil.windfalls  
 
Walt, Stephen. 1987. The Origins of Alliances. London: Cornell University Press.  
 
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Watanabe, Paul Y. 1984. Ethnic Groups, Congress and American Foreign Policy: The 
Politics of the Turkish Arms Embargo. London: Greenwood Press. 
 
 
188 
Weber, Mark. 1997. CIS Integration Trends: Russia and the Former Soviet South. London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Winrow, Gareth. 2000. Turkey and The Caucasus: Domestic Interests and Security 
Concerns. London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs.  
 
Yalçınkaya, Alaeddin.1998. Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Petrol Boru Hatları. İstanbul: Bağlam 
Yayınları. 
 
Yavuz, Turan. 1999. Satılık Müttefik : Gizli Belgeler Işığında 1962 Küba Füze Krizi ve 
Türkiye. İstanbul : Doğan Kitapçılık. 
 
The Military Balance. 2001-2002. 
 
Turkish-American Relations: Forty Years of Continuity and Change. 1987. İstanbul: SISAV. 
 
BOOK AND JOURNAL ARTICLES: 
 
Alieva, Leila. 1995. “The Institutions, Orientations, and Conduct of Foreign Policy in Post-
Soviet Azerbaijan.” in  Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., The Making of Foreign 
Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. New York, London: M.E.Sharpe. 
 
Allison, Roy. 1998. “ Introduction.” in  Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth, Security 
Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Allison, Roy. 1998. “The Chechnya Conflict: Military and Security Policy Implications.” in  
Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth, eds., Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia. London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Allison, Roy. 1998. “The Network of New Security Policy Relations in Eurasia.” in  Roy 
Allison and Christoph Bluth, eds., Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia. London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Aves, Jonathan. 1998. “The Caucasus States: The Regional Security Complex.” in  Roy 
Allison and Christoph Bluth, Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia. London: Royal 
Institute of International Affairs. 
 
Aves, Jonathan. 1995. “Security and Military Issues in the Transcaucasus.” in  Bruce 
Parrott, ed., State Building and Military Power in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. 
New York, London: M.E.Sharpe. 
 
Bhatty ,Robin and Rachel Bronson. 2000. "NATO's Mixed Signals in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia," Survival, 42:3. 
 
Blank , Stephen. 2000. “American Grand Strategy and the Transcaspian Region”, World 
Affairs, 163:2. 
 
Blank,  Stephen. 1999. "Every Shark East of Suez: Great Power Interests, Policies and 
Tactics in the Transcaspian Energy Wars," Central Asian Survey. 18:2. 
 
 
189 
Bölükbaşı, Süha. 1993. “The Johnson Letter Revisited,” Middle Eastern Studies 29:3. 
 
Bremmer, Ian. 1998. "Oil Politics: America and the Riches of the Caspian Basin," World 
Policy Journal. 15:1  
 
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. 1994. “Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs, 73: 2. 
 
Coppieters, Bruno. 1998. “Form and Content in Soviet and Post-Soviet Nationality and 
Regional Policies.” in  Michael Waller, Bruno Coppieters and Alexei Malashenko, eds., 
Conflicting Loyalties and the State in Post-Soviet Russia and Eurasia. London: Frank Cass 
Publishers. 
 
Craft, Cassady. 2000. “Reconciling disparate Views on Caucasus Security.” in  Gary K. 
Bertsch, Cassady Craft, Scott A. Jones and Michael Beck, eds., Crossroads and Conflict: 
Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. New York, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Cornell, Svante E. 1997. “ Undeclared War :The Nagorno Karabakh Conflict 
Reconsidered,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies. 20: 4. 
 
Cornell , Svante E. 2000. “Turkey: Priority to Azerbaijan”,  in  Svante E. Cornell ed., Small 
Nations and Great Powers. Richmond: Curzon Press. 
 
Criss, Nur Bilge. 1992. “ US Forces in Turkey.” in Simon W. Duke, ed., US Military Forces 
in Europe. Oxford: Westview Press. 
 
Criss, Nur Bilge. 1997. “ Strategic Nuclear Missiles in Turkey,” Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 20:3. p. 108. 
 
Criss, Nur Bilge. “Turkey’s Foreign Policy and the West, 1945-1999” (unpublished). 
 
Dale, Catherine. 1995. “The Case of Abkhazia.” in  Lena Johnson and Clive Archer, eds., 
Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia. Colorado: Westview Press.  
 
Darchiashvili, David. 2000. “Trends of Strategic Thinking in Georgia,” in  Gary K. Bertsch, 
Cassady Craft, Scott A. Jones and Micheal Beck, eds., Crossroads and Conflict: Security 
and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. New York, London: Routledge. 
 
De Pauw ,Freddy. 1996. “Turkey's Policies in Transcaucasia,” in Bruno Coppieters, ed., 
Contested Borders in the Caucasus. Brussels: VUB Press.  
 
Eaton, Mark. 2001.  “Major Trends in Military Expenditure and Arms Acquisitions by the 
States of the Caspian Region,” in Gennady Chufrin ed., The Security of the Caspian Sea 
Region. SIPRI: Oxford University Press. 
 
Elekdağ, Şükrü. 1984. “ The   Future of   Turkish-USA    Relations,”  Foreign 
Policy(Ankara)   11: 4.  
 
 
190 
Fuller, Graham E. 1999. “The EU and Turkey’s Eurasian Foreign Policy: The New 
Challenge.” in  Hüseyin Bağcı, Jackson Janes, Ludger Külnhardt, eds., Parameters of 
Partnership: The US-Turkey- Europe, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlaggesellschaft. 
 
Furman, Dimitry  & Carl Johan Asenius. 1995. “The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh.” in Lena 
Johnson and Clive Archer, eds., Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia. Colorado: 
Westview Press. 
 
Gönlübol ,Mehmet and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu. 1977.  “1965-1973 Dönemi Türk Dış Politikası,” 
in Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1973. Ankara. 
 
Henze, Paul B. 2001. “The Lands Of Many Crossroads: Turkey’s Caucasian Initiatives,” 
Orbis  45:1. 
 
Hovannisian, Richard G. 1994. “Historical Memory and Foreign Relations: the Armenian 
Perspective.” in  S.Frederick Starr, ed., The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States 
of Eurasia. New York, London: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Hunter , Robert E. 1999. "Maximizing NATO" Foreign Affairs,  78: 3. 
 
Hunter, Shireen. 2000. “The Evolution of the Foreign Policy of the Transcaucasian States,” 
in  Gary K. Bertsch, Cassady Craft, Scott A. Jones and Michael Beck, eds., Crossroads and 
Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. New York, 
London: Routledge. 
 
Huttenbach, Henry R. 1995. “Chaos in Post-Soviet Caucasia, Crossroads of Empires: in 
Search of a US Foreign Policy.” in  John W. Blaney, The Successor States to the USSR. 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Qarterly Inc. 
 
Jones, Scott A. Jones. 2000. “Introduction.” in  Gary K. Bertsch, Cassady Craft, Scott A. 
Jones and Michael Beck, eds., Crossroads and Conflict: Security and Foreign Policy in the 
Caucasus and Central Asia. New York, London: Routledge. 
 
Kaminski, Bartlomiej. 1996. “Factor Affecting Trade Reorientation of the Newly 
Independent States.” in  Bartlomiej Kaminski, ed., Economic Transition in Russia and the 
New States of Eurasia. New York, London: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Karaosmanoğlu, Ali. 2001. “Turkey’s Objectives in the Caspian Region.” in  Gennady 
Chufrin, ed., The Security of the Caspian Sea Region. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Karaosmanoglu, Ali. 1988. “Turkey and the Southern Flank: Domestic and External 
Contexts”, in John Chipman, ed.,  NATO’s Southern Allies: Internal and External 
Challenges. London: Routledge. 
 
Karasapan, Ömer. 1989. “Turkey and US Strategy in the Age of Glasnost,” Middle East 
Report.   
 
Karpat, Kemal H. 1997. “The Role of Turkey and Iran in Incorporating the Former Soviet 
Republics into the World System.” in  Karen Dawisha, ed., The International Dimension of 
 
191 
Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia, London, New York: 
M.E.Sharpe.  
 
Kirişci, Kemal. 2001. “Ambivalent Allies.” in Bary Rubin and Thomas Keaney, eds., US 
Allies in A Changing World. London: Frank Cass. 
 
Kudava , Mamuka and Cassady Craft. 2000. "Developing Non-proliferation Export Controls 
in Georgia in the Context of the emerging Eurasian Transportation Corridor," in  Gary K. 
Bertsch, Cassady Craft, Scott A. Jones and Micheal Beck, eds., Crossroads and Conflict: 
Security and Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia. New York, London: 
Routledge. 
 
Kukhianidze, Alexander. 1998. “The Armenian and Azeri Communities in Georgia: On 
Georgia’s Nationalities and Foreign Policies.” in  Bruno Coppieters, Alexei Zverev and 
Dmitri Trenin, eds., Commonwealth and Independence in Post-Soviet Eurasia. London: 
Frank Cass Publishers. 
 
Kuniholm, Bruce. 1987. “Turkey and the United States: Views and Expactations.” in 
Turkish-American Relations: Forty Years of Continuity and Change. İstanbul: SISAV. 
 
Lebedev, Alexander. 2002. “Russia and Turkey in the 21 st Century: What is behind and 
what is Ahead,” Insight Turkey.  4: 2.  
 
Lepingwell, John W. R. 1995. “New States and Old Soldiers: Civil Military Relations in the 
Former Soviet Union.” In  John W. Blaney, ed., The Successor States to the USSR, 
Washington D.C.: Congressional Qarterly Inc. 
 
Makovsky,  Alan. 2000. “US Policy Toward Turkey: Progress and Problems,” in Morton 
Abrowitz, ed., Turkey’s Transformation and American Policy,Newyork: The Century 
Foundation Press. 
 
Mann, Steven R. 2002. “Caspian Sea Energy Resources: A US Perspective,” Insight Turkey 
.4:1. 
 
Mikoyan , Sergo. 1998. “The US and Regional Conflict in Eurasia,” Survival 11: 3. 
 
Miller, Steven E. 1995. “Proliferation Dangers in the Former Soviet Union.” in  John W. 
Blaney, ed., The Successor States to the USSR. Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly 
Inc. 
 
Morgenthau, Hans. 1976. “Alliances in Theory and Practice.” in Arnold Wolfers, ed., 
Alliance Policy in the Cold War. London: Greenwood Press.  
 
Orkunt, Sezai. 1987. “ The Dynamics, Influence and Effects of Foreign Assistance,” in 
Turkish-American Relations: Forty Years of Continuity and Change. İstanbul: SISAV. 
 
Otyrba, Gueorgui. 1994. “War in Abkhazia: The Regional Significance of the Georgian-
Abkhazian Conflict.” In  Roman Szporluk, ed., National Identity and Ethnicity in Russia and 
the New States of Eurasia. New York: M.E.Sharpe. 
 
 
192 
Pamir, A.Necdet.  2001. “Turkey: The Key to Caspian Oil and Gas,” IASPS Research 
Papers in Strategy  Vol:13. 
 
Panossian, Razmik. 1999. “The Armenians: Conflicting Identities and the Politics of 
division.” in  Charles King and Neil J. Melvin, eds., Nations Abroad. Colorado: Westview 
Press. 
 
Pipes, Daniel. 1994. “The Event of Our Era: Ex-Soviet Muslim Republics Change the 
Middle East.” in  Michael Mandelbaum,  ed., Central  Asia  and  the  World:  Kazakhstan,  
Kyrgyzstan,  Tajikistan,  Turkmenistan,  Uzbekistan. New York : Council on Foreign 
Relations Press.  
 
Rafik, Osman and et al. 1995. “Religion and Politics in the Caucasus.” in  Michael 
Bourdeaux, ed., The Politics of Religion in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. New 
York,London: M.E. Sharpe. 
 
Reiter, Dan. 1994. “Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the 
Past,” World Politics 46:4.   
 
Russe, Bruce M. 1968. “Components of an Operational Theory of International Alliance 
Formation,” The Journal of Conflict 12:3. 
 
Sayari, Sabri. 2000.  “Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era; The Challenges of 
Multi-Regionalism” Journal of International Affairs  54:1.  
 
Schroder, Gertrude. 1996. “Economic Transformation in the Post-Soviet Republics: An 
Overview.” in Bartlomiej Kaminski, ed., Economic Transition in Russia and the New States 
of Eurasia. New York, London: M.E. Sharpe.  
 
Schroder, Gertrude. 1997. “The Economic Transformation Process in the Post-Soviet States: 
The Role of Outside Actors.” in  Karen Dawisha, ed., The International Dimension of Post-
Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. London, New York: 
M.E.Sharpe. 
 
Schweller, Randall L 1994.  “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State 
Back,”  International Security 19:4.  
 
Sezer,  Duygu Bazoğlu. 1996. “Russia and the South: Central Asia and the Southern 
Caucasus,” European Security, .5:2. 
 
Sezer, Duygu Bazoğlu. 2000. “Turkish-Russian Relations: The Challenges of Reconciling 
Geopolitical Competition with Economic Partnership,” Turkish Studies, 1:1. 
 
Shashenkov ,Maxim. 1994. “ Russian  peacekeeping  in  the  ‘Near abroad,” Survival,  36: 3. 
 
Silagadze, Avtandil, and Teimuraz Beridze. 1996. “Note on Privatization in Georgia.” In 
Bartlomiej Kaminski, ed., Economic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. 
New York,London: M.E. Sharpe.  
 
 
193 
Snyder, Glenn H. 1990. “Alliance Theory A Neorealist First Cut,” Journal of International 
Affairs 41:1. 
 
Taşhan,  Seyfi.  1974. “ Turkish-US  Relations  and  Cyprus,”  Turkish  Foreign  Policy  4:4. 
 
Taşhan, Seyfi. 1998. “A Review of Turkish Foreign Policy in the Beginning of 1998,” 
Turkish Foreign Policy 22:1. 
 
Trenin, Dmitri. 2002. “Really Burying the Hatchet: Russia and Turkey Find Themselves on 
the Same Side,” Insight Turkey  4: 2.  
 
Turner, Karen and Micheal Turner. 1997. “The Interaction Between Internal and External 
Agency in Post-Communist Transitions.” in  Karen Dawisha, ed., The International 
Dimension of Post-Communist Transitions in Russia and the New States of Eurasia. 
London, New York: M.E.Sharpe. 
 
Tütüncü , Mehmet. 1998. “The Caucasus Policy of Turkey (1990-1997): An Evaluation”, in 
Mehmet Tütüncü, ed., Caucasus: War and Peace. Haarlem, Nederland: SOTA. 
 
Walt, Stephen M. 1997. “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” Survival 39:1.  
 
Zverev, Alexei. 1996. “Ethnic Conflicts in the Caucasus 1988-1994.” in  Bruno Coppieters, 
ed., Contested Borders in the Caucasus. Brussels: VUB Press.  
 
ARTICLES ON THE INTERNET: 
 
Aral , Berdal, “The Black Sea Economic Co-Operation after Ten Years: What Went 
Wrong?”, at www.alternativesjournal.com/aral.htm  
 
Arbatov , Alexei G., “ The  Russian Military in the 21st Century,” at  
www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/rusmil21.pdf  
 
Aynura Akhmedova, “Azerbaijan, Georgia Move To Secure Oil Pipelines,” at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/pp042102.shtml,  
 
Baran , Zeyno “United States Will Help Georgia Fight Terrorism and Strengthen Internally,” 
at www.csis.org/ruseura/georgia/gaupdate_0203.htm  
 
Basu,  Baidya Bikash, “Russian National Security Thinking,” at 
www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa/sa_oct00bab01.html  
 
Berniker, Mark, “Lack Of Strong Legal Framework, Corruption Hinder Foreign Investment 
In Armenia,”  at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav011603.shtml 
 
Blagov, Sergei, "Military Issues Block Russia-Georgia Détente," at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/  
 
Blagov, Sergei, “Kocharian’s Moscow Visit Underscores Strengthening Armenian-Russian 
Security Cooperation”at www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav012103prshtml  
 
 
194 
Blandy, C. W., “The Caucasus-Caspian Region: Cardinal Changes To The Military 
Balance,” at www.pims.org/Projects/CSRC/ob64-compl-cwb.htm   
 
Blank, Stephen J., “U.S. Military Engagement with Transcaucasia And Central Asia,” at 
www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/ 2000/milengag/milengag.pdf   
 
Blank , Stephen, “Russia, the OSCE, and Security in the Caucasus,” at www.osce-arf.de/ 
Pub/ Russia,%20the%20OSCE,%20and%20Security%20in%20the%20Caucasus(1).PDF  
 
Blank, Stephen J., “ Turkey's Strategıc Engagement in the Former USSR and US Interests,” 
in  eds  Stephen  J.   Blank,   Stephen  C.  Pelletiere, William T. Johnsen, Turkey's Strategic 
Position At The Crossroads of World Affairs at 
www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/1993/turkey/turkey.pdf   
 
Blank, Stephen, ‘The Future of Transcaspian Security,’ at 
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/trnscasp/trnscasp.pdf  
 
Blank,  Stephen, ‘US Military in Azerbaijan, to Counter Iranian Threat,” April 10, 2002 at 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=30 
 
Blank,   Stephen, “The Prospects Of Russian-American Partnership: The Georgian Litmus 
Test,” at http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=47 
 
Blua , Antoine, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Withdraws From GUUAM, Remaining Members 
Forge Ahead,” at www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/06/18062002164458.asp  
 
Bronson, Rachel, “NATO’s Expanding Presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” in  ed 
Stephen J. Blank, NATO After Enlargement:New Challenges, New Missions,New Forces,  
p.230 at at www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/ 1998/natoafter/natoafter.pdf .  
 
Carley, Patricia, “ Nagorno-Karabakh Searching for a Solution ,” at 
http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks257chap5_25.html 
 
Cem,  Ismail,  "Turkey and The World" at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/ba/baa98/july/02.htm 
 
Cheterian, Vicken, "Ethnic Conflict in Georgia," at 
http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/10georgia  
 
Cheterian ,Vicken, “Central Asia: America's rear base,” at 
http://mondediplo.com/2003/02/05oil. 
 
Christopher , Warren and William J. Perry, “NATO’s True Mission,” New York Times , 
October 21, 1997. Available at www-hoover.stanford.edu/publications/ 
digest/982/perry.html  
 
Criss, Nur Bilge, and Pınar Bilgin, “Turkish foreign Policy Toward the Middle East,” at 
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue1/jv1n1a3.html  
 
 
195 
Criss, Nur Bilge, “A Short History of Anti-Americanism and Terrorism: The Turkish Case,” 
at www.historycooperative.org/journals   
 
Cohen , Ariel, “Ethnic Conflicts Threaten U.S. Interests in the Caucasus,” at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1222.cfm 
 
Cohen,  Ariel,  “Iran’s  Claims   Over  Caspıan  Sea   Resources  Threaten Energy Security,” 
 
Cohen , Ariel, “U.S. Polıcy in the Caucasus and Central Asıa: Buildıng A New “Sılk Road” 
to Economic Prosperity,” at 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/BG1132.cfm  
 
Cohen , Ariel, “The New “Great Game:Oil Politics in The Caucasus and Central Asıa,” at 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/Caspian_13.htm 
 
Cook, Steven A., “US-Turkey Relations and The War On Terrorism,” at 
http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/2001_cook.htm.  
 
Cornell, Svante E., “Turkey and the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh: a Delicate Balance,” at 
www.pcr.uu.se/tfopol.pdf  
 
Cornell ,Svante E., " Turkey's role and prospects in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its 
regional implications," at http://www.traceca.org/rep/marco/mp06.pdf 
 
Cornell, Svante E., “ The Caucasian States and Eurasian Strategic Alignments,” at 
www.geocities.com/svantec/geop1.html  
 
Cornell, Svante E., “Straightening U.S. Policy in Eurasia,” at 
www.cornellcaspian.com/pub/0101uspol.html  
 
Cornell,  Svante E., “The Caucasus under Renewed Russian Pressure: Realities on the 
Ground and Geopolitical Imperatives”, Caspian Brief, No. 10 (January 2001) 
Available at http://www.cornellcaspian.com/pub/10_0101russianpressure.html 
 
Cornell , Svante E., “Iran and the Caspian Region: The Domestic and International Context 
of Iranian Policy,” Caspian Brief,No. 15, Cornell Caspian Consulting, (May 2001). 
Available at http://www.cornellcaspian.com 
 
Cornell, Svante E., “Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia,” Perceptions, Vol.4, No.2, June-August 1999. Available at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/iv-2/cornell.htm 
 
Cutler, Robert M., "Ajaria, the Russian Military in Georgia, and Stability in the South 
Caucasus," at http://www.robertcutler.org/consult/topical/ge0001aj.htm. 
 
Cutler ,Robert, “Tskhinvali (South Ossetia), Georgia,”  at 
http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/ossetia.html 
 
Cutler, Robert, “Georgia/Abkhazia,” at  http://www.selfdetermine.org/conflicts/abkhaz.html. 
 
 
196 
Çiller ,Tansu, “Turkey and its Neighborhood,” at  www.ciaonet.org/pbei/winep/cit01.html  
 
Danielyan , Emil, “Armenia: CIS Defense Chiefs Map Out Cooperation Despite Divisions,” 
at  www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/ 05/F.RU.990520135014.html  
 
Danielyan, Emil “Armenia's Foreign Policy: Balancing between East and West,” at  
www.jamestown.org/pubs/view/pri_004_002_003.htm  
 
Darchiashvili, David, “ The First Decade of Army Building of Georgia,” The Army and 
Society in Georgia, February-March 1998 at 
http://www.lib.berkeley.edu/Collections/Slavic/army.html 
 
 
De Temple , James E., ‘Expanding Security Eastward: NATO Military Engagement in the 
South Caucasus and Central Asia,’ at  
https://research.au.af.mil/papers/student/ay2001/affp/detemple.pdf 
 
Devdariani, Jaba, “Georgia On A Fault Line,”  Perspective 13: 2 (2002) at 
http://www.bu.edu/iscip/vol13/Devdariani2.html  
 
Devdariani, Jaba and Blanka Hancilova, “US Involvement in Caucasian Security 
Architecture Grows,” 23 October  2002  at 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=8 
 
Eyvazov, Jannatkhan, “NATO and Military-Political Aspects of Azerbaijan's Security,” at 
http://bridge.aznet.org/bridge/nato.htm  
 
Feinberg, Jared , "The Georgian Military: Nowhere to Go but Up," at  
http://www.cdi.org/weekly/1998/issue26/#4 
 
Feinberg, Jared, "Armed forces in Georgia," at 
http://www.cdi.org/issues/Europe/gastudy.pdf 
 
Freedman, Robert O., “Russian Iranian Relations in the 1990s”, Middle East Review of 
International Affairs, Vol.4, No.2 (June 2000). Available at 
http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/meria/meria00_frr01.html 
 
Fuller, Liz, “Georgia/Turkey: Agreements Secure Bilateral Trade And Defense,” at  
www.rferl.org/nca/features/1999/ 03/F.RU.990310150916.html 
 
Fuller, Liz, "See Change in Georgian-Russian relations?" at http://www.atimes.com/c-
asia/AA12Ag02.html  
 
Fuller , Liz, RFE/RL, No. 46, “Transcaucasia and Central Asia: Shevardnadze in 
Washington,” at  www.naukanet.org/friends/news/omri/1994/03/940308.html  
 
Fuller ,Liz, “A New Strategic Partnership?” at www.rferl.org/caucasus-report/1999/03/10-
090399.html 
 
Funabashi, Yoichi, Alliance Tomorrow at  
 
197 
www. www.tkfd.or.jp/eng/research/alliance/pdf/AT_Cncpt.pdf 
 
Gegeshidze, Archil, "A strategic vision for Georgia," at  www.internationalreports.net/cis/ 
georgia/2002/1/astrategic.html 
 
Gorman, Patrick “The Emerging Army in Azerbaijan,” at  
http://www-scf.usc.edu/~baguirov/azeri/azarmy.htm  
 
Gorvett, Jon, “Turkey Plays Big Brother to Azerbaijan in Opening Skirmishes Over Control 
of Caspian Resources,” at  www.wrmea.com/archives/november01/0111031.html 
 
Haindrava, Ivlian, “Georgia to NATO,” at www.idee.org/nij230.htm  
 
Hays, F. Wallace, “US Congress and the Caspian,” at 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/333.htm 
 
Henze Paul B., “ Turkey's Caucasian Initiatives,” at 
www.eurasianet.org/resource/cenasia/hypermail/200102/0012.html  
 
Hill, Fiona, “A Not-So-Grand Strategy: United States Policy in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia since 1991,” Politique étrangère, February 2001, 
http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/views/articles/fhill/2001politique.htm 
 
Hovannisian, Richard G., "Historical Memory and Foreign affairs," at 
www.sscnet.ucla.edu/history/centers/ armenian/source106.html  
 
Howard ,Glen E., “NATO and the Caucasus: the Caspian Axis,” in  ed Stephen J. Blank, 
NATO After Enlargement:New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces at 
www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/ 1998/natoafter/natoafter.pdf  
 
Ismailova,  Gulnara, “Central Asia - Caucasus Analyst Wednesday / April 10, 2002 
Azerbaijan-American Military Consultations Take Place In Baku,” at 
http://www.cacianalyst.org/view_article.php?articleid=231 
 
Lieven ,Anatol, “GUUAM: What Is It, and What Is It For?” at  
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav  121800.shtml 
 
Johnsen ,  William  T.,  “Turkey  and  Europe:  Expectations  and  Complications,”  in 
Stephen J. Blank, Stephen C. Pelletiere,William T. Johnsen, eds., Turkey's Strategic Position 
At The Crossroads of World Affairs at 
www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/1993/turkey/turkey.pdf 
 
Jones, Scot A., ““Parochial and Opportunist: US Interests in the Caucasus,” at  
www.uga.edu/cits/programs/ southern_tier_us-caucasus.htm  
 
Kanbolat,  Hasan, “Rusya Federasyonu’nun Güney Kafkasya’daki Askeri Varlığı ve 
Gürcistan Boyutu”, at http://avsam.org/turkce/stanmak/03analiz/04-48ha.pdf 
 
Kasim, Kamer, “The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From Its Inception To The Peace 
Process,” at http://www.eraren.org/eng/articles/nagorno_karabag_confroinpeapro.htm 
 
198 
Kaya, Kemal, “Turkey’s New Challenges in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” at 
http://www.cacianalyst.org./November 7 2001 Turkeys Challenges.html. 
 
Khalilzad ,Zalmay, “A Strategıc Plan For Western-Turkish Relations,” in Zalmay Khalilzad, 
Ian O. Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee eds, The Future of Turkish-Western Relations:Toward A 
Strategic Plan, www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241/MR1241.chap5.pdf  
Kjamal, Ali, “ Azeri Army Death-wish: No-one in Azerbaijan is Prepared to Take 
Responsibility for the Increasingly Parlous State of the Armed Forces,” at http://perso.club-
internet.fr/kozlowsk/azerb.html 
 
Koetje, Fred San, “Shifting The Paradigm In RSA International Relations,” at 
www.mil.za/CSANDF/CJSupp/TrainingFormation/DefenceCollege/ResearchPapers1999/ko
etje.htm 
 
Köknar, Güler, “ US policy in the Caucasus: Lead, follow or get out of the way? ,” at 
www.ataa.org/ataa/events/pastevents/mission/ us_policy_in_the_caucasus_.html   
 
Larrabee , F. Stephen, “Turkish Foreign and Security Policy:New Dimensions and New 
Challenges”, in (eds) Zalmay Khalilzad, Ian O. Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee The Future of 
Turkish-Western Relations: Toward A Strategic Plan at 
www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241/MR1241.chap3.pdf  
 
Laos, Nicolas K., “International Security In The  Post-Cold War Era ,” at 
www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/IV-4/laos.htm 
  
Lesser, Ian.O., “ In Search of a Post-Cold War Role,” at 
www.tusiad.org/yayın/private/autumn 97/html/lesser.html  
 
Lesser,  Ian O., “Western Interets in a Changing Turkey,” Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age 
of Uncertainty at www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1241/MR1241.chap4.pdf  
 
Macdougall, James, "The New Stage in US-Caspian Sea Basin Relations," at 
http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/st_04_dougall.shtml  
 
Makovsky, Alan, “The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy”,  at 
www.washingtoninstitute.org/media/ amakovsky/alansais.htm  
 
Martin, Patrick, “US troops deployed to former Soviet Republic of Georgia,” at 
www.wsws.org/articles/2002/mar2002/geor-m01.shtml  
 
Mindreau , Manuel, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward The Conflict Between Armenia And 
Azerbaijan” at www.docentes.up.edu.pe/Mmindreau/docs/ U.S.%20Foreign%20Policy%20-
%20Armenia%20and%20Azerbaijan.PDF  
 
Meyer, James H., “Policy Watershed: Turkey's Cyprus Policy and the Interventions of 
1974,” at http:// www.wws.princeton.edu/~cases  
 
 
199 
Migdalovitz ,Carol, “Issue Brief for Congress” at 
http://www.fas.org/asmp/resources/govern/crs-IB92109.pdf 
 
Miller,   Eric  A.,  “ Georgia   Struggles   To   Develop   National  Security  Framework,”  at  
www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/ articles/eav032803.shtml  
 
Mollazade, Jayhun, “A Window on Russian Policy Towards the South Caucasus 19991-
2002 Through an Analysis of Russian Azerbaijani Relations,” at 
http://www.usazerbaijancouncil.org/caspiancrossroads/archieve/2000/54.html. 
 
Morris, Chris, and Ian Traynor, “Caspian Oil Plan Stirs Political Cauldron,”   at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,3930880,00.html 
 
Naegele, Jolyon, " Turkey: Foreign Relations Good with Two of Eight Neighbours,"at  
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/1998/08/F.RU.980813130211.html 
 
Nichol ,  Jim, “ Transcaucasus  Newly  Independent  States :  Political  Developments  and 
Implications for US Interests,” at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/95-024.htm. 
 
Nichol, Jim  and Julie Kim, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia:Political Developments and 
Implications for U.S. Interests,” at www.fas.org/man/crs/IB95024.pdf  
 
Nissman, David, “The Two Azerbaijans: A Common Past and A Common Future,” at 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/usazerb/126.htm 
 
Nuriyev,  Elkhan E., “The Ongoing Geopolitical Game in the Caucasus and the Caspian 
Basin: Towards War or Peace?” Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies; Monterey Institute 
of International Studies. Available at http://cns.miis.edu/cres/nuriyev.htm 
 
Nuriyev,  Elkhan, “ Geopolitical Breakthrough And Emerging Challenges: The Case Of The 
South Caucasus,” Perceptions, June - July 2001,4:2 at 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/VI-2/nuriyev.10.htm 
 
Ögütçü , Mehmet, “The Turkish-U.S. Strategic Partnership: Broadening and Deepening in 
the 21st Century ,” at http://www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/ogutcu5.pdf  
Öniş ,Ziya, “Turkey And Post-Sovıet States: Potentıal And Lımıts Of Regıonal Power 
Influence ,” at meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2001/issue2/jv5n2a6.html  
Pavliuk, Oleksandr, “Empire of Words,” at  
http://www.tol.cz/transitions/sep98/empireof.html 
 
Peimani,  Hooman, “Caspian Sea divide no closer to closure,” Asia Times ,April 18, 2002 at 
www.cdi.org/russia/202-11.cfm  
 
Peuch, Jean-Christophe, “ Georgia: What Are The Motives For U.S. Sending Elite Troops?” 
at www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/02/27022002095326.asp  
 
Press, Daryl G., “Power, Reputation and Assessments of Credibility During the Cuban 
Missile Crisis,” at pro.harvard.edu/papers/018/018005PressDaryl.pdf  
 
200 
Putilov,  Sergey, “U.S. Said Seeking To Draw Caspian Into Sphere of Influence,” 
Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye, 27 February-5 March 1998. Available at  
www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2095.html  
Rosen, Steve, “Turkey’s Emerging Role In The New War Against Terrorism,”  at 
http://www.mfa/gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm  
 
Sadigbeyli , Rovshan, " Trans-Regional Linkages' in Turkey's Foreign Policy: The Case of 
the South Caucasus," at www.ir.metu.edu.tr/conference/papers/sadigbeyli.pdf  
 
Schweller, L., “Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest,”  at 
http://www.ciaonet.org/book/schweller/schweller03.html 
 
Serdar Sayan, “The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Project:A Substitute for or A 
Complement to Globalization Efforts in the Middle East and the Balkans?”   at 
http://www.bilkent.edu.tr/~sayan/DiscussionPapers/ERF_WP9806.pdf 
 
Sezer,  Duygu Bazoğlu, “Turkish-Russian Relations a Decade Later: From Adversity to 
Managed Competition”, at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/percept/VI-1/dbsezer.05.htm 
 
Shaffer,  Brenda, “Partners in Need: The Strategic Relationship of Russia & Iran”, Caspian 
Crossroads, Vol.5, No.4 (Summer 2001). Available at 
http://www.usazerbaijancouncil.org/caspiancr.html 
 
Shaitelman, Kenneth, “The Azerbaijan-Armenia Conflict: The War in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
Section 907, and Their Impact on Oil Pipeline Routes,” at 
http://www.wws.princeton.edu/~wws401c/1998/ken.html 
 
Sherwood, Elizabeth, “US Policy and the Caucasus,” at. http://ist-
socrates.berkeley.edu/~bsp/caucasus/newsletter/1998-05.pdf 
 
Staples , John R. and Harold Otto, “Russian Defence Spending Trends and Consequences,” 
at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/pdf/ Russian_doctrine_paper-e.PDF  
 
Smith, M A, “Foreign Policy 2000: The Near Abroad,” at 
https://da.mod.uk/CSRC/Home/documents/pdfs/F71-mas.pdf  
 
Starr, S. Frederick, "Power Failure: American Policy in the Caspian," The National Interest, 
Spring 1997, at http://www.treemedia.com/cfrlibrary/library/policy/powerfailure.html  
 
Swietochowski , Tadeusz,  “The Long Shadow of Russia,”  at 
http://www.usazerbaijancouncil.org/caspiancr.html  
 
Tamrazian ,  Harry, “ Which  Formula  can  Guarantee  Security for the South Caucasus?” at   
 www.eurasianet.org/resource/georgia/ hypermail/200006/0019.html  
 
Tamrazian, Harry, “Armenia/Russia: Landmark Treaty Includes Provision For Mutual 
Defense,” at www.rferl.org/nca/features/1997/ 08/F.RU.970829143441.html  
 
Torbakov , Igor, ‘Expanding Turkish-Georgian Strategic Ties Rankle Russia, at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav042503_pr.shtml 
 
201 
Tsereteli, Mamuka, “Georgian Economy: An Important Building Block for Security ," at 
www.agbdc.com/ InternationalReports_net%20%20Georgia%202002.htm  
  
Türkmen, Füsun, “Turkey and  The  Korean  War,” at  
www.usconsulate-istanbul.org.tr/korea/koreaft.html  
 
Walker, Edward, "No Peace, No War in the Caucasus: Secessionist Conflicts in Chechnya, 
Abkhazia and Mountainous Karabakh" at  http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/wae01/ 
 
Winrow ,Gareth M., "Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the 
Transcaucasus," at meria.idc.ac.il/journal/1997/issue2/jv1n2a5.html  
 
Young, Dietrich , “Turkey at the Crossroads,” at www.ciaonet.org/wps/jud01 
  
Yüksel,  Emir Salim, “Turkish-Iranian Relations In The Post-Cold War Era: 1991-1996,” at  
www.metu.edu.tr/home/wwwsbe/thabs/1998/ir_abs_98.html 
  
“A  Case  Study  of  the  PKK  in  Turkey,”  at   www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ac/acf/acf1/f641.htm 
  
“Are Non-Military Solutions Obsolete?” at   www.pcusa.org/washington/issuenet/gs-020308htm 
 
 “Armenia Confirms Plans to Upgrade Security Links with U.S., Georgia,” at 
www.aaainc.org/armenia_week/04-05-02.htm 
 
 “Azerbaijan- The Status of Armenians, Russians, Jews and Other Minorities,” at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ins/azerba93.pdf 
 
“Azeri army spokesman says military doctrine to rely on Turkey ,” BBC Monitoring Service 
- United Kingdom; Jul 10, 2001. Available at 
www.geocities.com/fanthom_2000/archives/Archive53.html  
 
DA DPM - Information on Georgia  
at www.usaic.hua.army.mil/SCHOOL/111MI/309th/ EATC/Country%20Links/georgia.htm.  
 
“Even More Perilous Isolation,” Economist, 5/25/2002, Vol. 363  
 available online at database http://www.ebscohost.com  
 
“Georgia: Bush Says U.S. Helping Tbilisi Against Terrorists,” at 
http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/02/27022002103251.asp. 
  
“Georgian Economic Trends”  at www.geplac.org/publicat/economic/contents.html  
 
Georgian press reports in Army & Society in Georgia, September 1998 at  
www.lib.berkeley.edu/Collections/Slavic/army998.html 
  
“House Votes To Maintain Section 907,” at http://www.aaainc.org/press/archive98/9-18-98. htm 
 
Information Note on Foreign Minister İsmail Cem's Visit to Iran 12-13 February 2001 
www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ai/iran.htm  
  
 
202 
 “KADEK Gets Support And Shelter In Iran, Syria,” at 
www.diplomaticobserver.com/terorism/20020525_01.html 
 “Liars and Hypocrites” at 
  www.socialistworker.org/2002-1/409/ 409_06_WhatTheyWontSay.shtml  
 
“Mission Impossible – Turkey`s Role In Star Wars” at 
http://www.turkpulse.com/june2001.htm  
 
“Quotable quotes” at  
 www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/ 63_folder/63_articles/63_quotes.html 
  
“Programs and Funding,” at www.fpif.org/papers/miltrain/programs_body.html 
  
“PKK moves to Armenia,” at  
www.alexsrv7.com/~karabakh/ wmview.php?ArtID=36&act=refer  
 
“Russian missile parts stopped on Azerbaijani-Iranian border”  at 
www.payk.net/mailingLists/iran-news/ html/1998/msg00713.html 
  
“Q & A With Steven R. Mann :American Diplomat Sees Encouraging Signs On Baku-
Ceyhan Pıpelıne” at http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/qanda/articles/eav110801.shtml 
  
“ Russian Federation Foreign Policy,”at 
  www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/laenderinfos/laender/ laender_ausgabe_html  
  
“Section 907 of the Freedom Supporty Act,” at www.aaainc.org/press/Section907.pdf. 
  
“Silk Road Strategy Act of 1999,” at 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/regional/silkroad.html,  
  
Speech by the Rt.Hon. Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000926a.htm. 
 
“Terrorism-Military and Arms Aid,” at  www.cdi.org/terrorism/military-transfers.cfm 
 
 “The GUUAM Group: History and Principles,”November 2000 
www.guuam.org/general/history.html  
 
“The Real Money Behind Foreign Aid,” at www.cato.org/dispatch/01-24-01d.html  
 
Turkey, US Energy Information Country Analysis, (July 2001)  at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.htm  
 
“ Turkey to Give Georgia Third Grant for Defense Purposes,” RFE/RL Newsline, 3: 138, 
July 19, 1999  at www.friends-partners.ru/friends/news/omri/1999/ 07/990719I. html  
 
‘Turkey and the Arms Trade 1998 - 2002: A Precis Nurturing Turkey's War Machine ,’ at 
www.caat.org.uk/information/publications/ countries/turkey-0303.php 
 
 
203 
 “Turkey's Security Perspectives And Its Relations With NATO” at 
http://www.mfa/gov.tr/grupa/af/secure.htm.. 
 
 “Turkey’s relations with Armenia,” at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ae/caucasian.htm. 
 
“Turkish Foreign Policy,” at  http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm#06 
 
“Foreign Policy of Turkey: The Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy”, Official 
Declaration of Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs at 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/REFERENCES/for-pol-98.htm 
  
“Turkish Energy Policy,” at www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/an/policy.htm 
 
‘US Arms Sales to Turkey,’ at www.geocities.com/tziakas/arms1.htm 
 
 “US-Azerbaijan Program Launched,” at www.resources.net.az/d/us0402.htm  
 
‘U.S. Military Aid and Arms Sales to Turkey,’ at 
www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/turkey_weapons.htm  
 
“USA assigned 1 million dollars for Azerbaijan army,” at 
www.bakutoday.net/view.php?d=897 
 
THESE: 
 
Aliyev, Ilgar, The US Strategic Engagement in the South Caucaus 1991-2002, Ankara: 
Bilkent University, Thesis -Master's- ,2002. 
 
Altın, Erhan, NATO Enlargement in the Caucasus: Implications for the Caspian Security, 
İstanbul: Yeditepe University, Thesis -Master’s-, 2000. 
 
Çetiner,Yusuf Turan, The Making of Turkey's Western Alliance : 1944-1952, Ankara: 
Bilkent University, Thesis –Doctarate-, 2001.  
 
Demirci, Levent ,Turkey's Political Objectives in the Caucasus, Ankara: Bilkent University, 
Thesis -Master's- ,2002. 
 
Eligur, Banu , Turkey's Quest For A Western Alliance (1945-1952): A Reinterpretation, 
Ankara: Bilkent University, Thesis - Master's-, 1999.   
 
Kotaman, Yunus, US Policy and Russian Interests in the Transcaucauss since 1991, 
California :Naval Postgraduate School, Thesis-Master's-, 2001. 
 
Mangıtlı, Ulaş, Russia, Turkey and Eurasia: Intersection of Turkish and Russian Foreign 
Policy Spheres in Eurasia, Ankara: Bilkent University, Thesis-Master's-,  2001.  
 
Piccoli, Wolfango, Alliance Theory: The Case of Turkey and Israel, Ankara: Bilkent 
University, Thesis -Master's-, 1999.  
 
 
204 
Sadıgbeyli, Rovshan, Stability in the South Caucasus: The Role of Russia and Turkey, 
Ankara:Bilkent University, Thesis -Master's- ,2002. 
 
Tosun, Murat, Military Power in the Caucasus, İstanbul:Yeditepe , Thesis -Master's- ,2002,  
Yassa, Çağla Gül, Bakü-Ceyhan Petrol Boru Hattının Jeopolitik Önemi & Etkileri Ve 
Yapımını Etkileyen Unsurlar, İstanbul: Marmara University, Thesis -Master's-, 1999. 
    
DOCUMENTS:     
 
Agreement on the establishment of the blacksea naval cooperation task group at 
http://www.blackseafor.org/establishment.htm  
 
Armenia : Torture and Ill-Treatment:Comments on the Second Periodic Report to the United 
Nations Committee Against Torture at web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/ 
EUR540022000?OpenDocument&of=COUNTRIES%5CARMENIA  
 
Foreign direct investment data of selected years (1985~2001) from the World Investment 
Report of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 2002 at 
http://www.ipanet.net/infores/tinforesult.cfm?In_country=16 
 
IMI on Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Crude Oil Pipeline Project; US Embassy Ankara  at 
http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/country/000605gapln.htm. 
 
Joint Declaration by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin on the New 
Strategic Relationship Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation 
[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents], Available at 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=2002presidentialdocuments 
&docid= pd27my02 _txt-28 
 
Joint Press Release on the Establishment of the Blackseafor Istanbul, 2 April 2001 at 
www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/af/bsec9.htm  
 
 Letter from President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü, June 15, 1964 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~akommata/letter2.html 
 
Public Information Notice of International Monetary Fund, “IMF Concludes 2002 Article IV 
Consultation with the Republic of Armenia,” at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2002/pn02118.htm. 
 
Orta  Asya  ve  Kafkasya’daki  Durum  ve  Avrupa  Güvenliği  Konulu Batı Avrupa Birliği 
Asamblesi Raporu,  (43.Oturum/Doküman 1586/ 19 Kasım 1997). 
 
Turkey, US Energy Information Country Analysis, May 2003,  at 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/turkey.htm 
 
U.S. Assistance to Armenia, Fiscal Year 2002 Fact Sheet, Bureau of European and Eurasian 
Affairs Washington, DC, June 6, 2002, at www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/fs/11027.htm  
 
 
205 
“U.S. Welcomes Approval of Shah Deniz Natural Gas Project in Azerbaijan,” Press 
Statement, February 28, 2003 at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/18092.htm 
 
CONFERENCE, PANEL PAPERS: 
 
“Black Sea Region: Priorities and Perspectives for the 21st Century,” April 1999, 
Conference paper at . www.irex.org/pubs/policy/black-sea.asp  
 
Hovanissian, Nikolai, “Views from the Region: Armenia,” Seminar on Russia and the NIS, 
1996  at http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/sam/1.96/I-3.ht 
 
Leila Aliyeva ”The Foreign Policy of Azerbaijan,” Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects, 
Briefing Paper no.9, October 1996  http://www.riia.org/Research/rep/bp9.html 
  
Panel about the Baku-Ceyhan Pipeline available at www.csis.org/turkey/event00413P2.html  
 
“Tarih Boyunca Türk-Ermeni İlişkileri Sempozyumu,” at 
www.belgenet.com/arsiv/ermeni/sempozyum4.html  
  
“Turkey-United States Relations: Potential and Peril,”, 19.10.1995 at 
http://www.house.gov/csce/Turkey USRelations.html 
 
NEWSPAPERS : 
 
Akıncı, Uğur, “White House: Turkey Should Remain Secular, Pro-West,” Turkish Daily 
News,  May 22, 1997.   
 
Baker ,James A., "America's Vital Interest in the 'New Silk Road'," New York Times, July 
21, 1997. 
 
Fitchett, Joseph, “War Alters Caspian Equation,” in  Herald Tribune, October 31,2001. 
 
Kasim, Kamer, “Armenia’s Foreign Policy: Basic Paremeters of the Ter-Petrosian and 
Kocharian Era”, Turkish Daily News, 5 July 2002. 
 
McManus ,Doyle,  “Washington Says It Does Not Back Azerbaijani Call For 
Independence,” Los Angeles Times, January 18, 1990. 
 
Mengi, Güngör , “Dar Kaçış,” Sabah, December 30, 1999. 
 
“ Putin's parody of partnership,” Washington Post,September19,2002. 
  
“The Caucasus and Central Asia in U.S foreign policy,” Eurasia Insight, June 12, 2001  
  
“Turkey and Azerbaijan Improve Strategic Cooperation,”  Turkish Daily News, May 6, 
1997. 
RESEARCH PAPERS: 
 
Macwillie, Donald, “The Increasing importance of Turkey for US Security,” available at 
https://carlisle-www.army.mil/srp/ex_paper/MacWillie%5FD%5FM%5F02%2Epdf 
 
206 
 
Yılmaz, Ayhan, “Instability in Caucasus and Central Asia And Caspian Basin Energy 
Resources Management,” at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/srp/ex_paper/yilmaz_a__02.pdf 
INTERNET ADRESSES: 
 
http://www.anca.org/anca/transcaucasus.asp?trid=11  
 
http://www.angelfire.com/bc3/coldwar/cubacrisis.html 
 
http://www.armeniadiaspora.com/history/2001oct.html 
 
http://www.azer.com/aiweb/graphics/maps/neighbors_map.html  
 
http://www.azeriturkleri.com/enqacq.htm  
 
http://www.azstat.org/publications/yearbook/2002/en/014_9.shtml 
 
http://www.bioem.tsk.mil.tr/pfptc.htm 
 
http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/RussiaCaucasus.html 
 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/Yayınlarımız/AyınTarihi/1992/mart1992.htm. 
 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/Yayınlarımız/AyınTarihi/1992/mayıs1992.htm  
 
http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/newspot/2002/july-aug/n8.htm 
 
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol6no6/kennedyG1.htm 
 
www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/01/30/iran.bush/  
 
http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNALP455.pdf 
 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/azerbjan.html  
 
http:// www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgrph.html  
  
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/armenia/index.shtml#                          
 
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/azerbaijan/hypermail/200201/0019.shtml 
 
http://www.geographyiq.com/countries/gg/Georgia_map_flag_geography.htm 
 
http:// www.guuam.org/media/GUUAM.html  
 
http://cf.heritage.org/index/country.cfm?ID=5.0 
 
  http://www.iiasa.ac.at/~wagner/ECS/docs/caspian.html 
 
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0107305.html  
 
207 
 
http://www.inogate.org/html/brief/brief2.htm 
 
http://www.kultur.gov.tr/portal/kultur_en.asp?belgeno=5764 
 
http://members.tripod.com/madsiz/pipeline.html 
 
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/intorg.html  
 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupb/ba/baa98/july/02.htm 
 
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/coldwar.htm 
 
htttp://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/0611/e0611a.htm  
 
http://www.president.az/Azerbaijan/nk/un.htm 
 
http://www.rferl.org/Caucasus-report/1998/10/35-301098.html 
 
http://www.russia.jamestown.org/pubs/view/mon_003_201_000.htm  
 
  http://www.state.gov/www/policy_remarks/971023_eizen_caspian.html 
 
http://www.tiscali.co.uk/reference/encyclopaedia/countryfacts/armenia_map.html  
 
http://www.traceca.org/docs/main.php  
 
 http://www.uaembingeorgia.gov.ua/eng/econom.htm. 
 
http://www.ultimateconspiracy.com/history/turkishnotes.htm   
 
http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/ 
 
http://www.usatrade.gov/Website/CCG.nsf/CCGurl/CCG-GEORGIA2002-CH-3:-   
005F3D57 
 
http://www.usemb-ankara.org.tr/IRC/treaty/32t3323.htm  
 
http://web.sanet.ge/gic/economy.htm  
 
http://www.wps.ru:8101/chitalka/military/en/20010907.shtml  
INTERVIEW: 
 
Interview with A. Necdet Pamir,  Foreign Policy and Energy Adviser to the ARI Movement  
( an independent political initiative in Turkey). 
 
Blair ,Betty, “Envisioning the Nation,” - Interview with Azerbaijan's President, Heydar 
Aliyev – at  http://www.azer.com/aiweb/categories/magazine/93_folder/93_articles/93_aliyev.html 
 
Interview with Mustafa Kibaroğlu in  ‘Anahtar’ program on NTV, 28 April 2003. 
 
208 
 
APPENDIX :1 
 
A CHRONOLOGY OF  TURKISH - AMERICAN RELATIONS  
 
9 November 1800 "George Washington" arrives in Istanbul, the first United States navy 
ship to visit Turkey. 
15 January 1820 Plincy Fish and Levi Parsons, the first American Christian missionaries 
arrive in Izmir. 
7 May 1830 Navigation and Trade Agreement between the Ottoman State and the United 
States. 
11 August 1874 Extradition Agreement between the Ottoman State and the United States. 
March 1878 Former President Grant visits Istanbul. 
20 April 1917 The Ottoman State severs diplomatic ties with the United States. 
27 October 1922 The United States delivers a memorandum on the Lausanne peace treaty 
to the British, French and Italian governments. 
9 April 1923 Turkish Parliament ratifies the Chester Concession (which was not 
implemented). 
6 August 1923 Soon after Lausanne, the signing of a General Treaty, which the Senate turns 
down on 18 January 1927. 
17 February 1927 Modus Vivendi concerning the establishment of diplomatic and consular 
relations between the two countries. 
12 October 1927 Joseph C. Crew, the first American Ambassador to Turkey, presents his 
credentials to Turkish President Gazi Mustafa Kemal. 
1 April 1939 Trade Agreement. 
September 1940 Turkey starts to benefit from the American Lend-Lease arrangements 
through Britain. 
4-6 December 1943 İnönü-Roosevelt meeting at the Allied Conference in Cairo. 
1 April 1944 The United States stops aid to Turkey upon discontinuation of Anglo-Turkish 
military talks. 
23 February 1945 Lend-Lease Agreement between Turkey and the United States. 
2 November 1945 The United States delivers a note to Turkey concerning the Straits of 
Marmara. 
27 February 1946 A $ 10 million credit agreement is signed between Turkey and the US. 
5 April 1946 Turkish Ambassador Ertegün's body is brought to Istanbul on the warship 
Missouri, an indication of Turkeys importance for the U.S. 
12 March 1947 Truman declares his doctrine to defend Turkey and Greece against the 
Soviet threat. 
22 May 1947 Congress passes a bill to provide $400 million in aid to Turkey and Greece. 
5 June 1947 Secretary of State Marshall announces a plan to provide aid to Turkey and 
Greece alongside the West European countries. 
12 July 1947 Aid Agreement between Turkey and the United States. 
4 July 1948 Turkish - American Agreement to include Turkey in the Marshall Plan. 
25 June 1950 Turkey sends an army corps of 4500 troops to South Korea 
13 May 1951 The United States proposes to its allies the Turkish (and Greek) accession to 
NATO. 
7 January 1952 Joint Security Agreement (through exchange of letters). 
18 February 1952 Turkey joins NATO. 
17-25 January 1954 Celal Bayar's official visit to the United States (the first Turkish 
President to do so). 
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5 January 1957 Eisenhower announces his doctrine aimed at protecting Middle Eastern 
countries against international communism 
22 March 1957 Turkey is included in the Eisenhower doctrine 
11 October 1957 The Soviets threaten Turkey in the "Syrian crisis". Washington offers 
defense guarantees. 
9 December 1957 First US guided missiles are installed in Turkey. 
10 May-15 July 1958 American forces use the Incirlik Air Base to intervene in Lebanon. 
May 1959 The exhibition "150 Years of Turkish – American Friendship" opens. 
6-7 December 1959 President Eisenhower visits Turkey 
1 May 1960 An American U-2 surveillance aircraft which takes off from the Incirlik Air 
Base is shut down over Russia 
23 October 1962 During the Cuban crisis, the USSR demands the removal of Jupiter 
missiles from Turkey in return for its missiles in Cuba. Americans accept.  
5 June 1964 During the Cyprus crisis President Johnson sends a letter to PM İnönü to warn 
him that Turkey would not be allowed to use weapons supplied by the United States, should 
it intervene in Cyprus. 
Summer 1964 The slogan "Yankee Go Home" gets popular in public and youth rallies 
7 April 1966 The Turkish Government memorandum to the US Government on the 
consolidation of 54 separate Bilateral Treaties signed between 1945 and 1965. 
3 July 1969 Turkish - American Defense Cooperation Agreement is signed upon the 
completion of the talks to consolidate bilateral agreements. 
30 June 1971 Opium poppy cultivation is banned in Turkey upon American demands, 
which promises to compensate for loss of earnings. 
1 July 1974 The Ecevit Government lifts the ban on poppy farming and permits cultivation 
in 7 provinces. 
5 February 1975 Congress imposes an arms embargo on Turkey on the grounds that Turkey 
intervened in Cyprus using American weapons. 
25 July 1975 The Turkish Government terminates the 1969 Turkish-U.S. agreement on joint 
defense facilities and stops operations at bases and facilities other than Incirlik. 
26 September 1978 The arms embargo is lifted by Congress Turkey reopens the bases and 
facilities under a provisional status. 
29 March 1980 Defense Cooperation Agreement. 
16 March 1987 DCA is extended by five years. 
2 August-End 1990 Turkey unequivocally opposes Iraq in the Gulf Crisis and cooperates 
with the United States. 
8 April 1991 A buffer zone is established on the Turkish border to safeguard some 460,000 
Kurds who fled Iraq after the Iraqi army suppresses the Kurdish uprising. 
11 April 1991 "Operation Provide Comfort" is launched. A Security Zone is set up for 
refugees, and the Coalition forces enters Northern Iraq. 
12 July 1991 The Turkish, American, British and French governments deploy a provisional 
force to protect the Kurds north of the 36th parallel. 
December 1991 After the collapse of the Soviet Union the United States closes down some 
of its military bases. 
10-11 January 1992 Allegations about "OPC helping the PKK"(Stories appear in the press 
about OPC aircraft dropping relief supplies on the Bisi Plateau). 
6 October 1992 The establishment, under US guarantees and supervision, of a Kurdish 
Federated State in Northern Iraq with its capital in Erbil. 
January 1994 The U.S. Commerce Department cites Turkey among ten Big Emerging 
Markets. 
19 April 1994 In his Cyprus report presented to Congress, 
 
210 
President Clinton finds UN Secretary-General Gali's confidence- building measures to be 
fair and balanced and urges the parties to reach an agreement. 
19 May 1994 The Appropriations Sub-Committee of the House of Representatives suspends 
25% of the military credit aid to Turkey until the latter makes progress on human rights and 
Cyprus issues. 
10 June 1994 Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin 
announce their agreement of principle on the draining of petroleum belonging to Turkey 
from the Iraqi pipeline 
31 January 1995 Ambassador Grossman says they will support the passing of the Kazakh 
and Azerbaijani petroleum pipeline through Turkey. 
30 June 1996 Turkish Parliament ratifies the US-Turkish Agreement on Mutual Assistance 
between Customs Administrations. 
12 January 1997 Turkish Parliament ratifies the Supply and Mutual Service Agreement and 
the Mutual Logistic Support Application Agreement. 
20 March 1997 Turkish Parliament ratifies the MoU concerning the creation of Business 
Opportunities Development Council. 
24 March 1997 Turkish Parliament ratifies NAT-I-3300 Agreement between the US Federal 
Aviation Administration and the Turkish Police Headquarters. 
28 October 1998 Foreign Minister Ismail Cem meets with Richard Morningstar, the Senior 
Advisor to the U.S. Secretary of State on the Caspian Basin Energy Resources and discusses 
the prospective Baku-Ceyhan pipeline. 
29 October 1998 Turkey and Turkmenistan sign an Agreement concerning the Execution of 
the Trans-Caspian Turkmenistan-Turkey-Europe Gas Pipeline Project and the Sale of 
Natural Gas by Turkmenistan to Turkey. 
January - March 1999 The capture of Abdullah –Öcalan, the chief of the terrorist 
organization PKK, in Kenya, through cooperation between the CIA and the Turkish 
National Intelligence Agency; 
Turkey extends political and military support to the U.S.-led NATO air raids on Yugoslavia 
to help ethnic Albanians of Kosovo; President Clinton, the Department of State and the 
Pentagon publicly emphasize the political and military importance of Turkey in the region, 
as reflected by the international media. 
SOURCE: PrivateView Spring 1999.vol.3. No.7.1999 
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APPENDIX: 2 
 
Draft Notes of President Truman Explaining Why the US Should Grant Financial Aid 
to Greece and Turkey.  
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SOURCE: 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/folder3/mpc10-
1.htm 
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                                   APPENDIX: 3 
Letter from President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu, June 15, 1964 
Dear Mr. Prime Minister, 
I am gravely concerned by the information which I have had through Ambassador Hare from 
you and your Foreign Minister that the Turkish Government is contemplating a decision to intervene 
by military force to occupy a portion of Cyprus. I wish to emphasize, in the fullest friendship and 
frankness, that I do not consider such a course of action by Turkey, fraught with such far reaching 
consequences, is consistent to the commitment of your government o consult fully in advance with 
the united States. Ambassador Hare has indicated that you postponed your decision for a few hours 
to obtain my views. I put it to you personally whether you really believe that is appropriate for your 
government, in effect, to present an ultimatum to an ally who has demonstrated such staunch 
supporter over the years as has the United States for Turkey. I must, therefore, urge you to accept the 
responsibility for complete consultation with the united States before any such action is taken is my 
impression that you believe such intervention by Turkey is permissible under the provision of the 
Treaty if Guarantee of 1960. I must call to your attention, however, to our understanding that the 
proposed intervention by Turkey would be for the purpose of supporting intervention by Turkish 
Cypriot leaders to partition the island, a solution which is specifically excluded by the Treaty of 
Guarantee. Further, that treaty requires consolation among the guarantor powers. It is such a view of 
the United States that the possibilities of such consultation have by no means been exhausted in this 
situation and that, therefore, the reservation of the right to take unilateral action is not yet applicable. 
I must call to your attention also, Mr... Prime minister, the obligations of NATO. There can 
be no question in your mind that a Turkish intervention in Cyprus would lead to military engagement 
between Turkish and Greek forces. Secretary of State Rusk declared at a recent meeting of the 
ministerial council of NATO, n its very essence, means that NATO countries will not wage war on 
each other. Germany and France have buried centuries of animosity and hostility in becoming NATO 
allies; nothingness can be expected from Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, a military intervention in 
Cyprus by Turkey could lead to direct involvement by the Soviet Union. I hope you will understand 
that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect 
Turkey against the Soviet union if Turkey takes a step which result in Soviet intervention without the 
full consent and understanding of its NATO allies. 
Furthermore, Ma.. Prime Minister, I am concerned about the obligations of Turkey as a 
member of the United Nations. The United Nations has provided forces on the island to keep peace. 
Their task has been difficult, but, during the past several weeks, they have been progressively 
successful in reducing the incidents of violence on that island. The United Nations Mediator has not 
yet completes his work. I have no doubt that the general membership of the Unites Nations would 
react in the strongest terms to unilateral action by Turkey which would defy the efforts of the united 
Nations and destroy any prospect that the united Nations could assist in obtaining a reasonable and 
peaceful settlement of this difficult problem. 
I wish also, Mr.. Prime minister, to call your attention to the bilateral agreement between the 
United States and Turkey in the field of military assistance. under Article IV of the agreement with 
Turkey of July of 1947, your government is required to obtain United States consent for the use of 
military assistance for purposes other than those for which such assistance acknowledged to the 
United States that you fully understand this condition. I must tell you in all candor that the United 
States cannot agree to the use of any United States supplied military equipment for a Turkish 
intervention in Cyprus- under present circumstances. 
Moving to the practical results of the contemplated Turkish move, I feel obligates to call 
your attention in the most friendly fashion the fact that such a Turkish move could lead to the 
slaughter of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots on the island of Cyprus. Such an action on your 
part would unleash the furies and there is no way by which military action on your part could be 
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sufficiently effective to prevent wholesale destruction of many of those you're trying to protect. The 
presence of United Nations forces could not prevent such a catastrophe. 
You may consider that what I have said is much too severe and that we are disregardful of 
Turkish interests in the Cyprus situation. I should like to assure you that this is not the case. We have 
exerted ourselves both publicly and privately to assure the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist 
that a final solution of the safety of Turkish Cypriots and to insist that a final solution of the Cyprus 
problem should rest upon the consent of the parties most directly concerned. It is possible that you 
feel in Ankara that the United States has not sufficiently active in your behalf. But surely you know 
that our policy has caused lively resentment in Athens (where demonstrations have been aimed 
against us) and has led to basic alienation between the United States and Archbishop Makarios. As I 
said to your Foreign Minister in our conversation just a few weeks ago, we value very highly our 
relations with Turkey. WE have considered you as a greatly ally with fundamental common interests. 
Your security and people been a deep concern for the American people and we have expressed that 
concern in the most practical terms. you and and we have fought together to resist the ambitions of 
the communist world revolution. This solidarity has meant a great deal to us and I would hope that it 
means a great deal to your government and to your people. We have no intention of lending any 
support to any solution in Cyprus which endangers the Turkish Cypriot community. We have not 
been able to find a final solution because this is. admittedly, one of the most complex problem on the 
earth/ but I wish to assure you that we have been deeply concerned about the interests of Turkey and 
of Turkish Cypriots and will remain so. 
Finally, Mr.. Prime minister, I must tell you that you have posed the gravest issue of war and 
peace. These are issues which go far beyond the bilateral relations between Turkey and the Unites 
States. They not only will certainly involve war between Turkey and Greece, nit could involve wider 
hostilities because of the unpredictable consequences which a unilateral intervention in Cyprus cold 
produce. You have your responsibilities as chief of the government of Turkey: I also have mine as 
President of the United States. I must, therefore, inform you in the deepest friendship that unless I 
can have your assurance that you will not take such action without further and fullest consultation 
that I cannot accept your injunction to Ambassador Hare of secrecy and must immediately ask for 
emergency meetings of the NATO Council and the United Nations security Council. 
I wish it were possible for us to have a personal discussion of this situation. Unfortunately, 
because of the special circumstances of our present constitutional position, I am not able to leave the 
united States. If you could come here for a full discussion I would welcome it. I do feel that you and 
I carry a very heavy responsibility for the general peace and for the possibilities of a sane and 
peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem. I ask you, therefore, to delay any decisions which you 
and your collegues might have in mind until you and I have had the fullest and frankest consultation. 
Sincerely, 
Lyndon B. Johnson  Source: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/~akommata/letter2.html 
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APPENDIX: 4 
Table 1. Caspian Sea Region Oil and Natural Gas Reserves 
Country 
Proven* 
Oil 
Reserve
s 
Possible** 
Oil 
Reserves 
Total Oil 
Reserves 
Proven* Natural 
Gas Reserves 
Possible** 
Natural Gas 
Reserves 
Total Natural 
Gas Reserves 
Azerbaijan 1.2 BBL 32 BBL 33.2 BBL 4.4 Tcf 35 Tcf 39.4 Tcf 
Iran*** 0.1 BBL 15 BBL 15.1 BBL 0 Tcf 11 Tcf 11 Tcf 
Kazakhstan 5.4 BBL 92 BBL 97.4 BBL 65 Tcf 88 Tcf` 153 Tcf 
Russia*** 2.7 BBL 14 BBL 16.7 BBL N/A N/A N/A 
Turkmenistan 0.6 BBL 80 BBL 80.6 BBL 101 Tcf 159 Tcf 260 Tcf 
Total 10 BBL 233 BBL 243 BBL 170.4 Tcf 293 Tcf 463.4 Tcf 
Sources: Oil and Gas Journal, Energy Information Administration 
* proven reserves are defined as oil and natural gas deposits that are considered 90% probable  
** possible reserves are defined as oil and natural gas deposits that are considered 50% probable  
*** only the regions near the Caspian are included 
BBL = billion barrels, Tcf = trillion cubic feet  
 
 
Table 2. Caspian Sea Region Oil Production and Exports  
(thousand barrels per day) 
Country Production (1990) 
Est. Production 
(2001) 
Possible Production 
(2010) 
Net Exports 
(1990) 
Est. Net Exports 
(2001) 
Possible Net Exports 
(2010) 
Azerbaijan 259 311.2 1,200 77 175.2 1,000 
Kazakhstan 602 811 2,000 109 631 1,700 
Iran* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia** 144 11 300 0 7 300 
Turkmenistan 125 159 200 69 107 150 
Total 1,130 1,292.2 3,700 255 920.2 3,150 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
* only the regions near the Caspian are included  
** includes Astrakhan, Dagestan, and the North Caucasus region bordering the Caspian Sea  
Table 3. Caspian Sea Region Natural Gas Production and Exports  
(billion cubic feet per year) 
Country 
Produc
tion 
(1990) 
Est. 
Production 
(2000) 
Possible 
Production 
(2010) 
Net 
Exports 
(1990) 
Est. Net 
Exports 
(2000) 
Possible Net 
Exports (2010) 
Azerbaija
n 350 200 1,100 -272 0 500 
Kazakhst
an 251 314.3 1,100 -257 -176.6 350 
Iran* 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia** 219 30 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Turkmen
istan 3,100 1,642 3,900 2,539 1,381 3,300 
Total 3,920 2,072 6,100 2,010 1,204.4 4,150 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
* only the regions near the Caspian are included  
** includes Astrakhan, Dagestan, and the North Caucasus region bordering the Caspian Sea  
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Table 4. Oil Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region 
      
Atyrau-
Samara 
Pipeline 
Atyrau (Kazakhstan) to 
Samara (Russia), 
linking to Russian 
pipeline system 
Recently increased to 
310,000 bbl/d 432 miles 
Increase in 
capacity cost 
approximately  
$37.5 million 
Existing pipeline recently upgraded by 
adding pumping and heating stations to 
increase capacity. 
Baku-Ceyhan 
("Main Export 
Pipeline") 
Baku (Azerbaijan) via 
Tbilisi (Georgia) to 
Ceyhan (Turkey), 
terminating at the 
Ceyhan Mediterranean 
Sea port 
Planned: 1 million 
bbl/d 
Approximately 
1,038 miles $2.9 billion 
One-year detailed engineering study 
completed in June 2002. Construction on 
Turkish section of pipeline began in June 
2002. Completion of entire pipeline 
targeted for 2004, exports by Feb. 2005. 
Baku-Supsa 
Pipeline 
(AIOC "Early 
Oil" Western 
Route) 
Baku to Supsa 
(Georgia), terminating 
at Supsa Black Sea port 
Recently upgraded 
from 115,000 to 
145,000 bbl/d; 
proposed upgrades to 
between 300,000 bbl/d 
to 600,000 bbl/d 
515 miles $600 million 
Exports began in April 1999; 
approximately 115,000 bbl/d exported via 
this route in 2001. 
Baku-
Novorossiisk 
Pipeline 
(Northern 
Route) 
Baku via Chechnya 
(Russia) to 
Novorossiisk (Russia), 
terminating at 
Novorossiisk Black Sea 
oil terminal 
100,000 bbl/d capacity; 
possible upgrade to 
300,000 bbl/d 
868 miles; 90 
miles are in 
Chechnya 
$600 million to 
upgrade to 
300,000 bbl/d 
Exports began late 1997; exports in 2001 
averaged 50,000 bbl/d. 
Baku-
Novorossiisk 
Pipeline 
(Chechnya 
bypass, with 
link to 
Makhachkala) 
Baku via Dagestan to 
Tikhoretsk (Russia) and 
terminating 
Novorossiisk Black Sea 
oil terminal 
Currently: 120,000 
bbl/d (rail and pipeline: 
160,000 bbl/d); 
Planned: 360,000 bbl/d 
(by 2005) 
204 miles $140 million 
Completed April 2000. Eleven-mile spur 
connects bypass with Russia's Caspian 
Sea port of Makhachkala. 
Caspian 
Pipeline 
Consortium 
(CPC) Pipeline 
Tengiz oil field 
(Kazakhstan) to 
Novorossiisk Black Sea 
oil terminal 
Currently: 565,000-
bbl/d; Planned: 1.34-
million bbl/d (by 2015) 
990 miles 
$2.5 billion for 
Phase 1 
capacity; $4.2 
billion total 
when 
completed 
First tanker loaded in Novorossiisk 
(10/01); exports rising to 400,000 bbl/d 
by end-2002 
Central Asia 
Oil Pipeline 
Kazakhstan via 
Turkmenistan and 
Afghanistan to Gwadar 
(Pakistan) 
Proposed 1 million 
bbl/d 1,040 miles $2.5 billion 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by 
the countries; project stalled by regional 
instability and lack of financing. 
Iran-
Azerbaijan 
Pipeline 
Baku to Tabriz (Iran) Proposed 200,000 bbl/d to 400,000 bbl/d N/A $500 million Proposed by TotalFinaElf. 
Iran Oil Swap 
Pipeline 
Neka (Iran) to Tehran 
(Iran) 
175,000 bbl/d, rising to 
370,000 bbl/d 208 miles 
$400 million to 
$500 million 
Under construction; oil will be delivered 
to Neka and swapped for an equivalent 
amount at the Iranian Persian Gulf coast. 
Kazakhstan-
China Pipeline 
Aktyubinsk 
(Kazakhstan) to 
Xinjiang (China) 
Proposed 400,000 bbl/d 
to 800,000 bbl/d 1,800 miles 
$3 billion to 
$3.5 billion 
Agreement 1997; feasibility study halted 
in September 1999 because Kazakhstan 
could not commit sufficient oil flows for 
the next 10 years. 
Kazakhstan- 
Turkmenistan-
Iran Pipeline 
Kazakhstan via 
Turkmenistan to Kharg 
Island (Iran) on Persian 
Gulf 
Proposed 1million bbl/d 930 miles $1.2 billion Feasibility study by TotalFinaElf; proposed completion date by 2005. 
Khashuri-
Batumi 
Pipeline 
Dubendi (Azerbaijan) 
via Khashuri (Georgia) 
to Batumi 
Initial 70,000 bbl/d, 
rising to 140,000 bbl/d-
160,000 bbl/d 
Rail system from 
Dubendi to 
Khashuri, then 
105-mile pipeline 
from Khashuri to 
Batumi 
$70 million for 
pipeline 
renovation 
ChevronTexaco has canceled plans to 
rebuild and expand the existing pipeline. 
Trans-Caspian 
(Kazakhstan 
Twin 
Pipelines) 
Aqtau (western 
Kazakhstan, on Caspian 
coast) to Baku; could 
extend to Ceyhan 
N/A 370 miles to Baku 
$2 billion to $4 
billion (if to 
Ceyhan) 
Feasibility study agreement signed in 
December 1998 by Royal/Dutch Shell, 
ChevronTexaco, ExxonMobil, and 
Kazakhstan; project stalled by lack of 
Caspian Sea legal agreement. 
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Table 5. Natural Gas Export Routes and Options in the Caspian Sea Region 
      
Baku-
Erzuru
m 
Baku (Azerbaijan) via Tbilisi 
(Georgia) to Erzurum 
(Turkey), linking with 
Turkish natural gas pipeline 
system 
Planned 254 
Bcf capacity 540 miles 
$1 billion 
(includes up to 
$500 million to 
construct new 
Azeri section) 
Financing being arranged, construction originally 
scheduled to start in summer 2002. 
"Centga
s" 
(Central 
Asia 
Gas) 
Daulatabad (Turkmenistan) 
via Herat (Afghanistan) to 
Multan (Pakistan). Could 
extend to India. 
700 Bcf/year 
870 miles to 
Multan 
(additional 
400 miles to 
India) 
$2 billion to 
Pakistan 
(additional $500 
million to India) 
Memorandum of Understanding signed by 
Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Uzbekistan. Presidents of Pakistan, Afghanistan, 
and Turkmenistan met in May 2002 to discuss 
reviving this pipeline idea. 
Central 
Asia-
Center 
Pipeline 
Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan via Kazakhstan 
to Saratov (Russia), linking 
to Russian natural gas 
pipeline system 
3.5 Tcf/year Existing route N/A 
Operational. Turkmenistan is using this pipeline to 
export a total of 8.83 Tcf to Ukraine (via Russia) 
from 2002 to 2006, as well as smaller amounts to 
Russia. 
China 
Gas 
Pipeline 
Turkmenistan to Xinjiang 
(China). Could extend to 
Japan. 
1 Tcf/year 
4,1,61 miles; 
more if to 
Japan 
$10 billion to 
China; more if to 
Japan 
Preliminary feasibility study done by ExxonMobil, 
Mitsubishi, and CNPC 
Trans-
Caspian 
Gas 
Pipeline 
(TCGP) 
Turkmenbashy 
(Turkmenistan) via Baku and 
Tbilisi to Erzurum, linking 
with Turkish natural gas 
pipeline system 
565 Bcf in first 
stage, 
eventually 
rising to 1.1 
Tcf/year 
1,020 miles $2 billion to $3 billion 
Project stalled; negotiations between Turkmenistan 
and Azerbaijan over pipeline volumes restarted in 
October 2001. 
Korpezh
e-Kurt-
Kui 
Korpezhe (Turkmenistan) to 
Kurt-Kui (Iran) 
283-350 
Bcf/year; 
expansion 
proposed to 459 
Bcf/year by 
2005 
124 miles 
$190 million; 2005 
expansion: $300 
million to $400 
million 
Operational since December 1997. 
                                           Table 6. Bosporus Bypass Oil Export Routes  (for Oil Transiting the Black Sea) 
      
Adria-
Druzhba 
Integration 
Russian Druzhba export pipeline 
connected to Adria pipeline (flows 
reversed) to terminus at Omisalj 
(Croatia) 
100,000 bbl/d in 
first full year of 
operation; 
increasing to 
300,000 bbl/d 
1,987 
miles 
in total 
$20 million to 
modernize Adria, 
integrate the 
pipelines, and 
reverse existing 
flows 
Yukos expects exports from Omisalj via the 
integrated pipeline system to start by end-
2002. 
Albanian 
Macedonia
n Bulgarian 
Oil 
(AMBO) 
Pipeline 
Burgas (Bulgaria) via Macedonia to 
Vlore (Albania) on Adriatic coast 
750,000 bbl/d 
(could be 
expanded to 1-
million bbl/d) 
560 
miles 
$850 million to $1.1 
billion 
Construction delayed, (proposed 2001-
2002) as financing is arranged. Completion 
originally targeted for 2004-2005. 
Burgas 
Alexandrop
oulis 
(Trans-
Balkan Oil 
Pipeline) 
Burgas to Alexandropoulis (Greece) 
on the Aegean Sea coast 
Proposed 600,000 
bbl/d to 800,000 
bbl/d 
178 
miles $600 million 
Initial agreement signed in 1997 between 
Bulgaria, Greece, and Russia. Project 
delayed. 
Constanta-
Trieste 
Pipeline 
Constanta (Romania) via Hungary, 
Slovenia, and/or Croatia to Trieste 
(Italy) on the Adriatic Sea coast. 
Omisalj (Croatia) has also been 
proposed as a terminus. 
660,000 bbl/d 855 miles $900 million 
Feasibility studies completed; financing still 
to be arranged. 
South-East 
European 
Line 
(SEEL) 
Constanta via Pancevo (Yugoslavia) 
and Omisalj to Trieste. Omisalj has 
also been proposed as a terminus. 
660,000 bbl/d 750 miles $800 million 
Feasibility studies completed; financing still 
to be arranged. 
Odesa-
Brody 
Pipeline 
Odesa (Ukraine) to Brody (Ukraine), 
linking to the southern Druzhba 
pipeline; optional  
spurs to the northern  
Druzhba line at Plotsk (Poland) 
and/or to Gdansk on the Baltic Sea  
500,000 bbl/d 
400 
miles 
from 
Odesa 
to 
Brody 
$750 million for 
pipeline and 
Pivdenny terminal 
Construction on pipeline completed in 
August 2001; Pivdenny terminal became 
operational in December 2001. Ukraine is 
seeking to sign contracts with Caspian oil 
exporters to fill the line. 
 
SOURCE: http:// www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspgrph.html     
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SOURCE: http://members.tripod.com/madsiz/pipeline.html 
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APPENDIX 6 
 
ILLEGAL ARMS TRANSFER IN FIGURES 
No 
               Name 
Price Per Item 
     Quantity      Total Cost 
  1 R-17 Missile Systems       210,000                        8          1.680.000 
 R-17 Missiles       210.000                      32          6.720.000 
  2 “Krug” Surface To Air Systems       300.000                      27          8.100.000 
 Missiles For Them       300.000                    349      104.700.000 
  3 Missiles For The “Osa” Surface To 
tems       200.000                      40          8.000.000 
  4 T-72 Tanks    1.200.000                      84       100.800.000 
  5 BMP-2 Armored Combat Vehicles         280.000                      50         14.000.000 
  6 122 Mm D-30 Howitzers         52.000                      36           1.872.000 
  7 155 Mm D-20 Howitzers         40.000                      18              720.000 
  8 152 Mm D-1 Howitzers         50.000                      18              900.000 
  9 “Grad” Multiple Missile Systems       250.000                      18           4.500.000 
 10 Mortars         12.000                      26              312.000 
 11 Portable “Igla” Anti-Aircraft  Systems         40.000                      40           1.600.000 
 Missiles For Them        40.000                    200           8.000.000 
 12 Grenade Launchers          2.500                      20                50.000 
 13 Machine-Guns             400                    306              122.400 
 14 Assault Rifles             120                 7.910              949.200 
 15 Pistols               60                 1.847              110.820 
 16 Shells             400             489.160       195.664.000 
 17 Shells For ACV (BMP-2)               30             478.480         14.354.400 
 18 BM Anti-Tank Self Targeting 
s      330.000                       4           1.320.000 
19 Anti-Tank Self-Targeting Missiles           8400                   945           7.938.000 
20 
Hand Grenades              
30 
           
345.800 
        
10.374.000 
21 
Different Types Of Bullets                
1 
    
227.253.000 
      
227.253.000 
22 
Other Types Of Weapons, 
Equipment And Military Property  
Approxim
ately              
 
27.000.000.000 
 
 
TOTAL                                                                          Approximately       $ 1 Billion 
 
 
SOURCE: Fatma Abdullazadeh, Karabakh, (“XXI” YNE: Baku,1999), p. 124. 
 
